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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The growth of the service sector and economy has been a remarkable trend during the past
50 years in the development of the world’s economy (Buera and Joseph, 2012). Nowadays,
according to the World Bank, service business contributes more than 70% of the GDP in many
countries1. For manufacturing companies, especially for producers of durable goods, providing
more and more product-related services has been a growing revenue stream. For example, as
shown in Table 1.1, service generates much more revenue for Rolls-Royce than the original
equipment (OM) during the past five years. The process of adding services into products is
widely referred as servitization (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988; Tukker and Tischner, 2006;
Kastalli and Looy, 2013; Smith et al., 2014). Under servitization, the importance of service
is highlighted and manufacturing companies have to constantly innovate their business model
and operational strategy for providing value-added services for customers (Fischer et al., 2014).
Servitization can be represented by several different business models (Cohen et al., 2006; Wang
et al., 2011).
• A product-oriented business model (item (1)(2)(4) in Table 1.2). The consumers buy
products and the manufacturers provide after-sales services which include repair, main-
tenance, product refurbishing, and recycle, etc.
1http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.ZS/
1
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Table 1.1: Key financial data of Rolls-Royce, 2013 (Rolls-Royce, 2013).
• A use-oriented business model (item (3) in Table 1.2). The manufacturers have the
ownership of products and provides the consumers with usage and function. Examples
include product leasing or sharing.
• An outcome-oriented business model (item (5)(6) in Table 1.2). The manufacturers deliver
solutions and results, and the consumers pay for performance or outcomes. “Power-by-
the-Hour”2 usage of the product can be an example of this case.
Table 1.2: Models of after-sales services (Cohen et al., 2006).
2http://www.rolls-royce.com/news/press releases/2012/121030 the Hour.jsp
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In response to the different business models for providing services, companies have different
service contracts with customers. In service management practice, such contracts typically
have one of the following structures.
Warranty. A warranty is a contractual agreement between the buyer and the manufacturer
upon the sale of the product. During the warranty period, the manufacturer has to guarantee
the availability of the product and failure recovery is free of charge for the customer. Warranty
contracts are broadly used in the sales of consumer durables (B2C, e.g. white goods, as shown in
item (2), Table 1.2) and industrial equipment (B2B, e.g., airplanes, production lines) (Murthy
and Djamaludin, 2002). For example, HP provides a one-year warranty for their laptops. During
warranty, parts and labor for repair are fully covered3. Another example is ASML that offers a
12 month warranty on their lithography systems for semiconductor manufacturing (Helleputte,
2014).
Transaction-based contracts. Under transaction-based contracts, customers have to pay for
service transactions, such as spare parts and labor, to the service providers. Time & Material
contracts are one example of the transaction-based contracts, under which customers pay for
the direct labor hours at specified fixed hourly rates and actual cost for materials4. An example
is the US Federal Transit Administration that uses Time & Material contracts for construction
of highways5. This type of contracts can be related to the business models given in item (1)
and item (4) in Table 1.2.
Performance-based contracts. Performance-based contracts (PBC) are becoming more
popular in recent years with the growth of the outcome-oriented business model. Under
performance-based contracts, suppliers conduct repair and maintenance for products, but the
service activities are not compensated by customers. Customers only pay for what they use, or
the predefined product performance, rather than the ownership of the physical assets6 (Hypko
et al., 2010). Currently, performance-based contracts are widely adopted in public service acqui-
sition (Hensher and Stanley, 2003; Fearnley et al., 2004), defence (DoD, 2003), airlines (Smith,
2013), industrial equipment7, advertisement (Dellarocas, 2012), and healthcare (Jiang et al.,
3http://www8.hp.com/us/en/support-drivers/total-care/totalcare-for-laptops.html
4http://www.niaid.nih.gov/researchfunding/sop/pages/contracttype.aspx
5http://construction.about.com/od/Cost-Control/a/Time-And-Material-Time-And-Materials-Contract.htm
6PBC can also be applied when a customer buys and owns the product, like item (5) in Table 1.2. Here the
“physical assets” mostly refer to the service related materials, such as spare parts. Under PBC, the customer
usually does not buy the parts but pays for performance.
7http://www.gtspower.com/Services/Power-as-a-Service
Chapter 1. Introduction 4
2012), etc. PBC can be related to the business models given in item (3), item (5), and item (6)
in Table 1.2.
Successful implementation of service contracts, especially for performance-based contracts, re-
quires managers to solve many challenging tasks such as performance management, service
resource management and supply chain coordination.
Performance measurement. Service performance can be measured by different indicators,
such as operational availability, operational reliability, and cost per unit usage, etc (Defense
Acquisition University, 2005). Although product availability is usually a key metric, different
ways to deal with the “unavailability” may result in various impact on the suppliers’ or the
customers’ benefits. For example, performance-based contracts can be executed based on pe-
nalizing under-performance. In such a case, suppliers have to pay penalties to the customers if
product downtime occurs, or have to compensate the customers’ revenue loss due to product
unavailability. On the other hand, performance-based contracts can also be conducted based
on uptime payment. The customers only pay for product uptime, and if the products are not
working, the suppliers do not receive payment during the time period of failure restoration.
Different payment schemes may have different impact on the suppliers’ decision-making for
managing service and product support.
Resource management. The resources of a company, such as spare parts and repair capacity,
are critical to the provision of after-sales service and product support. Product failures usually
occur randomly, and require either repair or replacement by spare parts. If suppliers can not
deliver the right parts at the right time due to stockouts or insufficient repair capacity, it may
not be possible to quickly restore products from system failures, and customers may suffer a
loss. On the other hand, if suppliers maintain high levels of spare parts and repair capacity, the
total operational cost increases, although a high product availability can be realized. Service
suppliers have to make the optimal decisions in trading off between cost and efficiency, in the
presence of different service contracts.
Supply chain coordination. For capital goods, the final product usually consists of many
subsystems and components, which are produced by part suppliers. As a consequence, the
performance of the final product is not purely affected by the final assembler, but also depends
on the part suppliers’ effort. However, in many cases, the part suppliers’ production and quality
control process can not be fully dictated by the final assembler who is responsible for supplying
service to the end customers. Therefore, appropriate incentive alignment methods need to be
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developed to coordinate the supply chain. Usually, the final assembler only buys parts from the
suppliers, and the suppliers are not involved in the after-sales service, except for selling spare
parts. In such a case, the part suppliers can not be incentivized to exert efforts on improving the
reliability of their products or on maintaining a high level of service capacity. In order to improve
the performance of the final product, managers need to design mechanisms to coordinate the
suppliers’ activity of product quality improvement and repair capacity management.
In this thesis, we study the aforementioned problems in the presence of different business models
in after-sales and product support management. The results derived from our models provide
managerial insights for managers to design service contracts and operate their service networks.
1.2 Contribution
By applying methods from economics (game theory and contract theory) to analyzing OM
(Operations Management) issues (service contracting), we make the following contributions to
literature.
• In Chapter 2, we incorporate the customer’s initial purchase decision of the number of
products into the model with after-sales service, where in most literature, product and
after-sales service are separated. We formulate a Stackelberg game model and analyze the
comparisons between Warranty + Transaction-based contracts with Performance-based
contracts with two different penalty terms. Furthermore, we incorporate the impact of
part obsolescence and Lifetime-buy planning into the decision model, which is, to our
knowledge, the first work to discuss this issue in such a setting.
• In Chapter 3, we study the supply chain coordination problem under Performance-based
contracts and come up with a penalty-sharing mechanism which can achieve the First
Best solution in coordinating the supply chain members’ activity. We contribute to the
quality management research in OM literature, where people normally focus on quality
control by inspection under a transaction-based framework. Our work is different as it
studies quality management along supply chains in the context of a Performance-based
contracting framework and proposes the channel coordination contract. Moreover, we also
discuss the efficiency loss under the more traditional price-only and cost sharing contracts.
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• In Chapter 4, we systematically compare service capacity setting under Time & Material
contracts and Performance-based contracts, where in literature, discussions are usually
given only under PBC. Moreover, we also incorporate the customer’s effort on product
failure prevention, which is usually discussed at the supplier’s end. In addition, we study
the uptime payment PBC, whereas in literature, PBC are usually formulated with a lump
sum + penalty structure.
1.3 Structure
The structure of this manuscript is as follows.
Chapter 2. Contracting for Products and After-sales Service When Components
Expire. In Chapter 2, we study joint contracting for durable products and the after-sales
service between a customer and a supplier, while the supplier simultaneously has to plan the
spare part inventory, as the part may expire. The customer makes decisions on how many
products to buy to satisfy the external demand. At the same time, the customer must take
the after-sales service into account since only working products can generate revenue. On the
supplier’s side, when selling the product, spare parts need to be well planned to service the
product, because those parts may expire and become difficult to reacquire once stockouts occur.
We establish game-theoretic models for the cases of Warranty + Transaction-based contracts
(W+T) and Performance-based contracts (PBC) with two different penalty terms and come
up with the equilibrium solutions. We find that a penalty on the customer’s lost revenue can
result in a higher product availability but a lower profit. W+T with longer warranty can be
more profitable if spare parts stockouts can be replenished at a low cost.
Chapter 3. Coordinating Product Support Supply Chains under Outcome-based
Compensations. In Chapter 3, we study the supply chain coordination problem under an
outcome-based contract for product support. In our setting, the final product is assembled
from parts which are manufactured by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and the
supplier. As a result, the quality of the final product is affected by the effort of the supplier
and the OEM, who is responsible for servicing the end customer but cannot directly control the
supplier’s quality management activity. We formulate Principle-Agent models to fit the moral
hazard setting and capture the supply chain members’ decisions under price-only contracts,
repair cost sharing contracts, and penalty sharing contracts. We show that penalty sharing
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contracts can lead to the First Best solutions which coordinate the supply chain, while price-
only contracts and repair cost sharing contracts result in efficiency loss due to over-investment
in service capacity and under-investment in part failure rate reduction. The results hold even
when repair capacity is decentralized or the final product is nonseparable.
Chapter 4. Contract Choice for Product Support. In Chapter 4, we compare Time &
Material contracts (T&M) and Performance-based contracts with downtime penalty (PBC-P)
and Performance-based contracts with uptime payment (PBC-U). Under PBC-P, the customer
pays the supplier a lump sum and the supplier pays a penalty to the customer based on the
product downtime; under PBC-U, the customer pays the supplier based on the product uptime.
We show that if the supply chain members are risk neutral, equal profits can be realized across
contracts for the supplier. If the supplier becomes risk averse to the profit variance caused by
uncertainty of product failures, PBC-P are the best contract for the supplier while T&M are
better than PBC-U if the product failure rate is high. PBC-P also dominate when the customer
exerts effort on reducing the product failure rate, and T&M lead to the lowest profit in this
case.
Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Research. In this chapter, we draw conclusions of the
thesis and discuss potential directions for future research.
1.4 Co-authorship
The main body of this thesis (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4) is written based on the
output of the author’s research work done during his Ph.D. study at Rotterdam School of
Management, Erasmus University. The author’s contribution mainly includes idea generation,
problem identification, model formulation, result analysis and discussion, and thesis (all chap-
ters) writing. Dr. Nishant Mishra (Erasmus University) acts as the daily supervisor and is
fully involved in the whole research process. Besides, Professor Serguei Netessine (INSEAD)
contributes to idea development and model evaluation for the research in Chapter 4. Professor
Rene de Koster (Erasmus University) acts as the promoter and gives valuable suggestions on the
general orientation of the research and polishes all the chapters throughout this thesis. Further-
more, Professor Geert-Jan van Houtum (Eindhoven University of Technology), Dr. Vladimir
Karamychev (Erasmus University), and Professor Serguei Netessine (INSEAD) acting as the
members of the author’s Ph.D. committee, review the entire manuscript and come up with
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many insightful comments. Finally, the Chapter Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) is written
by Tim Lamballais Tessensohn (Erasmus University) by translating the Chapter Summary.
Chapter 2
Contracting for Products and
After-sales Service When Components
Expire
2.1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, after-sales support activities have been acknowledged as a relevant source
of revenue, profit and competitive advantage in most manufacturing industries (Cohen et al.,
2006). The after-sales service market for durables has been found to be up to four or five times
larger than the market for new products (Bundschuh and Dezvane, 2003), and is responsible
for 40%-50% of profits of the companies (Dennis and Kambil, 2003). For the customers, after-
sales support for durables is significant because product downtime can result in huge loss
in revenue, productivity, and even reputation1. As such, acquisition of products is usually
accompanied by considering the after-sales services in the customers’ purchasing plan. On the
other hand, the suppliers have been changing their business models, from selling products and
services separately to combining products and services as a package to better satisfy customers’
requirements (Sawhney et al., 2004; Cook et al., 2006). With the advent of servitization, which
is defined as the process of adding service to products to add value (Vandermerwe and Rada,
1988), both the suppliers and the customers no longer view products and services apart, but
1e.g., see http://www.dba-oracle.com/art dbazine high avail.htm
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focus on the “solutions” which are delivered by integrating products and services (Cohen et al.,
2006).
Spare parts are critical to operating product support because whether the defective components
can be replaced timely determines the overall product availability. For spare parts management,
life cycle mismatch brings about many challenging jobs for managers (Bradley and Guerrero,
2008). Components may become obsolete quickly due to rapid technological changes, the mar-
ket, or new regulations, while the products are intended to be in service for decades. For
example, it is estimated that 60% of the integrated circuits on aerospace products become
obsolete within five years2. Shortage of parts may result in significant challenges to product
support and increase maintenance costs for the supply chain partners. Mitigating part obsoles-
cence may include redesigning a system or reverse engineering, sourcing parts from the third
party aftermarket, and Lifetime-buy. A Lifetime-buy is a purchase decision which is made by
the part buyers (the supplier in our model) to purchase a sufficient volume of parts to sustain
the product for its life (Bradley and Guerrero, 2009). In practice, Lifetime-buy is a strategy
adopted in “nearly every electronic part obsolescence management program no matter what
other reactive or pro-active strategies are being followed (Feng et al., 2007)”.
The after-sales service contracts for durables usually consists of warranty and an extended
service period. Under warranty, the supplier has to guarantee full availability of products with
free repair service. After that, the supplier offers services based on per-transaction activities,
i.e., the supplier charges a service fee for each repair. We call this type of service contracts
“Warranty + Transaction-based contracts” (hereafter W+T). More recently, Performance-based
contracts (hereafter PBC), which allow the customers to only pay for outcomes, have been
increasingly adopted in both public and private sectors. For example, PBL (Performance-based
Logistics) now becoming an almost mandatory acquisition model for service and maintenance
in the defense industry in several countries (DoD, 2003; Phillips, 2005; Aerospace Systems
Division, 2007). In commercial sectors, KLM equipment services offers a “power by the hour”
arrangement, which allows customers to pay only for the number of hours they actually use3.
Another example is Honeywell’s mobile power solution, which “allows customers to pay for
their battery power as it is used, effectively turning battery power into a fixed recurring expense
instead of a periodic (and often unplanned for) capital expenditure4”. The essence of PBC is
buying performance outcomes, not individual parts and repair actions (Kim et al., 2007). Under
2see http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero 10/elect textonly.html
3see http://www.afiklmem.com/AFIKLMEM/en/g page news/300414AIRCHINA GE90.html
4see http://www.honeywellbatteries.com/powerbythehour.html
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PBC, suppliers are usually penalized if product unavailability occurs. Furthermore, managing
part obsolescence is also an important issue under PBC. For example, the US government is
planning to use more PBL contracts to deal with electronics obsolescence5.
In the context of the aforementioned business setting, we build a dynamic game-theoretic model
to study the problem of joint acquisition of products and the after-sales service under W+T or
PBC in a supply chain, where the customer decides on product order quantity; the supplier plans
Lifetime-buy quantity of critical parts which are tend to be obsolete, to guarantee operation of
the products, and set the contract terms. By analyzing the equilibrium solutions, we find that
different penalty terms under PBC may create different incentives for the supplier. Given the
same number of spare parts, the supplier compensating the customer’s lost revenue can lead to
lower profits, compared to paying a penalty based on the number of spare parts stockouts. If the
supplier can voluntarily set the Lifetime-buy quantity, compensating the customer’s lost revenue
may lead to an overstock on spare parts and lower efficiency, although product availability is
higher. In addition, we also compare PBC with W+T. We find that PBC are not always
dominate W+T. Warranty can improve the overall product availability, but the benefit is also
affected by the part reacquisition cost. We show that if it is easy and cheap to reacquire the
part, W+T can result in higher profits than PBC, even with few spare parts and long warranty.
However, if the reacquisition cost is high, profits under long-warranty W+T may be lower than
PBC.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After a brief literature review in §2.2,
We describe the problem setting in §2.3. In §2.4, we formulate the contracting decision models
under W+T and PBC. Subsequently, in §2.5 and §2.6, we investigate the problem when the
quantity of spare parts are exogenously and endogenously specified, respectively. We then give
some extensions of the model in §2.7 by discussing a special case of a full warranty contract,
checking the robustness of the results given other type of revenue functions, and introducing
risk aversion. In §2.8, we conclude the results of this chapter.
5see http://www.kmimediagroup.com/military-logistics-forum/172-mlf-2009-volume-3-issue-5/1607-
obsolescence-management.html
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2.2 Literature Review
This chapter relates to the literature of supply chain contracting, after-sales service, and part
obsolescence management. First, there are many papers in OM (Operations Management) liter-
ature studying production/capacity decision and contracting problems in decentralized supply
chains. For example, Anupindi et al. (2001) develop a general framework for the analysis of
decentralized distribution systems on inventory allocation problems. Bernstein and Federgruen
(2005) investigate the equilibrium behavior of decentralized supply chains with competing re-
tailers under demand uncertainty. Bassamboo et al. (2010) examine the classical problem of
capacity and flexible technology selection with a newsvendor network model of resource port-
folio investment. In addition, Lariviere and Porteus (2001) analyze a wholesale price-only
contract of coordinating supply chains with newsvendor retailers. Krishnan et al. (2004) dis-
cuss buy back contracts in supply chain with retailer promotional effort. Cachon and Lariviere
(2005) summarize revenue sharing contracts in general supply chain models. Plambeck and
Taylor (2005) study quantity flexibility contracts with more than one downstream firm and
ex-post renegotiation. Cachon (2004) gives a comprehensive review in supply chain contracts
research. Examples of more recent works are (Ha et al., 2011; Krishnan and Winter, 2010;
Shin and Tunca, 2010), etc. Although following similar modelling and analyzing methods, our
work differentiates previous papers by introducing spare parts and product availability into the
decisions for product quantity, which is oftentimes ignored in previous works. In this chapter,
we study the setting where the customer has to consider the after-sales service when making
decisions on product order quantities for durable goods, because only working products can
generate revenue for the customer.
Secondly, there are also related articles studying after-sales service. Cohen and Whang (1997)
develop a product life-cycle model that studies a set of strategic choices facing manufacturers
as they design the joint product/service bundle for a product which may require maintenance
and repair support after its sale. Iyer (1998) analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate
distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such
as the provision of product information, free repair, faster check-out, or after-sales service. In
particular, some recent papers look at PBC issues. For example, Kim et al. (2007) analyze two
practically important issues of contracting in service supply chains – performance requirement
allocation and risk sharing. Kim et al. (2010) study how the low rate of system disruption
influences the efficiency of PBL contracts with two different measurements. Bakshi et al. (2015)
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examine reliability signaling under Performance-based contracts and Resource-based contract.
What is new in this chapter is as follows. In (Kim et al., 2007) and (Bakshi et al., 2015), parts
are assumed to be repairable, thus replenishment is not necessarily needed. However, in this
chapter, we focus on the components like electronics which are normally scrapped once failed,
and furthermore, due to the obsolescence risk, replenishing those parts may become problematic.
Another difference is that in those papers, product order quantity is not considered or assumed
to be an exogenous parameter. In this chapter, we incorporate the customer’s order quantity
decisions in the contracting model, rather than only consider after-sales service. Besides, we
also look at different penalty terms under PBC and find out the different impact on product
availability and contract efficiency.
Finally, the model in this chapter also relates to spare parts inventory and part obsolescence
management, especially with Lifetime-buy decisions. For spare parts inventory management,
Muckstadt (2005) gives comprehensive reviews on the models and algorithms of inventory plan-
ning. On the other hand, Bradley and Guerrero (2009) investigate optimal Lifetime-buy de-
cisions in a setting with multiple obsolete parts. Unlike those papers, the main focus in this
chapter is not giving optimal spare parts inventory control policies, but is exploring how ex-
pired spare parts impact product availability and the supply chain members’ profits, when the
product and service are provided under different type of contracts.
In summary, we make the following contributions to literature. First of all, we capture the
decision for joint purchasing of the products and the after-sales services in the model, where
revenue is impacted by product availability. Secondly, we investigate the impact of part ob-
solescence on contracting decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
studies the impact of Lifetime-buy planning on the comparison of service contracts. Finally,
within PBC, we compare two forms of penalty schemes: penalty on lost revenue and penalty
on spare parts stockouts and show how each type of penalty can affect inventory decision and
profits.
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2.3 Model Setting
2.3.1 Problem Description
Consider a two-player supply chain consisting of one customer (she) and one supplier (he), who
are both risk neural, as shown in Figure 2.1. The customer needs to buy some identical durable
products to generate revenue by satisfying the external demand that she faces. The product
typically consists of subsystems or parts. The supplier is the final assembler of the product
and the only after-sales service provider (which is a reasonable assumption with regards to
particularly critical equipments and services, due to the complex and proprietary nature of the
products). During the long life cycle of the product, some critical components may fail, which
leads to product downtime. As the after-sales service provider, the supplier has to plan and stock
spare parts so that failed components can be replaced. The problem becomes more challenging
when those components (especially like the electronic components) become obsolete due to
various factors such as rapid technological or the market changes. Component obsolescence
implies that its manufacturer discontinues the production or supply, and reacquiring those
components usually incurs much higher cost as this is generally done via remanufacturing or
via sourcing from other spare parts sellers.
To mitigate the risk of component obsolescence, a Lifetime-buy strategy is adopted by the sup-
plier. The supplier buys a certain number of components as spare parts before they become
obsolete to cover the total maintenance and service demand for the entire life of the product.
In the model, we assume that when contracting with the customer to sell the product, the sup-
plier considers the obsolescence issue and incorporates the Lifetime-buy cost into his planning;
however, at that time, the components may have not been obsolete yet. We make such an as-
sumption based on the following reasons. First, the time period that the electronic components
become obsolete is usually much shorter compared to the life cycle of the product. For exam-
ple, the life cycles of OTS (off-the-shelf) electronic parts, such as memory and microprocessors,
oftentimes last on the order of 2 years. But the product, such as communication equipment
and large Internet routers, can be used for 20 years or more (Bradley and Guerrero, 2009).
Moreover, we also observe that “designers frequently find that components and technologies
have been made obsolete before the newly designed equipment is ready for production (Tren-
chard, 2005)”. Second, the time when the components expire is sometimes unknown. Although
some part manufacturers may give End-of-life notice to the buyers, “electronic parts can also be
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made obsolete with little or no warning” (Bradley and Guerrero, 2008). So the supplier has to
plan in advance to avoid such unexpected situation. Since reacquiring the obsolete components
is usually very expensive, obsolescence issue has become one of the main costs in the life cycle
of long-field life systems. Due to the above reasons, before signing the contract, it is necessary
for the supplier to include the obsolescence cost within his budget planning (Rojo et al., 2010).
Because only working products can generate revenue for the customer, she also takes product
availability and the after-sales service into account when buying the product, i.e., contracts are
designed with regards to both the product and the after-sales support. In this chapter, the
product and service are delivered based on two type of contracts - W+T and PBC. We assume
the service contract period (i.e., the life cycle of the product) is [0, T ], where at time 0, the
products start to be used by the customer. Under W+T, the supplier charges price p for each
product and offers a certain period of warranty. Let t, t < T be the warranty duration. Under
warranty, i.e., during [0, t], the supplier repairs all the product failures free of charge. After
warranty, i.e., (t, T ] is the period of the transaction-based contract. The supplier charges ps
for each repair which includes replacement of failed parts. Under PBC, theoretically, there are
no specific prices for products or services. The customer pays the supplier for the products’
real performance during the contract period. In this chapter, we use the “initial payment +
penalty” as the structure of the PBC, which is common in the literature (e.g., Kim et al., 2007).
The supplier first charges an initial payment w for each product. During the contract period,
if product failures can not be repaired due to spare parts stockout, the supplier has to pay
corresponding penalties to the customer. Penalties can be based on the number of spare parts
stockouts B or the customer’s revenue loss RL (if all product failures are repaired, there will
be no loss for the customer). Let κ be the penalty rate, then the supplier’s penalty is κB or
κRL. In the former, κ > 0 and in the latter, κ ∈ [0, 1]. In this chapter, we assume κ can be set
by the supplier or exogenously given (e.g., by negotiation).
The business event sequence is as depicted in Figure 2.1. First, both of the supplier and the
customer observe the external demand. Then the supplier gives the contract terms (p, ps under
W+T or w, κ under PBC). After that, the customer gives the order quantity N . We assume
that N takes continuous values, which is a common approximation in game theoretic models
(Cachon and Netessine, 2004). Then the supplier delivers the product to the customer and
starts to provide after-sales service. Meanwhile, he also plans for the amount of Lifetime-buy
for the spare parts. Although there can be multiple components in one product, we assume there
is one critical component which can lead to product failure once it is defective. Furthermore,
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Figure 2.1: Sequence of events.
the component may become obsolete6. The one-component assumption is also used in OM
literature (e.g., Kim and Netessine, 2013). Let s be the Lifetime-buy quantity of the spare
parts and δ ≡ s/N . We call δ the Lifetime-buy ratio in this chapter. We allow for δ to be
exogenously or endogenously specified. Exogenous δ would represent the case when critical
components are mandated to be purchased by the supplier for servicing the product and the
quantity of the components is specified exogenously, whereas endogenous δ would capture the
case when the supplier can set the number of spare parts in stock based on his service plan.
During the after-sales contract period, once part failure occurs, the supplier will replace the
failed parts with the working units stocked in the spare parts inventory. We assume that failed
parts are scrapped, which is often the case for electronic components (such as processors and
memory chips) that can no longer be economically repaired. However, if spare parts are run out
when a part is failed, a stockout occurs. The supplier will make different reactions depending
on the types of contacts.
6For the components without the obsolescence issues, replenishment is normally not a problem. Then, the
shortage of those components does not have big impact on product availability since they can be replenished
quickly. In this chapter, we focus on the components which can become obsolete and thus have a much bigger
impact on product availability and the supply chain members’ profit. However, if considering multiple com-
ponents with heterogeneous failure rates and all those parts may become obsolete, the model becomes highly
complex and intractable for game-theoretic analysis.
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(i) Under W+T, if spare parts stockout occurs within the period of warranty, the supplier has
to reacquire the parts since he has to guarantee a full product availability. If stockout occurs
after warranty, the supplier is not obliged to repair all the failures, although repairing failed
parts can be a revenue stream for the supplier7.
(ii) Under PBC, if spare parts stockout occurs, the supplier pays a penalty to the customer for
product unavailability. As stated above, the penalty can be based on the number of stockouts
or a proportion of the customer’s lost revenue. The supplier maintains the products and at the
end of the contract period, performance is measured based on the overall product availability
and payment is made according to the contract.
When planning for after-sales service and setting the contract terms, the supplier’s cost structure
is as follows. The unit production cost of the whole product for is cp. The unit production cost
of the critical component, i.e, the unit Lifetime-buy price is cs. Once the component becomes
obsolete, the unit reacquisition cost is cr, cr ≥ cs. The supplier also incurs the holding cost of
leftover inventory ch if not all the parts are used.
Particularly, we assume commitment is not an issue in the analysis. In other words, We do
not consider default or incomplete fulfil of contracts. Specifically, for the proposed number of
spare parts, the commitment can be ensured in some ways. For example, under W+T, the
customer can ask the supplier to show the payment for the predefined number of spare parts
before paying for the products to the supplier. Under PBC, as long as spare parts shortage
occurs, the supplier has to pay a penalty. So the supplier has no incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium solution. On the other hand, if the supplier refuses to replenish the spare parts
and repair the failed product during warranty, court action may be initiated by the customer.
Then, the supplier may have to pay a huge fine because of the default. Also, loss of reputation
may make the supplier lose more customers in the long run. Such default is not commonly seen
in manufacturing industry.
Finally, we first assume that both the customer and the supplier are risk neutral and maximize
their expected profit. In §2.7.3, we introduce risk aversion for both players.
7The supplier may also incur a cost related to the loss of goodwill. In our model, this cost is ignored.
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2.3.2 Product Availability
The critical components are subject to random failures during the process of running. Normally
a Poisson process is formulated to model the failure process. However, the discrete distribution
will cause tractability issues for our game-theoretic analysis. Following literature such as (Kim
et al., 2007; Zipkin, 2000), we approximate the failure occurrence by a continuous process. Let
x denote the average number of failures of the N components in unit time. We assume that
x ∈ [0,∞) is a continuous random variable with density function f(x), and distribution F (x).
F (0) = 0, lim
x→∞
F (x) = 1, and F (x) is continuously differentiable with respect to (w.r.t.) x
in [0,∞). Then, the number of failed components, i.e., the demand for spare parts in a time
duration ∆τ is Nx∆τ .
If there are no spare parts available when a failure occurs and no replenishment is made, the
product then becomes unavailable. The number of working products at time τ is denoted by
Nv(τ). We define product availability as A =
∫ T
0
Nv(τ)dτ. Let AP (δ, T ) and AW+T (δ, t, T ) be
the expected product availability under PBC and W+T (we use the subscript W + T and P
to represent W+T and PBC throughout this chapter). We have the properties summarized in
Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1. (1) AP (δ, T ) is increasing and concave in δ. AW+T (δ, t, T ) is increasing
in δ and t, for t ∈ (0, T ).
(2) Given the same value of δ, AW+T (δ, t, T ) ≥ AP (δ, T ).
The proof can be found in Appendix C.
The results in Proposition 2.1 can be explained as follows. Since downtime only occurs when
no spare parts are available, product availability increases in stock quantity δ. Under W+T,
warranty implies 100% uptime. Thus product availability increases in the duration of warranty
t. Finally, product availability under W+T is higher than under PBC, because warranty in
W+T increases the overall uptime.
2.3.3 Revenue Function
We model the customer’s revenue R, as a quadratic function in the number of working products.
Specifically, R =
∫ T
0
r(τ)Nv(τ)dτ , where r(τ) = ξ −Nv(τ). r(τ) is the revenue generated per
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working product. ξ represents the stochastic demand and has mean D and variance V ar(ξ).
We assume that ξ is independent of x. The form of the revenue rate r(τ) implies that it is
increasing in the external demand ξ and and decreasing in the number of working products (as
more working products would result in a lower per-unit revenue if demand is fixed). To rule out
triviality, we also assume that ξ takes values no less than N so that r(τ) cannot be negative.
Additive or multiplicative shocks with linear inverse demand function are often used in the
literature, e.g., (Anupindi and Jiang, 2008). Then we have the expected revenue functions
under PBC and W+T as E[RP ] = DNA1(δ, T )−N2A2(δ, T ) and E[RW+T ] = DNA3(δ, t, T )−
N2A4(δ, t, T ), where A1(δ, T ) = AP (δ, T ) A2(δ, T ) = E[AP 2], A3(δ, t, T ) = AW+T (δ, t, T ) and
A4(δ, t, T ) = E[AW+T 2]8.
Our insights do not change when we consider other forms of the revenue function, such as the
Cobb-Douglas function or a newsvendor-type framework discussed in §2.7.2.1 and §2.7.2.2. For
a list of notations, please refer to Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: List of notations.
p Unit price of the product x Average number of failures in unit time
ps Price for each repair service C, C Total costs, normalized expected total costs
w Initial payment under PBC B, B Spare parts stockouts, normalized expected stockouts
κ Penalty rate under PBC L Spare parts leftover
N Product order quantity A Product availability (PA)
cp Unit production cost of the product A1, A2 Expected PA , E[A2] under W+T
cs Unit Lifetime-buy cost of spare parts A3, A4 Expected PA , E[A2] under PBC
cr Unit reacquisition cost of spare parts ξ, D External demand, E[ξ]
s Lifetime-buy spare parts quantity R The customer’s revenue
δ s/N , Lifetime-buy ratio r Unit revenue rate of working product
T Contract period Π, pi Profit of the supply chain, profit of the supplier/customer
t Duration of warranty E Efficiency
8Expectations are w.r.t. all the random parameters throughout this chapter.
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2.4 Contracting
As described in §2.3, the Lifetime-buy ratio δ, can be decided exogenously or endogenously. In
practice, the former case represents the setting when some critical parts are mandated to be
stocked with the product, or the supplier has various service levels at different prices. In the
latter case, δ can be set by the supplier himself. We start by looking at the First Best solution as
the benchmark, i.e., the case of an integrated supply chain. After that, we discuss the decision
problems of the decentralized setting, where the customer and the supplier maximize their own
profits.
2.4.1 First Best
In the centralized decision-making setting, the integrated firm solves for the optimal order
quantity of the products and Lifetime-buy quantity of spare parts (in case of exogenous δ) that
maximize the expected profit, which is the difference between the expected total revenue and
the expected total costs. The firm’s decision problem can be written as
max
N, (δ)
E[ΠSC ] = E(R)− E[Ncp +Nδcs + chL], (2.1)
where L = N(δ − xT )+, is the leftover inventory after the contract period. The total costs con-
sist of production cost of the products, spare parts (Lifetime-buy) inventory cost, and inventory
leftover holding cost. (δ) means δ can be exogenous or endogenous. This also applies to the
decentralized cases. In addition, let N0 be the optimal order quantity, and δ0 be the optimal
Lifetime-buy ratio for the supply chain. By solving the optimization problem in Equation (2.1),
we have the optimal solutions as given in Table 2.2, where C(δ, T ) = E[Ncp +Nδcs + chL]/N ,
and A′(·) is the function of the first derivative w.r.t. δ.
We assume D is large enough to ensure a positive order quantity N0. We use the First
Best solution as the benchmark for the analysis of contract efficiency in the decentralized
setting. We define the efficiency E as the ratio of the supply chain’s profit at equilibrium in
the decentralized setting with respect to the maximum profit in the centralized setting, i.e.,
EW+T/P = Π
∗
W+T/P/Π
0. Next, we formulate the decision problems in the decentralized setting
under W+T and PBC.
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Table 2.2: Optimal solution of the First Best case.
Exogenous δ Endogenous δ
δ0 -
DA
′
1(δ
0,T )−C′ (δ0,T )
DA1(δ0,T )−C(δ0,T ) =
A
′
2(δ
0,T )
2A2(δ0,T )
N0 DA1(δ,T )−C(δ,T )
2A2(δ,T )
DA1(δ0,T )−C(δ0,T )
2A2(δ0,T )
Π0 [DA1(δ,T )−C(δ,T )]
2
4A2(δ,T )
[DA1(δ0,T )−C(δ0,T )]2
4A2(δ0,T )
2.4.2 Warranty + Transaction-based Contract
Under W+T, the supplier sells the products with a certain warranty period t. We assume t is
an exogenous parameter. Once the warranty period expires, the service is operated under TBC,
where the supplier can repair the product on a per-transaction basis. The supplier can thus
generate additional profit by servicing the product. From the sequence of events in Figure 2.1,
we know that the supplier makes decisions on the price of the product (including warranty) p
and the price of service ps in TBC (and δ if endogenous). The customer decides on N , i.e., how
many products to buy given the supplier’s prices. The supplier’s problem under W+T can be
written as
max
p,ps,(δ)
E(pisW+T ) = N∗W+Tp+ E[S(N∗W+T , δ, t, T )]ps − E[CW+T (N∗W+T , δ, t, T )]
s.t.
N∗W+T = arg maxE[picW+T (N)],
E[picW+T (N)] = E(RW+T )−Np− psE[S(N, δ, t, T )].
(2.2)
where S(N, δ, t, T ) = min{N(δ − xt)+, Nx(T−t)}, which is the number spare parts used during
TBC (the minimum function guarantees the supplier cannot sell more parts than needed); and
CW+T (N
∗
W+T , δ, t, T ) is the supplier’s total costs under W+T. Since the supplier has to repair
any failures during the warranty period, he might incur the cost of reacquisition. The spare
parts stockouts during warranty can be calculated as BW = N(xt− δ)+. Then total costs for
the supplier can be expressed as CW+T (N, δ, t, T ) = Ncp + Nδcs + chL + crBW , i.e., the sum
of production cost of the products, Lifetime-buy cost of spare parts, leftover inventory holding
cost, and the reacquisition cost. In addition, we use superscripts c and s to denote the customer
and the supplier respectively throughout this chapter.
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2.4.3 Performance-based Contract
Under PBC, we model the payments between the customer and the supplier via an “initial
payment + penalty” type of mechanism. Here the supplier charges the customer a fee w for
delivering the product, and is penalized by the customer if under-performance (measured by
product unavailability) occurs. We capture the performance-based characteristic by considering
two forms of penalty: the supplier can compensate a proportion of the customer’s lost revenue
(PBC-L), or be penalized on the number of stockouts of spare parts (PBC-B). The decision
variables for the supplier are the initial payment w and the penalty rate κ (and δ if endogenous).
And the customer still decides on the order quantity N .
(i) Under PBC-L, the supplier’s problem can be written as
max
w,(κ),(δ)
E(pisPL) = N∗PLp− κE[RL]− E[CP (N∗PL, δ, T )]
s.t.
N∗PL = arg maxE[picPL(N)],
E[picPL(N)] = E[RP ] + κE[RL]−Nw,
(0 ≤ κ ≤ 1).
(2.3)
where the customer’s lost revenue RL =
∫ T
0
(ξ −N)Ndτ − ∫ T
0
[ξ −Nv(τ)]Nv(τ)dτ , i.e., the dif-
ference between the revenue when all N products are working and when product unavailability
possibly occurs (Nv(τ) ≤ N(τ) for τ ∈ [0, T ]).
(ii) Under PBC-B, the supplier’s problem can be written as
max
w,(κ),(δ)
E(pisPB) = N∗PBp− κE[B(N∗PB, δ, T )]− E[CP (N∗PB, δ, T )]
s.t.
N∗PB = arg maxE[picPB(N)],
E[picPB(N)] = E[RP ] + κE[B(NPB, δ, T )]−Nw.
(2.4)
where B(N, δ, T ) = N(xT − δ)+, is the number of stockouts during the entire contract period.
The supplier’s costs under PBC CP (N, δ, T ) = Ncp+Nδcs+chL. Since there is no reacquisition
cost, we can verify that E[CW+T ] ≥ E[CP ].
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Next, we discuss the solutions of the games under the different contracts and analyze how the
decisions are impacted by the parameters.
2.5 Analysis with Exogenous δ
Solving the decision problems formulated by Equations (2.2)-(2.4), we derive the equilibrium
solutions for the cases under both contracts, which is stated as Lemmas below.
Lemma 2.2. (1) Under W+T, the customer’s profit function is concave in N ; the supplier’s
profit function incorporating the customer’s decision is concave in p and in ps.
(2) Under W+T, the supplier’s optimal solution is a price combination p̂∗, given as p̂∗ = p∗+
p∗sS(δ, t, T ) =
DA3(δ,t,T )+CW+T (δ,t,T )
2
, where S(δ, t, T ) = E[S(N, δ, t, T )]/N , and CW+T (δ, t, T ) =
E[CW+T (N, δ, t, T )]/N .
(3) The customer’s optimal order quantity N∗W+T =
DA3(δ,t,T )−CW+T (δ,t,T )
4A4(δ,t,T )
.
(4) ∂p̂∗/∂δ > 0, and ∂p̂∗/∂t > 0.
The proof can be found in Appendix D.
At equilibrium, the prices are not unique and the supplier can choose from a menu of different
product and service prices in order to satisfy an overall price for the product-service package.
This is because the supplier makes a profit from selling both the product and the service. As
a result, he can choose different combinations of the two prices depending on the customer’s
preference. For instance, the supplier may set a lower product price but a relatively higher
service price to appeal to customers who prefer low purchasing cost and trust the reliability of
the products. On the other hand, he can also set a higher product price and a lower service
price for customers who focus more on the maintenance cost. From Lemma 2.2, we also know
that prices are increasing in the number of spare parts stocks, and the length of warranty.
This is because any increase of spare parts or the warranty duration implies extra cost for the
supplier, which would induce the supplier to charge a higher price. Furthermore, we can verify
∂N∗W+T/∂D > 0, ∂pˆ
∗/∂D > 0, implying that the growth of external demand leads to higher
order quantity and higher prices.
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On the other hand, we can verify that the total cost CW+T is convex in δ. If cs + chF (
δ
T
) >
cr[1 − F ( δt )], CW+T is increasing in δ, otherwise decreasing in δ. The intuition behind this
inequality is that if the cost of stockout is higher than the cost of Lifetime-buy and leftover
inventory holding cost, more inventory before obsolescence actually decreases the total costs.
However, when the reacquisition cost is lower compared to the costs of Lifetime-buy plus leftover
holding, the total costs increases with δ. Furthermore, we have ∂pˆ∗/∂t ≥ 0, which implies that
a longer warranty period results in a higher transaction price. This confirms the intuition that
the customer has to pay a higher price for a longer warranty.
Next, Lemma 2.3 gives the solutions for PBC.
Lemma 2.3. (1) Under PBC, the customer’s profit function is concave in N ; the supplier’s
profit function is concave in w, regardless of penalty terms (lost revenue or the number of
stockouts).
(2) Under PBC-L, κ∗ = 0 if it can be set endogenously by the supplier. Otherwise, w∗ =
Dκ2T (T−A1)+DA2[(2−κ)κT+(1−κ)2A1]+[κT+A2(1−κ)]CP
κT+(2−κ)A1 . In addition, ∂w
∗/∂κ > 0.
(3) Under PBC-B, the supplier’s optimal solution is given as w∗−κ∗B(δ, T ) = DA1(δ,T )+CP (δ,T )
2
,
where B(δ, T ) = E[B(N, δ, T )]/N and CP (δ, T ) = E[CP (N, δ, T )]/N .
(4) Under PBC-L, endogenous κ and PBC-B, the customer’s order quantity N∗PB = N
∗
PL =
DA1(δ,T )−CP (δ,T )
4A2(δ,T )
. Under PBC-L, exogenous κ, the customer’s order quantity N∗PL =
[DA1(δ,T )−CP (δ,T )]2
4κT+4(2−κ)A2(δ,T ) .
The proof can be found in Appendix E.
From Lemma 2.3, we can see that the contract terms are different if penalty is incurred on
different performance measures. If the supplier pays a stockout penalty, similarly to the prices
under W+T, he will create contract terms w∗ and κ∗ as a combination based on demand and
costs. The difference is that under W+T, a higher price of product+warranty implies a lower
service fee in TBC; while under PBC-B, a higher initial price results in a higher penalty rate.
If the penalty is incurred on lost revenue, the optimal penalty rate is 0, if it can be set by the
supplier. The optimal initial payment in this case equals the price combination under PBC-B.
Even if the customer receives no penalty from the supplier, it is the optimal solution for the
customer, the supplier and the supply chain. When the supplier is forced to compensate more
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for lost revenue, i.e., the penalty rate is exogenously specified, we have ∂w∗/∂κ > 0, which
means the intimal payment is increasing in the penalty rate.
For the total costs under PBC, ∂CP (δ, T )/∂δ > 0. So the total costs are monotonously increas-
ing in δ. This is because under PBC, the supplier does not incur any direct replenishment cost,
but pays a penalty which is incorporated in the contract terms.
Although we have shown the impact of δ and t on the contract terms (prices/penalty rate), it
is not straightforward to see how the Lifetime-buy ratio affects profits. We discuss this issue in
the next section.
2.5.1 Comparison of Contracts
After we obtain the equilibrium solutions for the contract terms and the customer’s order
quantity, we can have the maximal profits for the supplier, the customer, and the supply chain.
In particular, at equilibrium, the customer and the supplier shares a proportion of the supply
chain’s profit. In the sequel, We refer “profits” to the profit of the supplier, the customer, and
the supply chain. By comparing the equilibrium profits across W+T and PBC, we have the
following analytical results as stated in Proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.4. For a given spare parts Lifetime-buy ratio (i.e., δ),
(1) under PBC-L, pi
s(c)∗
PB = pi
s(c)∗
PL if κ is endogenously set by the supplier (and κ
∗ = 0).
(2) under PBC-L, if κ is exogenously specified, N∗PL ≤ N∗PB, and pis(c)∗PL ≤ pis(c)∗PB . Furthermore,
∂N∗PL/∂κ < 0, ∂pi
s(c)∗
PL /∂κ < 0, ∂EPL/∂κ < 0.
(3) if no stockouts occur during warranty, pi
s(c)∗
W+T = pi
s(c)∗
PB ≥ pis(c)∗PL .
The proof can be found in Appendix F.
In Proposition 2.4, we first look at the impact of different penalty terms under PBC. Under
PBC-L, the optimal penalty rate is 0, which makes the profits the same as PBC-B. If κ is forced
to be more than zero, the profits under PBC-L will be less than PBC-B. This is because under
PBC-B, the number of stockouts and the order quantity have the same manner of impact on
the supplier’s profit. Thus, penalizing stockouts is equivalent to reducing the order quantity.
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Figure 2.2: Contract efficiency under PBC-B and PBC-L, exogenous δ. x satisfies uniform
distribution in [0,1]. D = 50, T = 10, cp = 30, cs = 10, ch = 5.
For the customer, the price combination is the only factor that impacts the order quantity.
So the supplier can choose different w∗ and κ∗ without affecting the customer’s decision on
N∗. However, if penalty is incurred on lost revenue, κ plays a different role on affecting the
supplier’s profit compared to the initial price w. The customer’s lost revenue now depends on
the order quantity as well as on the penalty rate. Since the revenue rate is not a constant,
but a function of the order quantity, κ does not act as a product “price” to the customer, in
the same manner as w. Consequently, w and κ cannot be treated as factors in a combination.
Actually, w∗ in such a case is increasing in κ∗, which consequently make the customer give a
less order quantity and finally, profits become lower. As stated in part (2), the order quantity,
profits, and contract efficiency are decreasing in κ. As shown in Figure 2.2, the efficiency curve
of PBC-B is on top of those under PBC-L. Moreover, the efficiency decreases as κ increases.
The efficiency of PBC-B remains constant at 75% due to the linear revenue function in our
model. The curves converge at the point where δ is large enough to cover all the demand in
the contract period, and thus no penalty occurs.
If we compare the profits across W+T and PBC, we can prove that if spare parts are sufficient
to cover all the demand during warranty, W+T result in the same profit as PBC-B and PBC-
L, endogenous κ. This is because if no spare parts reacquisition is required, the total costs
as well as the product availability under W+T and PBC are the same, resulting the same
price combinations and order quantity. Only under PBC-L, exogenous κ, the profits are lower.
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However, if stockouts occur during warranty, the reacquisition cost cr will play a role in the
supply chain partners’ decision. Unfortunately, we cannot have the analytical closed-form
results for comparing the profits. We then conduct extensive numerical analysis to observe the
impact of Lifetime-buy and reacquisition cost on the supply chain members’ profits.
The profits under W+T are dependant on the warranty length t and reacquisition cost cr. As
shown in Figure 2.3, for a given δ, with low reacquisition cost (cr = 10 in the figure), the profit
is increasing in t when stockouts occur (where t > δ in the figure, under a uniform distributed
x), whereas with high reacquisition cost (cr = 80 in the figure), it decreases in t when stockouts
occur. However, if cr is medium, the impact of t is implicit. Consider the margin of the
product defined as M∗ = pi∗/N∗. In this model, we just use the supplier’s margin to conduct
our analysis since the individuals share part of the supply chain’s profit. We have the margin
of the supplier under W+T and PBC-B as M s∗W+T = pi
s∗
W+T/N
∗
W+T =
DA3(δ,t,T )−CW+T (δ,t,T )
2
and
M s∗PB = pi
s∗
PB/N
∗
PB =
DA1(δ,T )−CP (δ,T )
2
, respectively. Now we can clearly see that the profit is
determined jointly by the margin and the order quantity. For W+T, both the margin and the
order quantity are not monotonously affected by the warranty length t, but also depend on cr
. So given δ, different combinations of t and cr may result in various changes in profit. As
illustrated in Figure 2.4, when reacquisition is expensive (cr = 80), both the order quantity
and the margin are decreasing in t, and thus profit decreases with t. When reacquisition is
cheap (cr = 10), the order quantity almost remains the same but the margin is increasing, so
profit increases with t. However, if the reacquisition cost is moderate (cr = 40), the margin is
increasing yet the order quantity is decreasing in t. Hence, the profit change caused by t can
be in either direction.
Figure 2.5 shows the results of profit comparison under W+T and PBC, varying the Lifetime-
buy ratio δ and warranty duration t. First, we can see that in all the subfigures, the profits
under W+T are the same as PBC-B where δ > t, i.e., spare parts are more than failure
occurrence. This result validates our analytical conclusion stated in part (3), Proposition 2.4.
Next, we discuss the cases when δ < t. (i) When cr is small, as shown in Figure 2.5(a), profit
under W+T is higher than under PBC. Longer warranty implies higher product availability.
In this case, the revenue increase caused by a higher product availability is more than the cost
increase, given cr is low. As a result, profit will be increasing in t. (ii) When cr is large, as
shown in Figure 2.5(d), profit under W+T is lower than under PBC-B, and in some cases when
warranty is long, it is even lower than PBC-L. In this case, the cost of extending the warranty is
expensive, because a much higher reacquisition cost is incurred, which decreases the profit. (iii)
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Figure 2.3: Profits under W+T and PBC-B, changing with warranty length t and various
reacquisition cost cr. x satisfies uniform distribution in [0,1]. D = 50, T = 10, cp = 30, cs =
10, ch = 5, δ = 2.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.4: Margin (a) and order quantity (b) under W+T and PBC-B, changing with t and
various reacquisition cost cr. x satisfies uniform distribution in [0,1]. D = 50, T = 10, cp =
30, cs = 10, ch = 5, δ = 2.
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(a) cr = 10, κ = 0.2 (b) cr = 40, κ = 0.2
(c) cr = 40, κ = 0.8 (d) cr = 80, κ = 0.2
Figure 2.5: Regions of profit comparison under W+T and PBC (exogenous κ), changing
with t and δ, with different reacquisition cost cr. x satisfies uniform distribution in [0,1].
D = 50, T = 10, cp = 30, cs = 10, ch = 5.
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When cr is medium, as shown in Figure 2.5(b)-(c), Counter-intuitively, W+T performs better
when inventory is low but warranty is very long. This is mainly due to the rapid increase of the
margin. In other words, with a relatively low reacquisition cost (e.g., the supplier has strong
belief that the component will not be obsolete and replenishment is cheap), offering a longer
warranty can generate more profit even if he does not have many pre-purchased spare parts.
Parameter sensitivity analysis with exogenous δ is summarized in Appendix B, Table 2.9-
2.10. Specifically, the customer’s willingness-to-pay (WW+T ,WPBC) with respect to a marginal
increase of the Lifetime-buy ratio can be viewed as WW+T = ∂(p
∗, p∗s)/∂δ under W+T and
WPBC = ∂(w
∗, κ∗)/∂δ under PBC. We have
WPBC −WW+T =

cr[1− F (δ/T )] +D
∫ ∞
δ
t
f(x)
x
dx > 0, if t <
Tδ
1 + δ
,
cr[1− F (δ/T )] +D
(∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
x
dx+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
t
(T − δ
x
)f(x)dx
)
> 0, if t >
Tδ
1 + δ
.
In other words, under PBC, the customer’s willingness-to-pay for a marginal increase of the
spare parts is higher than W+T. This is because the prices in the contracts are determined by
product availability and the supplier’s cost. First, given a marginal increase of δ, the supplier’s
total cost under W+T has a lower increase than PBC, i.e., ∂CP (δ, T )/∂δ > ∂CW+T (δ, t, T )/∂δ.
Second, product availability under PBC increases faster with δ than under W+T, i.e., ∂AP (δ, T )/∂δ >
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )/∂δ. Thus, under PBC, the customer is more willing to pay for a unit increase
of the Lifetime-buy ratio.
To sum up, if the Lifetime-buy quantity for spare parts is exogenously specified, penalizing
stockouts is better than the customer’s lost revenue under PBC. On the other hand, the tradi-
tional W+T can be better, depending on the reacquisition cost. If it is relatively cheap to get
the parts, offering a longer warranty can result in a higher profit, even with the risk of having
insufficient inventory. However, when it is very expensive to reacquire the parts, it is better to
go for PBC.
2.6 Analysis with Endogenous δ
In this section, we discuss the case when δ becomes an endogenous decision for the supplier.
In such a case, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium depends on certain conditions,
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because the concavity of profit function w.r.t δ is not always guaranteed. We come up with the
solutions summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.5. (1) Under W+T, the customer’s profit function is concave in N ; the supplier’s
profit function incorporating the customer’s response is concave in p and ps.
(2) Under W+T, the optimal Lifetime-buy ratio δ∗W+T solves
DA
′
3(δ
∗
W+T , t, T )− C ′W+T (δ∗W+T , t, T )
DA3(δ∗W+T , t, T )− CW+T (δ∗W+T , t, T )
=
A
′
4(δ
∗
W+T , t, T )
2A4(δ∗W+T , t, T )
.
(3) Under PBC, the customer’s profit function is concave in N ; the supplier’s profit function
is concave in w and κ under PBC-B, and is concave in w under PBC-L.
(4) Under PBC-L, κ∗ = 0 if it is endogenous.
(5) Under PBC-L, the optimal Lifetime-buy ratio δ∗PL solves
DA
′
1(δ
∗
PL, T )− C ′P (δ∗PL, T )
DA1(δ∗PL, T )− CP (δ∗PL, T )
=
2(2− κ)A′2(δ∗PL, T )
4κT + 4(2− κ)A2(δ∗PL, T )
.
Under PBC-B, the optimal Lifetime-buy ratio δ∗PB solves
DA
′
1(δ
∗
PB, T )− C ′P (δ∗PB, T )
DA1(δ∗PB, T )− CP (δ∗PB, T )
=
A
′
2(δ
∗
PB, T )
2A2(δ∗PB, T )
.
The optimal prices, order quantity, and profits are listed in Table 2.7.
The proof can be found in Appendix G.
From Lemma 2.5, we know that the optimal Lifetime-buy ratio is dependent on demand, costs,
and the product availability functions. Specifically, under PBC-L, if the penalty rate is exoge-
nously positive, κ also plays a role in setting δ∗PL. Compared to the exogenous δ case, κ
∗ = 0
is still the optimal solution for PBC-L. Another similar result is that contract terms under
W+T (p∗, p∗s) and PBC-B (w
∗, κ∗) are set in combinations. Hence, even if the supplier can set
the Lifetime-buy quantity in his own interest, how the contract terms under W+T and PBC
are given is in an analogous manner as the exogenous δ case. Next, we compare the optimal
Lifetime-buy ratio and profits across contracts.
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2.6.1 Comparison of Contracts
Although the fixed point equations for δ∗ complicate the problem, we are still able to derive
some conclusions based on analytical results.
Proposition 2.6. If the Lifetime-buy ratio (i.e., δ) becomes endogenous for the supplier,
(1) under PBC-B, δ∗PB = δ
0.
(2) under PBC-L, endogenous κ, same equilibrium profit can be achieved as PBC-B.
(3) under PBC-L, exogenous κ, δ∗PL ≥ δ∗PB, and ∂δ∗PL/∂κ > 0.
The proof can be found in Appendix H.
Under PBC-B, the supplier’s decision on Lifetime-buy quantity achieves the First Best solution.
In the decentralized supply chain, efficiency is lost due to double marginalization of the supply
chain partners. Specifically, when the customer and the supplier only maximize their own
respective profits, order quantity will be less than the First Best case. However, for the Lifetime-
buy ratio of the spare parts, the decentralized setting does not cause deviation from the First
Best solution. The reason is twofold. First, the cost structure in the First Best and PBC-B
is the same. In both cases, no reacquisition cost is incurred. Second, contract terms under
PBC-B are set in combinations where the penalty rate κ does not have independent impact on
setting the optimal δ. On the other hand, Under PBC-L, the optimal penalty is no penalty. If
κ can be set by the supplier, κ∗ = 0, resulting the same order quantity and profits as PBC-B. In
addition, the contract efficiency remains constant at 75%, which is the same as the exogenous
δ case. If κ is not allowed to be 0 so that the product performance must be evaluated, the
supplier would set a higher Lifetime-buy ratio than the First Best and PBC-B, and the ratio is
increasing in κ. In other words, a higher compensation rate of the lost revenue will induce the
supplier to buy more spare parts. Consequently, we can conclude that penalizing the supplier
based on the customer’s lost revenue would induce the supplier to stock more spare parts, and
thus result in a higher product availability.
Under W+T, the optimal Lifetime-buy ratio is affected by two more parameters: the reacqui-
sition cost cr and the duration of warrant t. With general product availability functions, we
cannot obtain the closed-form solutions to compare contracts. We use numerical experiments
to demonstrate the results of the optimal Lifetime-buy ratio and profits.
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The results of PBC are verified by numerical experiments given in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4.
On the other hand, for W+T, as in the exogenous δ case, the optimal inventory and profits
at equilibrium are determined by warranty length and reacquisition cost. Numerical results
can be found in Table 2.5. Parameter sensitivity analysis with endogenous δ is summarized in
Appendix B, Table 2.11-2.12.
Firstly, Table 2.3 shows how the equilibrium and resulting profits under PBC-B are affected by
parameters D, cp, cs and ch. We can see that the optimal inventory, prices, and order quantity
are all increasing in demand D. The total cost CP increases as well because the supplier will
have more spare parts inventory. However, if D is given, increasing costs (cp, cs and ch) may
cause different results. In general, any increase in cost will decrease order quantity and profits.
In particular, the optimal inventory increases in product production cost cp, but decreases in
spare parts unit cost cr and inventory holding cost ch. Because cp is the cost of the product and
is irrelevant to spare parts, if it increases, the supplier needs more spare parts to achieve higher
product availability and to guarantee the margin. Nevertheless, cs and ch are costs associated
with spare parts. If the cost of the product remains the same, increasing the costs of spare
parts intuitively reduces the level of inventory. In addition, since the optimal inventory under
PBC-B is always the same as the First Best case, the efficiency remains constant at 75%.
Secondly, as shown in Table 2.4, under PBC-L, the optimal inventory is increasing in the
penalty rate κ, if it is set exogenously. If the customer asks for more compensation on her lost
revenue, the supplier will set a higher inventory level to reduce the penalty. However, this raises
the initial price and decreases the order quantity and profits. Although product availability
becomes higher in this case, the efficiency is below the level of the other case of PBC. It is
generally argued that PBC can increase product availability, but our analysis here shows that
it may depend on the penalty schemes. In addition, higher product availability can lead to
lower efficiency.
Thirdly, under W+T, the warranty length t and reacquisition cost cr jointly impact the decision
on the optimal inventory. As shown in Table 2.5, if reacquisition is cheap (cr = 20 in the Table),
the optimal inventory can decrease in the warranty length t, and higher profits can be achieved.
Given a longer warranty, the supplier does not always have to stock more spare parts. In such
a case, the revenue increase caused by higher product availability due to a longer warranty
period, is higher than the replenishment cost. So the total profit increases in t while δ∗W+T
can be low. However, if reacquisition becomes more expensive (cr = 40, 80 in the Table), the
supplier has more inventory, and the total profits decrease in cr as well.
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Table 2.3: Numerical experiment results of the equilibrium solution under PBC-B, endoge-
nous δ. x satisfies uniform distribution in [0,1]. T = 10.
δ∗PB w
∗ − κ∗BP (δ∗PB) N∗PB pis∗PB pic∗PB E D cp cs ch CP
5.90 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75% 50 30 10 5 97.72
6.58 386.49 14.79 4138.76 2069.38 75% 70 30 10 5 106.64
7.03 491.10 19.68 7447.37 3723.69 75% 90 30 10 5 112.69
7.48 646.00 27.07 14267.60 7133.80 75% 120 30 10 5 118.84
5.95 286.02 9.65 1714.89 857.44 75% 50 40 10 5 108.39
6.00 291.89 9.37 1619.77 809.89 75% 50 50 10 5 119.03
6.05 297.72 9.09 1527.47 763.73 75% 50 60 10 5 129.67
6.10 303.52 8.81 1437.98 718.99 75% 50 70 10 5 140.28
5.10 277.54 9.41 1547.34 773.67 75% 50 30 15 5 113.04
4.42 271.65 8.96 1329.18 664.60 75% 50 30 20 5 123.26
3.83 263.23 8.56 1148.71 574.36 75% 50 30 25 5 129.37
3.31 253.00 8.26 998.66 499.33 75% 50 30 30 5 132.11
5.67 277.92 9.90 1779.55 889.78 75% 50 30 10 7 98.23
5.45 275.73 9.87 1748.62 874.31 75% 50 30 10 9 98.59
5.24 272.49 9.83 1706.04 853.02 75% 50 30 10 12 98.93
Table 2.4: Numerical experiment results of the equilibrium solution under PBC-L, endoge-
nous δ, exogenous κ. x satisfies uniform distribution in [0,1]. T = 10.
δ∗PL κ w
∗ N∗PL pi
s∗
PL pi
c∗
PL E D cp cs ch CP
6.46 0.1 289.65 9.76 1790.0 902.79 74.55% 50 30 10 5 104.98
6.68 0.2 294.79 9.68 1789.20 899.30 74.15% 50 30 10 5 107.98
6.81 0.3 298.07 9.63 1781.01 896.87 73.86% 50 30 10 5 109.66
6.88 0.4 300.43 9.59 1774.78 895.40 73.65% 50 30 10 5 110.58
6.92 0.5 302.44 9.56 1769.41 894.30 73.47% 50 30 10 5 111.22
6.96 0.6 304.27 9.53 1764.49 893.35 73.31% 50 30 10 5 111.75
6.99 0.7 305.93 9.50 1760.03 892.61 73.16% 50 30 10 5 112.14
7.03 0.8 307.60 9.48 1755.44 891.60 73.01% 50 30 10 5 112.67
7.05 0.9 309.08 9.46 1751.52 891.07 72.89% 50 30 10 5 112.92
7.07 1.0 310.39 9.44 1750.23 890.81 72.87% 50 30 10 5 113.32
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Table 2.5: Numerical experiment results of the equilibrium under W+T, endogenous δ. x
satisfies uniform distribution in [0,1]. T = 10, D = 50, cp = 30, cs = 10, ch = 5.
δ∗W+T t p
∗ + p∗sS(δ∗W+T ) N
∗
W+T pi
s∗
W+T pi
c∗
W+T E cr CW+T
5.90 1 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 20 97.72
5.90 3 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 20 97.72
5.90 5 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 20 97.72
5.18 7 275.29 10.05 1830.25 915.13 75.72% 20 93.26
3.78 9 295.60 10.01 1941.92 970.96 80.34% 20 101.65
5.90 1 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 40 97.72
5.90 3 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 40 97.72
5.90 5 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 40 97.72
6.11 7 286.30 9.84 1807.14 903.57 74.76% 40 102.71
6.21 9 306.04 9.54 1784.33 892.16 73.82% 40 119.04
5.90 1 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 80 97.72
5.90 3 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 80 97.72
5.90 5 280.11 9.94 1812.85 906.43 75.00% 80 97.72
6.57 7 291.94 9.73 1796.08 898.04 74.31% 80 107.51
7.56 9 312.40 9.27 1700.63 850.31 70.36% 80 129.10
In Figure 2.6, first we can see that δ∗ under PBC-L is higher than PBC-B. As κ increases, the
difference is even higher. This illustration validates our results as given in part (3), Proposition
2.6. Next, if we look at δ∗ under W+T, we find that as the warranty duration increases, the
supplier makes different decision on δ∗ based on the reacquisition cost. If the reacquisition
cost is relative low (cr = 20 in the Figure), δ
∗ decreases in t. If the reacquisition cost is high
(cr = 40, 80 in the Figure), δ
∗ becomes increasing t. This result implies that longer warranty
does not necessarily have to go with more spare parts. If replenishment is cheap, the supplier
can give a longer warranty to the customer with fewer spare parts. The economic mechanism
behind this is that the customer is willing to pay a higher price to have a longer warranty,
and this increased price brings more income for the supplier, given reacquiring spare parts is
relatively cheap.
Figure 2.7 shows the equilibrium profit under different contracts (we use the supply chain’s
profit in the Figure). First, PBC-L has a lower profit than PBC-B, and the profit under PBC-L
is decreasing in κ. If we look back on the exogenous δ case, we find that the result is the
same. Although product availability under PBC-L is higher, the profit will be drawn down by
the penalty rate. It is generally argued that PBC can increase product availability, but our
analysis here shows that it may depend on the penalty schemes. In addition, higher product
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Figure 2.6: δ∗ under W+T and PBC, changing in warranty length t and penalty rate κ, with
various reacquisition cost cr. x satisfies uniform distribution in [0,1]. D = 50, T = 10, cp =
30, cs = 10, ch = 5.
availability might lead to lower profits and efficiency. Second, the profit under W+T is likewise
impacted by cr and t. Combining the results in Figure 2.6, we can see that as the warranty
becomes longer, profit under W+T can be higher than PBC yet with a lower Lifetime-buy
quantity, if the reacquisition cost is low. As cr becomes larger, profit under W+T will become
lower than PBC.
2.7 Some Extensions
2.7.1 A special case: the supplier reacquires all the stockouts under
PBC
In previous sections, we have assumed that under PBC, the supplier is not mandated to reac-
quire the obsolete components but choose to pay a penalty. In this section, we discuss a special
case when stockouts are not allowed to be untreated, and the supplier is requested to restore
Chapter 2. Contracting for Products and After-sales Service 37
Figure 2.7: Profits at equilibrium under W+T and PBC, changing in warranty length t and
penalty rate κ, with various reacquisition cost cr. x satisfies uniform distribution in [0,1].
D = 50, T = 10, cp = 30, cs = 10, ch = 5.
all failed products. In such a case, PBC become fixed-fee full warranty contracts. Hence, it is
equivalent to the case of W+T, with t = T . Thus, following the previous main results, we have
a corollary as follows (we use the subscript F to denote this full warranty contract).
Corollary 2.7. (1) If δ is sufficiently large and there are no stockouts in [0, T ], profits under
all contracts are equal, i.e., pi
s(c)∗
F = pi
s(c)∗
W+T = pi
s(c)∗
PB .
(2) If stockouts do not occur in [0, t] but occur in (t, T ], when cr is small, pi
s(c)∗
F > pi
s(c)∗
W+T =
pi
s(c)∗
PB ; when cr is large, pi
s(c)∗
W+T = pi
s(c)∗
PB > pi
s(c)∗
F .
(3) If stockouts occur in [0, t], when cr is small, pi
s(c)∗
F > pi
s(c)∗
W+T > pi
s(c)∗
PB ; when cr is large,
pi
s(c)∗
PB > pi
s(c)∗
W+T > pi
s(c)∗
F .
Our former analysis tell us that longer warranty implies higher product availability by forcing
the supplier to replenish spare parts, though incurring extra reacquisition cost. If there are no
stockouts during the entire contract period [0, T ], profits under all contracts are equal. So even
t = T , as long as spare parts are sufficient, the profits will be in no difference across contracts,
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as stated in part (1), Corollary 2.7. However, if spare parts cannot satisfy all the demand during
the entire contract period, the cost of reacquisition will affect the equilibrium profits. If cr is
small, profits are increasing in the warranty duration t. Otherwise, if cr is large, the cost of part
reacquisition exceeds the revenue increase due to a higher product availability, then profits are
decreasing in t. Part (2) and (3) in Corollary 2.7 discuss such cases when stockouts may occur
in [0, T ]. With a small cr, the benefit from high product availability is more than the cost of
replenishing parts. Thus, the full warranty contract outperforms the partial warranty contract
(i.e., W+T) and PBC. On the other side, if the reacquisition cost is substantially high, paying
penalties is a better choice compared to giving long warranty.
2.7.2 Other Revenue Functions
We have thus far used a linear inverse revenue function for the customer. To test the robustness
of the results, we use a Cobb-Douglas function and a Newsvendor-type frame to model the
customer’s revenue in the following analysis. We only look at the exogenous δ case due to
tractability issues of the model.
2.7.2.1 Cobb-Douglas Revenue Function
In this section, we use the Cobb-Douglas model to form the customer’s revenue as a function
of external demand and number of working products. The Cobb-Douglas revenue function has
also been used in other works, see for instance (Roels et al., 2010). Define
R = Dα(E[
∫ T
0
Nv(τ)dτ ])
1−α
= Dα[NAP/W+T (δ, (t), T )]
1−α,
where α is the output elasticity, which measures the responsiveness of the output to a change
in input values. So the revenue has two input factors – external demand and the working time
capacity. In addition, we assume 0 < α < 1. This assumption guarantees the concavity of R
w.r.t. N . By solving the new model with a Cobb-Douglas revenue function, we are able to
obtain the unique equilibrium solutions under W+T and PBC (detailed results are listed in
Table 2.8). Furthermore, the main insights are consistent with our previous findings. We give
the numerical illustration in Figure 2.8.
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(a) Efficiency of PBC-B and PBC-L, exogenous κ. (b) Efficiency of PBC and W+T.
Figure 2.8: Contracts efficiency under Cobb-Douglas revenue function. Given α = 0.5, T =
10. (a): For PBC-L, κ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8. (b): For PBC-L, κ = 0.1. For W+T, t = 5, and cr =
5, 15, 50. Other parameters: x satisfies uniform distribution in [0, 1], cp = 30, cs = 10, ch = 5.
Under the Cobb-Douglas revenue function, α becomes an impacting parameter of the contracts
efficiency. For example, under PBC-B, the efficiency EPB =
(2−α)(1−α) 1α
1−α , which is not a constant,
like in the case of linear revenue function. Nevertheless, the main results remain similar. As
shown in 2.8(a), the efficiency of PBC-L is lower than PBC-B, and is decreasing in κ. Meanwhile,
from Figure 2.8(b), we can see that cr affects the contract efficiency in a similar manner. W+T
can be more efficient than PBC given a low reacquisition cost (cr = 5); when the reacquisition
cost is high (cr = 50), PBC-B works better than W+T. In sum, the Cobb-Douglas revenue
function does not change the main insights of our model.
2.7.2.2 Newsvendor Customer
In this section, we model the customer’s revenue using a Newsvendor type revenue function.
Let r be the revenue rate of a working product, which is assumed to be constant. Demand ξ has
a density function fξ(y), which is continuously differentiable. Under a newsvendor framework,
the revenue function can be written as
R = r
∫ T
0
min[ξ,Nv(τ)]dτ.
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It can be seen that the customer faces uncertainty on both the supply and demand sides. On
one hand, part failures can result in supply uncertainty; on the other hand, external demand
is another uncertainty. Then we have the expected revenue
E(R) = r
∫ ∞
0
f(x)
(∫ ∞
0
(∫ T
0
min[ξ,Nv(τ)]dτ
)
fξ(y)dy
)
dx.
Proposition 2.8. Under a newsvendor revenue function,
(1) The expected revenue functions under PBC and W+T are concave in N .
(2) A sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium is∫ N
0
ξ2fξ(y)dy ≤ N
3
2
fξ(N).
The proof can be found in Appendix I.
If we model the revenue function under a newsvendor framework, closed-form solutions of the
game are not feasible. However, we can come up with a sufficient condition for existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium, which is given in part (2), Proposition 2.8. However, we can
verify that not all distributions can always satisfy this condition (e.g., for normal or exponential
distributions, it depends on the parameters). Through numerical examples shown in Figure 2.9,
we can see the equilibrium profits under W+T and PBC. Profits under PBC-L are lower than
PBC-B. Moreover, profits under W+T can be higher with a low replenishment cost, and lower
with high a replenishment cost. Hence, we can conclude that under a newsvendor type revenue
function, the main insights are still in line with those from previous revenue functions.
2.7.3 Risk Aversion
We have so far assumed that the supply chain partners are risk neutral. However, in practice,
most companies show some level of risk aversion. In this section, we discuss how the supply chain
members’ risk aversion affects the equilibrium outcomes. We assume the customer is risk averse
to external demand and spare parts stockouts, and the supplier is risk averse to spare parts
stockouts. Then under PBC, the customer’s risk aversion RAcP = rc1V ar(ξ) + rc2V ar(BP ).
The supplier’s risk aversion RAsP = rs1V ar(BP ). Under W+T, since warranty guarantees
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Figure 2.9: Equilibrium profits under W+T and PBC, under a newsvendor type of revenue
function, exogenous δ.
full product availability, the customer is risk averse to the stockouts in the TBC period. So
RAcW+T = rc3V ar(BT). The supplier is risk averse to stockouts during warranty, i.e., RA
s
W+T =
rs2V ar(BW ). Here rs and rc are the risk averse coefficient of the supplier and the customer.
Then we have the utility functions under PBC and W+T.
Under PBC,
E(ucP ) = E(R) + κE(BP )(/κE(RL))−Nw − rc1V ar(ξ)− rc2V ar(BP ),
E(usP ) = Nw − κE(BP )(/κE(RL))− E(CP )− rs1V ar(BP ).
Under W+T,
E(ucW+T ) = E(R)−Np− psE(S)− rc3V ar(BT ),
E(usW+T ) = Np+ psE(S)− rs2V ar(BW ).
The decision variables in the respective games remain the same. We can then derive the closed-
form solutions for the equilibrium.
Proposition 2.9. With risk aversion,
(1) under PBC-B, the optimal contract term is a combination of w∗ and κ∗, based on demand,
costs, and risk-averse factors. Under PBC-L, the optimal penalty rate κ∗ = 0, and profits
and efficiency are lower and decreasing in κ if it is exogenous.
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(2) under W+T, the optimal contract term is a combination of p∗ and p∗s, based on demand,
costs, and risk-averse factors.
(3) compared to the risk neutral case, efficiency is lower due to the increase in prices. Specif-
ically, price increase under PBC is
∆∗PB =
(DA1 − CP )rs1B˜P
4A2 + 2(2rc2 + rs1)B˜P
and
∆∗PL =
(DA1 − CP )[A2((1− κ)rs1 − κrc2) + κT (rc2 + rs1)]B˜P
[A2(2− κ) + κT ][A2(2− κ) + κT + (2rc2 + rs1)B˜P ]
.
Under W+T, price increase is
∆∗W+T =
(DA3 − CW+T )rs2B˜W
4A4 + 4rc3B˜T + 2rs2B˜W
,
where B˜P (W ) = V ar(BP (W,T ))/N
2.
The proof can be found in Appendix J.
From Proposition 2.9, we can see that when the supply chain partners become risk averse,
the optimal decisions do not change. Risk aversion increases prices and thus reduces channel
efficiency. This is consistent with the results in other OM papers (Chen et al., 2009; Agrawal
and Seshadri, 2000). The price increase can be regarded as risk premiums that are set by the
loss-averse decision makers.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study joint contracting of product and the after-sales service under Warranty
+ Transaction-based contracts and Performance-based contracts. We also consider the problem
of part obsolescence, and incorporate Lifetime-buy planning as part of the contracting problem.
We look at the case of both exogenous and endogenous inventory requirements, as well as
different penalty terms for product unavailability in PBC.
For PBC, we find that if penalty is based upon stockouts of spare parts, the initial price and
penalty rate can be set in combination. However, if penalty is incurred on the customer’s
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lost revenue, zero penalty rate would be an ideal decision. However, in practice, product
performance must be measured and tied to the customer’s compensation. The penalty rate
can be given by negotiation, or based on some industrial norms. In such a case, the penalty
rate may reduce the supply chain partners’ profits, although penalizing the supplier on the
customer’s revenue may result in a higher product availability, if the supplier can voluntarily
chooses the number of spare part. We also compare PBC with the more traditional W+T,
under which the warranty there compulsorily makes the supplier guarantee a certain period of
full product availability. We find that if the supplier has more inventory than demand during
the warranty period, W+T and PBC can have equivalent efficiency. However, if the supplier
has to reacquire parts, the reacquisition cost will play a role in the decisions. For some parts
which are easy and cheap to get, the supplier does not have to worry about stockouts, and
offering longer warranty can make W+T result in higher profits than PBC. On the other hand,
if the parts are very expensive to replenish once obsolete, it is better to go for PBC. We also
show that the insights from our model are robust to other revenue functions.
Our analysis in this chapter provides insights to the implementation of service contracts. PBC
are supposed to bring higher product availability, but our model show that it would be depen-
dant on the penalty terms which may have different incentives. Moreover, sometimes higher
product availability may not always go with higher profits. The insights of this chapter also
shed light on contract selection between PBC and W+T. As PBC become increasingly popular,
our analysis show that PBC are not always dominate W+T. Giving warranty to the customer
can be beneficial to the supply chain in that warranty increases the overall product availabil-
ity. The supplier even would like to offer a longer warranty with fewer spare parts, as long as
replenishing components can be done at a low cost. However, when considering the part obso-
lescence issue, warranty may incur high acquisition cost of spare parts. If it is very expensive
to reacquire the obsolete components, the benefit of warranty can be defeated by the cost of
obsolescence, which makes PBC more preferable than W+T.
The model in this chapter also has limitations because some assumptions have been made to
keep the model tractability. For example, we assume the supplier uses cr in his planning when
contracting with the customer. Sometimes, the expiring date of the component is given by the
manufacturer in advance, and the buyer can make a last time order once he knows the exact
date. In such a case, the total costs for the supplier may become lower. Including the End-
of-life notice date in the model could be a direction for future research. Another assumption
is that product availability is only dependent on the spare parts. In the model, as long as no
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spare parts stockouts occur, or replenishment is made in time, product availability will not be
affected. Actually, in some other cases, product downtime also includes the lead time of service
completion time, which is determined by the service providers’ repair capacity. Since both
capacity and resource (i.e., spare parts) affect product performance, discussing the problem of
concurrent management of these two items can be another interesting research topic.
2.9 Appendix
A. Equilibrium solutions
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B. Sensitivity of Parameters
Table 2.9: Parameter Sensitivity under W+T, exogenous δ
D cp cs ch cr δ
p∗ + p∗sS(δ) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
N∗W+T ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ y
pis∗W+T ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ y
pic∗W+T ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ y
Table 2.10: Parameter Sensitivity under PBC, exogenous δ
D cp cs ch δ
w∗ − κ∗B(δ)/RL ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
N∗P ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ y
pis∗P ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ y
pic∗P ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ y
Table 2.11: Parameter Sensitivity under W+T, endogenous δ
D cp cs ch cr
δ∗ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ≺
p∗ + p∗sS(δ
∗) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
N∗W+T ↑ ↓ y y ≺
pis∗W+T ↑ ↓ y y ≺
pic∗W+T ↑ ↓ y y ≺
Table 2.12: Parameter Sensitivity under PBC, endogenous δ
D cp cs ch
δ∗ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
w∗ − κ∗B(δ∗)/RL ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
N∗P ↑ ↓ y y
pis∗P ↑ ↓ y y
pic∗P ↑ ↓ y y
C. Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Given the average number of faillures x, the product failure process under W+T and PBC is
shown in Figure 2.10. For a given spare parts inventory s, Ts is the time when the sth failure
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occurs. In other words, before Ts, all the failed parts can be replaced with working units.
Thus, until Ts the number of working products Nv = N . After Ts, no spare parts are available
and Nv decreases as more component failure occurs. Under PBC, as shown in Figure 2.10(a),
depending on x , case (a) and (b) occur when N or fewer than N products have failed before
T , respectively. If Ts > T , it implies that spare parts inventory is sufficient to cover all the
demand in [0, T ], resulting in case (c). Figure 2.10(b) shows the failure process under W+T.
The difference between W+T and PBC is that the warranty length t plays a role in W+T. If
t < Ts, i.e., there are no stockouts in the warranty period, the process is the same as PBC.
However, if stockout occurs in warranty (t′ > Ts in Figure 2(b)), the supplier has to reacquire
the parts at a higher cost cr to replace the failed ones, until the warranty expires (we ignore
the lead time of parts replenishment + repair). Once the warranty has expired, no additional
parts are reacquired, and each subsequent failure results in a decrease in the number of working
products Nv.
Firstly, in Figure 2.10(a), since Ts is the sth failure, we have Ts = δ/x. Case (c) occurs when
Ts > T , i.e., x < δ/T . Case (b) occurs when δ/T < x < (1 + δ)/T , and case (a) occurs when
x > (1 + δ)/T . Then we have the expected product availability under PBC
AP (δ, T ) =
∫ δ
T
0
Tf(x)dx+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(
δ
x
+
∫ T
δ
x
[1− (τx− δ)]dτ
)
f(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
(
δ
x
+
∫ 1+δ
x
δ
x
[1− (τx− δ)]dτ
)
f(x)dx.
Secondly, in Figure 2.10(b), we can see the warranty length t under W+T affects Nv(τ). If
t < Ts, it is equivalent to the case in Figure 2.10(a). If t > Ts(t
′ in Figure 2.10(b)), Nv(τ)
decreases from t′ (rather than from Ts in Figure 2.10(a). We have
• when t ≤ T δ
1+δ
,
AW+T (δ, t, T ) =
∫ δ
T
0
Tf(x)dx+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(
δ
x
+
∫ T
δ
x
[1− (τx− δ)]dτ
)
f(x)dx
+
∫ δ
t
1+δ
T
(
δ
x
+
∫ 1+δ
x
δ
x
[1− (τx− δ)]dτ
)
f(x)dx+
∫ ∞
δ
t
(
t+
∫ t+ 1
x
t
[1− x(τ − t)]dτ
)
f(x)dx.
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(a) Failure process under PBC.
(b) Failure process under W+T.
Figure 2.10: Failure process under PBC and W+T. X axis is the time interval. Y axis is
the number of working products. Contract duration is from 0 to T . Case (a), (b) and (c)
occurs when Nv(T ) = 0, 0 < Nv(T ) < N and Nv(T ) = N , respectively.
• when t > T δ
1+δ
,
AW+T (δ, t, T ) =
∫ δ
T
0
Tf(x)dx+
∫ δ
t
δ
T
(
δ
x
+
∫ T
δ
x
[1− (τx− δ)]dτ
)
f(x)dx
+
∫ 1
T−t
δ
t
(
t+
∫ T
t
[1− x(τ − t)]dτ
)
f(x)dx+
∫ ∞
1
T−t
(
t+
∫ t+ 1
x
t
[1− x(τ − t)]dτ
)
f(x)dx.
Differentiating AP (δ, T ) w.r.t. δ, we have (i) the first term
∂
∫ δ
T
0
Tf(x)dx
∂δ
= f(
δ
T
);
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the second term∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(
δ
x
+
∫ T
δ
x
[1− (τx− δ)]dτ
)
f(x)dx =
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(
T − T
2x
2
+ Tδ − δ
2
2x
)
f(x)dx,
so
∂
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(
T − T 2x
2
+ Tδ − δ2
2x
)
f(x)dx
∂δ
= −f( δ
T
) +
(
T + Tδ − Tδ2
2(1+δ)
− 1
2
T (1 + δ)
)
f(1+δ
T
)
T
+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(
T − δ
x
)
f(x)dx = −f( δ
T
) +
(1 + 2δ) f(1+δ
T
)
2 (1 + δ)
+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(
T − δ
x
)
f(x)dx;
(iii) the third term
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
(
δ
x
+
∫ 1+δ
x
δ
x
[1− (τx− δ)]dτ
)
f(x)dx =
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
(
δ
x
+
1
2x
)
f(x)dx,
so
∂
∫∞
1+δ
T
(
δ
x
+ 1
2x
)
f(x)dx
∂δ
= −
(
T
2(1+δ)
+ Tδ
1+δ
)
f(1+δ
T
)
T
+
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
x
dx
= −(1 + 2δ) f(
1+δ
T
)
2 (1 + δ)
+
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
x
dx.
Adding the above three terms together, we have
∂AP (δ, T )
∂δ
= f(
δ
T
)− f( δ
T
) +
(1 + 2δ) f(1+δ
T
)
2 (1 + δ)
+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(
T − δ
x
)
f(x)dx
− (1 + 2δ) f(
1+δ
T
)
2 (1 + δ)
+
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
x
dx
=
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
x
dx+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(T − δ
x
)f(x)dx > 0.
The second derivative
∂2AP (δ, T )
∂δ2
= −f(
1+δ
T
)
1 + δ
− f( δ
T
) + f(
1 + δ
T
) + f(
δ
T
)− δf(
1+δ
T
)
1 + δ
−
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
f(x)
x
dx
= −
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
f(x)
x
dx < 0.
Chapter 2. Contracting for Products and After-sales Service 52
So AP (δ, T ) is increasing in concave in δ.
Similarly, differentiating AW+T (δ, t, T ) w.r.t. δ and t, we have
• when t ≤ T δ
1+δ
,
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )
∂δ
=
∫ δ
t
1+δ
T
f(x)
x
dx+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
(T − δ
x
)f(x)dx > 0,
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )
∂t
= 1− F
(
δ
t
)
> 0.
• when t > T δ
1+δ
,
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )
∂δ
=
∫ δ
t
δ
T
(T − δ
x
)f(x)dx > 0,
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )
∂t
= 1− F
(
1
T − t
)
+
∫ 1
T−t
δ
t
(T − t)xf(x) > 0.
Let t = T δ
1+δ
, it can be verified that
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )
∂δ
∣∣∣∣
t≤T δ
1+δ
=
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )
∂δ
∣∣∣∣
t>T δ
1+δ
,
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t≤T δ
1+δ
=
∂AW+T (δ, t, T )
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t>T δ
1+δ
.
Then we can conclude that AW+T (δ, t, T ) is continuous and differentiable w.r.t. δ and t, as well
as increasing in δ and t.
Since AW+T (δ, t, T ) is increasing in t, we have when t = 0, AW+T (δ, t, T ) = AP (δ, T ). So given
δ and t, AW+T (δ, t, T ) ≥ AP (δ, T ). 
D. Proof of Lemma 2.2. Differentiating E[picW+T (N)] in Equation (2.2) w.r.t. N , we have
∂2E(picW+T )
∂N2
= −2A4(T, t, δ) < 0.
So the customer’s profit function is concave in N . By solving the First Order Condition (FOC),
we have the customer’s best response N∗W+T =
DA3(δ,t,T )−p−psS(δ,t,T )
2A4(δ,t,T )
. Substituting N∗W+T into
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the supplier’s profit function, and differentiating it w.r.t. p and ps, we have
∂2E(pisW+T )
∣∣
N=N∗W+T
∂p2
= − 1
A4(δ, t, T )
< 0,
∂2E(pisW+T )
∣∣
N=N∗W+T
∂ps2
= −S(δ, t, T )
2
A4(δ, t, T )
< 0.
Hence, the supplier’s profit function is concave in p and ps. The FOC w.r.t. p and ps is
DA3(δ, t, T ) + CW+T (δ, t, T )− 2[p+ psS(δ, t, T )]
2A4(δ, t, T )
= 0
S(δ, t, T )(DA3(δ, t, T ) + CW+T (δ, t, T )− 2[p+ psS(δ, t, T )]
2A4(δ, t, T )
= 0
Solving the system equations, we have p
∗ =
DA3(δ, t, T ) + CW+T (δ, t, T )
2
− S(δ, t, T )ps,
p∗s = ps
Then the optimal solution of p and ps satisfies
p∗ + p∗sS(δ, t, T ) =
DA3(δ, t, T ) + CW+T (δ, t, T )
2
.
Substituting into the customer’s best response, we have N∗W+T =
DA3(δ,t,T )−CW+T (δ,t,T )
4A4(δ,t,T )
. Because
of the concavity, p∗, p∗s and N
∗
W+T are the unique optimal solutions that maximize the agents’
decision functions.
In addition, we have ∂N∗W+T/∂D =
A3(δ,t,T )
2A4(δ,t,T )
> 0. For the price combination, we have ∂p̂∗/∂D =
A3(δ,t,T )
2
> 0, ∂p̂∗/∂δ = ps[F (δ/t) − F (δ/T )] > 0, and ∂p̂∗/∂t = D2 (∂A3/∂t + ∂CW+T/∂t) > 0.

E. Proof of Lemma 2.3. First, we prove the results of PBC-B. Differentiating E[picPB(N)] in
Equation (2.4) w.r.t. N , we have
∂2E(picP )
∂N2
= −2A2(δ, T ) < 0.
So the customer’s profit function is concave in N . By solving the FOC, we have the customer’s
best response N∗PB =
DA1(δ,T )−w+κB(δ,T )
2A2(δ,T )
. Substituting N∗PB into the supplier’s profit function
Chapter 2. Contracting for Products and After-sales Service 54
and differentiate it w.r.t. w, κ, we have
∂2E(pisPB)|N=N∗PB
∂w2
= − 1
A2(δ, T )
< 0,
∂2E(pisPB)|N=N∗PB
∂κ2
= −B(δ, x, T )
2
A2(δ, T )
< 0.
So the supplier’s profit function is concave in w and κ. Then solving the FOC, we can have the
unique equilibrium solution as stated in Table 2.6.
Second, under PBC-L, we have
∂2E(picp)
∂N2
= −2[κT + (1− κ)A2(δ, T )] < 0.
So the customer’s profit function is concave in N . Substituting the customer’s best response
N∗PL =
DκT−w+D(1−κ)A1(δ,T )
2[κT+(1−κ)A2(δ,T )] into the supplier’s profit function in Equation (2.3), if κ is a decision
variable, we have the Lagrangian of the supplier’s problem
L(w, κ, µ1, µ2) = N
∗
PLw − κE[RL(N∗PL)]− E[CP (N∗PL)] + µ1(1− κ) + µ2κ.
Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, we have the optimality conditions
∂L(w, κ, µ1, µ2)
∂w
= 0
∂L(w, κ, µ1, µ2)
∂κ
= 0
µ1(1− κ) = 0
µ2κ = 0
0 ≤ κ ≤ 1
µ1, µ2 ≥ 0
(1) µ1 = 0, µ2 > 0, κ
∗ = 0. We have the solution
w∗ =
DA1(δ, T ) + CP (δ, T )
2
, µ2 =
(T − A2(δ, T ))[DA1(δ, T )− CP (δ, T )]2
16A2(δ, T )
2 > 0,
which is feasible.
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(2) µ2 = 0, µ1 > 0, κ
∗ = 1. We have the solution
w∗ =
T [DT −DA1(δ, T ) +DA2(δ, x, T ) + CP (δ, T )]
T + A2(δ, T )
,
µ1 = − [T − A2(δ, T )][DA1(δ, T )− CP (δ, T )]
2
4(T + A2(δ, T ))
2 < 0,
which is not feasible.
(3) µ1 > 0, µ2 > 0. No solutions.
(4) µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0. No solutions.
Hence, the unique optimal solution
w∗ =
DA1(δ, T ) + CP (δ, T )
2
, κ∗ = 0.
If κ is given, we have
∂2E(pis∗PL)|N=N∗PL
∂w2
=
−κT + (−2 + κ)A2(δ, T )
2[κT + A2 − κA2(δ, T )]2
< 0.
So the supplier’s profit function incorporating the customer’s best response is concave in w.
Then solving the FOC, we can have the unique optimal solution w∗, and then the equilibrium
of the game. 
F. Proof of Proposition 2.4. (1) For PBC-L, if κ is set by the supplier, κ∗ = 0. Comparing
the solutions in Table 2.6, we have the results N∗PL = N
∗
PB, pi
∗
PL = pi
∗
PB. (2) For PBC-L, if κ is
exogenous, we have
∂N∗PL
∂κ
= − [T − A2(δ, T )][DA1(δ, T )− CP (δ, T )]
2[κT + (2− κ)A2(δ, T )]2
< 0,
∂pi∗PL
∂κ
= − [T − A2(δ, T )][DA1(δ, T )− CP (δ, T )]
2
4[κT + (2− κ)A2(δ, T )]2
< 0.
Since N∗PL(κ = 0) = N
∗
PB, pi
∗
PL(κ = 0) = pi
∗
PB, , we have N
∗
PB ≥ N∗PL, pis(c)∗PB ≥ pis(c)∗PL . (3) For
W+T, if no stockout occurs in warranty, i.e., E[BW ] = 0, then we have A1(δ, T ) = A3(δ, t, T )
and CW+T (δ, t, T ) = CP (δ, T ). So N
∗
W+T = N
∗
PB, pi
s(c)∗
W+T = pi
s(c)∗
PB . Since we have just proved
that pi
s(c)∗
PB ≥ pis(c)∗PL , we have pis(c)∗W+T = pis(c)∗PB ≥ pis(c)∗PL . 
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G. Proof of Lemma 2.5. The concavity w.r.t. N, p and ps remains the same as the exogenous
case. The supplier’s objective function incorporating the customer’s best response is
max
p,ps,δ
− [p−DA3(δ) + psS(δ)][p− CW+T (δ) + psS(δ)]
2A4(δ)
.
We have the determinant of the Hessian of the objective function Det(H) = 0. Then we first
solve the FOC of p and ps, and then substitute p
∗ and p∗s into the FOC of δ. We have
[DA3(δ)− CW+T (δ)][2A4(DA′3(δ)− C ′W+T (δ))− (DA3(δ)− CW+T (δ))A′4(δ)]
8A4(δ)
2 = 0.
We can easily verify that δ∗ that solves DA3(δ∗) − CW+T (δ∗) = 0 is not the maximum value
point. Then δ∗ that solves
2A4[DA
′
3(δ
∗)− C ′W+T (δ∗)] = [DA3(δ∗)− CW+T (δ∗)]A
′
4(δ
∗) (2.5)
is the optimal solution that maximizes the objective function.
For PBC, the concavity w.r.t. N,w and κ remains the same as the exogenous case. (i) Under
PBC-B, the supplier’s objective function incorporating the customer’s best response is
max
w,κ,δ
[DA1(δ) + κB(δ)− w][w − κB(δ)− CP (δ)]
2A2(δ)
.
We have the determinant of the Hessian of the above function Det(H) = 0. So by looking at
the Hessian can not directly show the existence of the optima. We then first solve the FOC
w.r.t. w, κ, and have the FOC w.r.t. δ given w∗ and κ∗ as
[DA1(δ)− CP (δ)][(−DA1(δ) + CP (δ))A′2(δ) + 2A2(δ)(DA′1(δ)− C ′P (δ))]
8A2(δ)
2 = 0.
It is straightforward to verify that profit is 0 if DA1(δ
∗)− CP (δ∗) = 0. So δ∗ which satisfies
2A2(δ
∗)[DA
′
1(δ
∗)− C ′P (δ∗)] = [DA1(δ∗)− CP (δ∗)]A
′
2(δ
∗) (2.6)
is the maximum point. (ii) Under PBC-L, if κ is exogenous, we have the supplier’s objective
function incorporating the customer’s best response is
max
w,δ
− (DκT − w + (D −Dκ)A1(δ))(DκT − w)(κT + (2− κ)A2(δ))−DκA1(δ)(T + κT + A2(δ)− κA2(δ)] + 2(κT + A2(δ)− κA2(δ))Cp(δ))
4[κT + A2(δ)− κA2(δ)]2
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We first solve the FOC of w, and have the FOC of δ incorporating w∗ as
[DA1(δ)− CP (δ)](2D(κT + (2− κ)A2)A′1(δ)− (2− κ)(DA1(δ)− CP (δ))A
′
2(δ)− 2(κT + (2− κ)A2(δ))C
′
P (δ))
4[κT + (2− κ)A2(δ)]2
.
Similarly, δ∗ that solves
2[κT + (2− κ)A2(δ∗)]DA′1(δ∗)− C
′
P (δ
∗)] = (2− κ)A′2(δ∗)[DA1(δ∗)− CP (δ∗)] (2.7)
is the optimal solution that maximizes the objective function. If κ is a decision variable, we
have the Lagrangian of the supplier’s problem
L(w, κ, δ, µ1, µ2) = N
∗
PLw − κE[RL(N∗PL)]− E[CP (N∗PL)] + µ1(1− κ) + µ2κ.
Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, we have the optimality conditions
∂L(w, κ, δ, µ1, µ2)
∂w
= 0
∂L(w, κ, δ, µ1, µ2)
∂κ
= 0
∂L(w, κ, δ, µ1, µ2)
∂δ
= 0
µ1(1− κ) = 0
µ2κ = 0
0 ≤ κ ≤ 1
µ1, µ2 ≥ 0
(1) µ1 = 0, µ2 > 0, κ
∗ = 0. We have the solution
2[κT + (2− κ)A2(δ∗)]DA′1(δ∗)− C
′
P (δ
∗)] = (2− κ)A′2(δ∗)[DA1(δ∗)− CP (δ∗)],
w∗ =
DA1(δ
∗) + CP (δ∗)
2
, µ2 =
(T − A2(δ∗))[DA1(δ∗)− CP (δ∗)]2
16A2(δ∗)
2 > 0,
which is feasible.
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(2) µ2 = 0, µ1 > 0, κ
∗ = 1. We have the solution
2[κT + (2− κ)A2(δ∗)]DA′1(δ∗)− C
′
P (δ
∗)] = (2− κ)A′2(δ∗)[DA1(δ∗)− CP (δ∗)],
w∗ =
T [DT −DA1(δ∗) +DA2(δ∗) + CP (δ∗)]
T + A2(δ∗)
, µ1 = − [T − A2(δ
∗)][DA1(δ∗)− Cp(δ∗)]2
4(T + A2(δ∗))
2 < 0,
which is not feasible.
(3) µ1 > 0, µ2 > 0. No solutions.
(4) µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0. No solutions.
Hence, the optimal solution is
2[κT + (2− κ)A2(δ∗)]DA′1(δ∗)− C
′
P (δ
∗)] = (2− κ)A′2(δ∗)[DA1(δ∗)− CP (δ∗)],
w∗ =
DA1(δ
∗) + CP (δ∗)
2
, κ∗ = 0.

H. Proof of Proposition 2.6. (1) Comparing Equation (2.6) with the solution of the First
Best case in Table 2.2, we can see that δ∗PB = δ
0. (2) For PBC-L, if κ is endogenous, then
κ∗ = 0. It is straightforward to see that δ∗PB = δ
∗
PL, N
∗
PB = N
∗
PL and pi
s(c)∗
PB = pis(c)
∗
PL. (3)
The left-hand-side of the equations solving optimal δ under exogenous and endogenous κ is the
same. Let
LHS(δ) =
DA1
′(δ)− Cp′(δ)
DA1(δ)− Cp(δ) .
We have
∂LHS(δ)
∂δ
=
−[DA1′(δ)− Cp′(δ)]2 + [DA1(δ)− Cp(δ)][DA1′′(δ)− Cp′′(δ)]
[DA1(δ)− Cp(δ)]2
.
From Proposition 2.1, we know A1(δ) is concave in δ, i.e., DA1
′′(δ) < 0. Since DA1(δ)−CP (δ) >
0 always holds, we have ∂LHS(δ)/∂δ < 0. So LHS(δ) is decreasing. Then we look at the right-
hand-side of the equations. For endogenous κ, we can see
RHSen−κ(δ) =
2(2− κ)A2′(δ)
4κT + 4(2− κ)A2(δ) ,
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and RHSen−κ=0(δ) = RHSex−κ(δ). Further, we have
∂RHSen−κ(δ)
∂κ
= − TA2
′(δ)
[A2(δ)(2− κ) + κT ]2
< 0.
ThenRHSen−κ(δ) ≤ RHSex−κ(δ). Because LHS(δ) is decreasing, the intersection withRHSex−κ(δ)
is further than that with RHSen−κ(δ) (Figure 2.11). Hence, δ∗ under exogenous κ is larger.

Figure 2.11: Optimal δ under exogenous and endogenous κ.
I. Proof of Proposition 2.8. (1) Under PBC, the number of working products in [0, T ] can
be cases (a)(b) and (c) in Figure 2.10(a), depending on x. If x < δ/T ,
Ec(R) = rT
∫ δ
T
0
f(x)dx
(∫ N
0
ξfξ(y)dy +N
∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)dy
)
.
If δ/T < x < (1 + δ)/T,
Eb(R) = r
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
f(x)
(∫ ∞
0
(∫ δ
x
0
min[ξ,N ]dτ +
∫ T
δ
x
min[ξ,N(1− τx+ δ)]dτ
)
fξ(y)dy
)
dx
= r
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
f(x)
δ
x
(∫ N
0
ξfξ(y)dy +N
∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)dy
)
dx+ r
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
N(2− Tx+ δ)(Tx− δ)
2x
f(x)dx
∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)dy
+ r
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
f(x)
(∫ N
0
ξ2 − 2ξN +N2(1− Tx+ δ)2
2Nx
fξ(y)dy
)
dx.
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If x > (1 + δ)/T ,
Ea(R) = r
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
(∫ ∞
0
(∫ δ
x
0
min[ξ,N ]dτ
)
fξ(y)dy +
∫ ∞
0
(∫ 1+δ
x
δ
x
min[ξ,N(1− τx+ δ)]dτ
)
fξ(y)dy
)
dx
= r
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
δ
x
(∫ N
0
ξfξ(y)dy +N
∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)dy
)
dx+ r
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
(∫ N
0
N2 + 2ξ(N − ξ)
2Nx
fξ(y)dy
)
dx
+ r
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
Nf(x)
2x
dx
∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)dy
Then the expected revenue
E(RP ) = Ea(R) + Eb(R) + Ec(R).
Differentiating E(RP ) twice w.r.t N , we have
∂2E(RP )
r∂N2
= −fξ(N)
(
T
∫ δ
T
0
f(x)dx+
∫ ∞
δ
T
δf(x)
x
dx
)
−
∫ N
0
ξ2fξ(y)dy
N3
∫ ∞
δ
T
f(x)
x
dx < 0.
Hence, E(RP ) is concave in N . Similar, we can prove the concavity of the expected revenue
function under W+T.
(2) Under PBC, the customer’s problem is
max
N
E(RPB)−Nw + κNB(δ).
It can be verified that the profit function is concave in N . Solving the FOC, we can have the
customer’s best response and equivalently the supplier’s decision on price as
w−B(δ)κ = r

(
T
∫ δ
T
0
f(x) + δ
∫ ∞
δ
T
f(x)
x
dx
)∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)dy +
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
(∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)
2x
dy +
∫ N
0
ξ2fξ(y)
2N2x
dy
)
dx
−
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
f(x)
(∫ N
0
N2(1− Tx+ δ)− ξ2
2xN2
fξ(y)dy +
∫ ∞
N
(2− Tx+ δ)(Tx− δ)
2x
fξ(y)dy
)
dx.

The supplier’s problem becomes
E(pisPB) = [w −B(δ)κ](N)N −NCP (δ),
where [w −B(δ)κ](N) is determined by the above equation. Differentiating w.r.t. N , we have
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∂E(pisPB)
r∂N
= −CP
r
+
(
T
∫ δ
T
0
f(x)dx+
∫ ∞
δ
T
δf(x)
x
dx
)∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)dy +
∫ ∞
1+δ
T
f(x)
2x
(∫ ∞
N
fξ(y)dy +
∫ N
0
ξ2fξ(y)
N2
dy
)
dx
+
∫ 1+δ
T
δ
T
f(x)
2x
(∫ ∞
N
(2− Tx+ δ)(Tx− δ)fξ(y)dy +
∫ N
0
[N2(1− Tx+ δ)2 − ξ2]fξ(y)
N2
dy
)
dx
−Nfξ(N)
(
T
∫ δ
T
0
f(x)dx+
∫ ∞
δ
T
δf(x)
x
dx
)
−
∫ ∞
δ
T
f(x)
x
dx
∫ N
0
ξ2fξ(y)
N2
dy
This equation is concave (unimodal) if the last term∫ ∞
δ
T
f(x)
x
dx
∫ N
0
ξ2fξ(y)
N2
dy
is nondecreasing (because all other terms are decreasing). Because
∂
∫ N
0
ξ2fξ(y)
N2
dy/∂N = fξ(N)−
∫ N
0
2ξ2fξ(y)
N3
dy,
so if
∫ N
0
ξ2fξ(y)dy ≤ N32 fξ(N), the game has the unique equilibrium. Analogously, we can prove
the results under W+T. 
J. Proof of Proposition 2.9. With risk averse agents (exogenous δ), we have
∂2E(ucPB)
∂N2
= −2A2(δ)− 2rc2B˜P (δ) < 0,
∂2E(usPB(N∗PB))
∂w2
= −2A2(δ) + (2rc2 + rs1)B˜P (δ)
2[A2(δ) + rc2B˜P (δ)]
2 < 0,
∂2E(usPB(N∗PB))
∂κ2
= −BP (δ)
2[2A2(δ) + (2rc2 + rs1)B˜P (δ)]
2[A2(δ) + rc2B˜P (δ)]
2 < 0.
So the utility functions are concave in N,w and κ under PBC. Similarly, we can prove the
utility functions under W+T are concave in N, p and ps. Then for PBC, penalty incurred on
backorder, we have the equilibrium prices
w∗RA =
A2(CP +DA1 + 2BPκ
∗) + (CP rc2 +DA1(rc2 + rs1) +BPκ∗(2rc2 + rs1))B˜P
2A2 + B˜P (2rc2 + rs1)
.
Taking the difference w∗RA and w
∗ under risk neutral, we can have the result ∆∗PB in Proposition
2.9. Similarly, we can also obtain ∆∗PL and ∆
∗
W+T . 

Chapter 3
Coordinating Product Support Supply
Chains under Outcome-based
Compensations
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, outcome-based contracts, also known as performance-based contracts (PBC),
performance-based logistics (PBL), or Power-by-the-Hour contacts, are increasingly used in in-
dustry (Cohen et al., 2006), and change companies’ business model for providing products and
services. For example, in the defence and military industry, PBL has become a mandatory
acquisition strategies for weapon systems (DoD, 2003). Boeing applies PBL contracts with
the US air force for maintenance of aircraft1. Rolls-Royce provides a Power-by-the-Hour strat-
egy with the customers for aircraft engines (Smith, 2013). The core concept of an out-come
based contract is that users only pay for what they use, or for product availability, rather
than the ownership of the assets (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2005). Since customers only pay for
outcomes, practitioners usually hope to realize higher product availability and lower operat-
ing cost (Aerospace Systems Division, 2007). Under such contracts, the Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) is usually the integrated service provider who is accountable for servicing
the products for the end customers, which implies that the OEM will be penalized whenever
1http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/support/business overview/pbr.page
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product downtime occurs. Hence, managing product availability is a highly important and
challenging task for the OEM (Kim and Tomlin, 2013).
Dealing with both customers and the suppliers in order to guarantee product availability adds
complexity to the OEM. Usually, the OEM assembles the final product. He is the contractor
who is responsible to the customer. However, the quality of the product also depends on
the subsystems or components that are manufactured by the suppliers. For example, BMW
manufactures engines and the car. But the sensors of the motor management systems are
supplied by Bosch. The car is not running if the sensors are faulty. The customer only attributes
the liability to BMW, even if a product failure is caused by the parts from the suppliers.
Outcome-based contracts target at the availability improvement for the final product, which
depends on the quality of the components and the response speed once failure occurs. Typically,
the OEM can invest in quality improvement on his own product to reduce failure occurrence,
and in service capacity to reduce the repair completion lead time (Kim and Tomlin, 2013).
However, the supplier’s activities on quality management are usually beyond the OEM’s direct
control. In order to improve the quality of the final product, the OEM has to give the supplier
appropriate incentives to make the supplier’s parts more reliable.
Without outcome-based contracts, the OEM usually tries to impact the supplier’s effort by
quality inspection and imposing cost penalties (Baiman et al., 2001; Hwang et al., 2006). How-
ever, better ways may exist to incentivize the supplier and result in a higher profit for the
OEM. In this chapter, we discuss three types of contracts which are offered by an OEM to the
supplier: price-only contracts (PO), repair cost sharing contracts (RCS), and penalty sharing
contracts (PS). Under the price-only contracts, the OEM buys parts from the supplier at a fixed
price. Once the product has been delivered to the customer, the OEM is in charge of product
support, and the supplier is not involved in the service process. Under the repair cost sharing
contracts, the supplier has to bear the service cost which is incurred due to the supplier’s part.
Under the penalty sharing contract, the supplier does not have to pay for the repair cost, but
compensates the OEM by sharing the penalty which is caused by downtime of the supplier’s
part. We study the impact of different contracts on the OEM’s and the supplier’s individual
activities on quality improvement and service capacity management, and analyze the supply
chain members’ profit and channel efficiency. Our main findings are as follows.
1) If only the OEM has the repair service capacity, price-only contracts and repair cost sharing
contracts cause under-investment in failure reduction for the supplier, which results in a lower
product availability. Penalty sharing contracts achieve the First Best solution for the OEM
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and for the supply chain. If the OEM also invests in service capacity, price-only contracts and
repair cost sharing contracts lead to over-investment in service capacity for the OEM and under-
investment in effort of failure reduction for the supplier. Penalty sharing contracts optimize
the supplier’s decision on failure reduction and the OEM’s decision on capacity setting, which
achieves the highest efficiency.
2) If both the supplier and the OEM have service capacity to repair their own part, paying
a fixed service fee to the supplier leads to under-investment in the supplier’s effort to reduce
failure rate. On the other hand, penalty sharing can realize the First Best solution by setting
an optimal penalty rate. If the product is nonseparable and repair cost/penalty is shared by
a predefined proportion between the OEM and the supplier, repair cost sharing contracts still
result in under-investment in the supplier’s effort of failure reduction, whereas penalty sharing
contracts achieve the First Best results and coordinate the supply chain.
3) If information about the quality of the part becomes asymmetric, i.e., only the supplier has
the private information about the failure rate of his part, penalty sharing contracts cannot co-
ordinate the supply chain, however, the OEM’s expected profit under penalty sharing contracts
is the highest, compared to the other two type of contracts.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In §3.2, we present a brief literate review
and summarize the contribution of this paper. Then, we introduce the model setting in §3.3
and establish the basic model in §3.4. Next, we give the equilibrium solutions and analyze
the comparison across contracts in §3.5. In §3.6, we examine the robustness of the results by
extending the model with different settings and introducing information asymmetry. Finally,
we give a summary of findings and potential future research directions in §3.7.
3.2 Literature Review
This chapter focuses on incentives and contracting issues in the product and service manage-
ment fields. Our models are developed based on streams of literature regarding product quality
management and (after-sales) service operations. First, product quality management is a signif-
icant research topic in Operations Management (OM). The game-theoretic quality management
model in this chapter is similar to the following papers in terms of methodology. Reyniers and
Tapiero (1995) study contracting on a supplier’s quality level and a buyers’s inspection policy.
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Tagaras and Lee (1996) discuss the relation of quality and cost in vendor selection. Chen et al.
(1998) study the optimal inspection procedure for products under warranty. More recently,
Baiman et al. (2000) discuss the impact of information availability on the efficiency of a sup-
ply chain where the supplier is responsible for quality improvement and the buyer for quality
appraisal. Later, Baiman et al. (2001) examine the relationship between product architecture,
supply-chain performance metrics, and supply-chain efficiency in a setting where the supplier
makes an effort in process improvement and the customer appraises the supplier’s components.
Hwang et al. (2006) also study the impact of the supplier’s performance measure on product
quality management. They develop a moral hazard model and compare two regimes - certifi-
cation and appraisal. Zhu et al. (2007) study the problem in which both the buyer and the
supplier incur quality-related costs and therefore have incentives to invest in quality improve-
ment. They examine how quality-improvement decisions affects the buyer’s order quantity
and the supplier’s production lot size. Moreover, Balachandran and Radhakrishnan (2005) also
study the quality control problem when the supplier’s penalty is based on the buyer’s inspection
or external failure. They develop single and double moral hazard models and analyze system
efficiency under different cases. Dai et al. (2012) study the impact of warranty period setting
on the efficiency of the supply chain, where the supplier controls the product quality and the
customer decides on order quantity. They show that when the warranty period is determined
by the firm sharing the larger proportion of total warranty costs, the supply chain can achieve
greater system-wide profit.
Those above-mentioned papers mainly focus on ensuring suppliers’ quality management by
different evaluation or penalty policies. However, product architecture has been ignored, i.e.,
the supplier is the single producer of the final product. As a contrast, we discuss a setting when
both the supplier and the manufacturer (OEM) produce their own parts which form the final
product. In such a sense, the setting of this paper resembles (Chao et al., 2009). In their model,
the manufacturer and the supplier both produce components that compose the final product,
but they focus on the recall problem, while the impacting factors are cost sharing contracts.
Unlike Chao et al. (2009), we consider a three stage supply chain where the supplier’s and the
manufacturer’s efforts both affect the product availability on which the customer’s profit relies.
Furthermore, we also incorporate service capacity decision next to the supply chain members’
efforts on quality improvement.
The after-sales service setting in this chapter is that the compensation between the manufacturer
and the customer is under an outcome-based contract. In the streams of literature studying
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performance-based contract, Kim et al. (2007) study how performance-based contracts affect
the supplier’s spare parts inventory decision. Roels et al. (2010) discuss collaborating with
the suppliers under different service contracts. Kim et al. (2010) investigate service capacity
decisions under performance-based contracts. Although the outcome -based payment setting is
similar, our work mainly focuses on how to transfer the accountability of the performance of
the final product to the supplier whose quality control activities are noncontractible. In (Kim
and Tomlin, 2013), they study failure reduction and capacity setting of parallel parties who
make simultaneous decisions. They emphasize the joint failure setting while our work assumes
independent failures and studies sequential games between the supply chain members under
certain types of contracts.
Finally, the model in this paper is based on game theory and contract theory. For the appli-
cation of game theory in OM, Cachon and Netessine (2004) introduce general game-theoretic
models in a SCM setting. Furthermore, Cachon (2004) gives extensive overview on supply
chain coordination with contracts. Our work contributes to this field by combining quality and
service decisions within the context of outcome-based compensations. Unlike revenue sharing
(Cachon and Lariviere, 2005) in the retailing supply chain, we come up with penalty sharing
mechanism for coordinating the after-sales service supply chain.
3.3 Model Setting
We consider a supply chain that consists of a customer, an OEM and a supplier, as shown
in Figure 3.1. The customer buys a durable product (such as industrial equipment) from the
OEM to generate revenue. The customer pays the OEM under an Outcome-based Compen-
sation contract. Under this type of contract, the OEM receives payment from the customer
based on product performance. Normally, product availability is the metric which is adopted
by practitioners to measure product performance. In our model, we assume that the payment
framework between the customer and the OEM is “initial payment + penalty”. At the begin-
ning, the customer pays the OEM a lump sum w. During the contract period, once the product
fails, the OEM is responsible for repairing the failed product. Since the product cannot generate
revenue for the customer during the failure-repairing period, the OEM has to pay a penalty to
the customer with rate κ, which is the penalty per unit downtime.
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of events.
In order to avoid product downtime, the OEM aims at optimizing two managements: improving
product quality to have fewer failure occurrences and investing service capacity to have a quicker
failure repair. In practice, industrial machines are often assembled from many subsystems and
components which are produced by the suppliers. Furthermore, the quality of the final product
is dependent on the various components. To capture this feature, in this chapter, we assume
the final product consists of two parts - part s and part m which are manufactured by the
supplier and the OEM respectively. The OEM acquires part s from the supplier and assembles
it with part m to form the final product. In addition, We assume that the product has a series
structure and the malfunction of any of the parts leads to a product failure. The OEM can exert
efforts on improving the quality of part m, however, the OEM is unable to dictate the supplier
to improve the quality of part s. Therefore, the OEM has to design appropriate contracts that
can incentivize the supplier to product part s with a higher quality2.
The sequence of events is as shown in Figure 3.1. (1) The OEM receives an order from the
customer3. The product and its after-sales service are delivered based on an outcome-based
contract. Without loss of generality, we normalize the contract period to 1. The OEM sets the
contract terms w and κ. Meanwhile, the OEM exert quality improvement effort and manufac-
tures part m. At the same time, the OEM offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the supplier
to acquire part s. The contract between the OEM and the supplier can be PO, RCS, or PS.
Specifically,
2In practice, asking the supplier to improve the part quality can be very difficult to implement because the
supplier’s effort is hardly possible to be monitored in an easy and cost-effective way, especially when there are
multiple suppliers or under global sourcing. That is the reason why such cases usually fall into the Moral-Hazard
setting, which is captured by Principal-Agent models in this chapter.
3To simplify the model and emphasize the main focus, we first assume there is a single product in the supply
chain, which is similar to the setting in (Kim et al., 2010).
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• under PO, the OEM pays the supplier a price p1 to buy part s. After that, the supplier
is not involved in the after-sales support for the product.
• under RCS, the OEM first pays the supplier a price p2 to buy part s. During the contract
period, the supplier has to bear the repair cost incurred by failures of part s.
• under PS, the OEM first pays the supplier a price p3 to buy part s. Instead of sharing
repair cost, the supplier has to share the OEM’s penalty which is caused by the downtime
of part s.
In addition, the OEM also has a service capacity µ to conduct repairing product failures during
the product support process. In the model, µ can be a given parameter (exogenous) or can be
set by the OEM (endogenous). (2) If the supplier accepts the contract, he manufactures part
s. Depending on the OEM’s contracts, the supplier may also exert quality improvement effort
on part s. Then the supplier delivers part s to the OEM. (3) The OEM assembles part m and
part m into the final product and delivers it to the customer. (4) The customer starts running
the product and the OEM commences after-sales product support. In case failure occurs, the
OEM repairs the defective parts4 and pays a penalty based on the duration of downtime.
As a general custom in literature, we assume that part s and part m fail independently according
to two Poisson processes. Given a quality level, the initial failure rate is λs0 and λm0. After the
quality improvement effort is exerted, the failure rate becomes λs and λm. Let N denote the
total number of part failures during the contract period. The expected value E[N ] = λs + λm.
The repair lead time for each failure is Si, i = 1, .., N , which are independent and identically
distributed with rate 1/µ, where µ is the service capacity. It is straightforward to see that a
large capacity implies short downtime. Since each part failure leads to a system offline, the
total system downtime can be formulated as
∑N
i=1 Si, and the uptime is 1−
∑N
i=1 Si. It can be
proved that
∑N
i=1 Si satisfies a Compound Poisson distribution with parameters (λi + λs, 1/µ).
Finally, the cost breakdown is as follows. The cost of the quality improvement effort is Ci(∆λi),
where ∆λi = λi0 − λi, i = s,m denoting the supplier and the OEM respectively. We assume
that Ci(∆λ) is increasing and convex in ∆λ. In order to make the model tractable for further
analysis, following literature such as (Heese and Swaminathan, 2006; Ju and Wan, 2012), we use
quadratic functions to represent the effort cost. Let Cs(∆λs) = cs(λs0 − λs)2 and Cm(∆λm) =
4In §3.6.1, we also look at the setting when the OEM and the supplier have individual service capacity and
repair their own part.
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cm(λm0 − λm)2, where cs and cm are effort cost coefficients. Besides, the production cost of
part s for the supplier is Ks, and the production cost of the final product (including the cost
of manufacturing part m) for the OEM is Km. Furthermore, cr is the cost for each repair and
c is the unit service capacity cost.
3.4 Contracting
3.4.1 First Best
As the benchmark, we first analyze the First Best (FB) case when the supplier, the OEM, and
the customer are integrated as a single decision maker. The risk-neutral firm maximizes his
expected profit by setting the level of effort of failure rate reduction for part s and part m
(service capacity µ can be exogenous or endogenous).
max
λs,λm,(µ)
r(1−E[
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λs, λm, µ])−(Ks+Km)−cµ−crE[N |λs, λm]−Cs(∆λ)−Cm(∆λm). (3.1)
The first terms in Equation (3.1) is the total revenue generated by the product. We notice
that the product only generates revenue during uptime 1 − E(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣λs, λm, µ), and r is the
product revenue rate in a unit working time. The remainders are the total costs, which consist
of production cost Km +Ks, service capacity cost cµ, cost of repair crE(N |λs, λm), and cost of
the failure rate reduction efforts Cs(∆λ), Cm(∆λm).
Lemma 3.1. (1) The firm’s profit function is concave5 in λs, λm, and µ.
(2) The optimal solution of FB is as summarized in Table 3.1.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
From Lemma 3.1, we know the optimal effort level and the service capacity for the supply
chain. Furthermore, we can understand how parameters affect the effort level. Let ∆λm =
5not jointly concave
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Table 3.1: Optimal solution of FB.
Exogenous µ Endogenous µ
µ∗ -
cm(r
2 + r(cr − 2cs(λm0 + λs0))µFB∗)
+ 2ccsµ
FB∗3) = csr(r + crµFB∗),
if
µFB∗ <
3(cm + cs)r
2(cm(2cs(λm0 + λs0)− cr)− crcs) .
λ∗m, λ
∗
s
λFB∗m = λm0 −
r + crµ
2cmµ
,
λFB∗s = λs0 −
r + crµ
2csµ
.
λFB∗m = λm0 −
r + crµ
FB∗
2cmµFB∗
,
λFB∗s = λs0 −
r + crµ
FB∗
2csµFB∗
.
λm0 − λ∗m(FB). If µ is exogenous, we have ∂∆λm/∂r > 0, ∂∆λm/∂cr > 0, ∂∆λm/∂cm < 0,
and ∂∆λm/∂µ < 0. If the customer’s revenue rate r increases, the central firm will exert more
effort on reducing the failure rate. If the repair cost increases, similarly, the effort level will
increase as well. This is because a lower failure rate implies fewer failure occurrences. If the
repair cost becomes higher, it is optimal to reduce the number of failures. However, if the effort
cost cm, or capacity increases, the effort level will decrease. It is intuitive that if the effort cost
cm increases, the effort level will becomes less. We also observe that increasing service capacity
can decrease the effort level. This is because higher capacity means quicker repair for each
failure; the total downtime will therefore be shortened. This implies the firm can invest less in
reducing the failure rate.
The optimal solutions for λ∗s and λ
∗
m are symmetric. We only need to change the impacting
parameter cm into cs in the denominator. Furthermore, if µ becomes endogenous, i.e., the service
capacity can be set by the decision maker, we can obtain the optimal capacity by solving the
polynomial equation with respect to µFB∗ in Table 3.1. However, this characteristic reduces
the tractability of the model and complicates our analysis, especially for contract comparison.
Next, we discuss the decentralized setting where the OEM offers contracts to the supplier. We
first analyze the case with exogenous µ, and then we discuss the endogenous µ case by numerical
analysis.
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3.4.2 Decentralized Supply Chain
Once the setting becomes decentralized, the supplier’s effort becomes incontractible. Let T be
the internal payment between the OEM and the supplier. We have the OEM’s problem as
max
λm,w,κ,(µ)
w − κE(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µ)−Km − cµ− crE[N |λs, λ∗m]− Cm(∆λm)− T
s.t.
r[1− E(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µ)]− w + κE(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µ) ≥ 0, (IR-C)
pis(λ
∗
s) = T −Ks − Cs(∆λ∗s) ≥ 0, (IR-S)
λ∗s = arg maxpis(λs). (IC-S)
(3.2)
The objective function of the OEM is to maximize the expected profit by setting the optimal
effort level λm, the PBC contract terms (w and κ) while taking the supplier’s decision λ
∗
s
into account. We can interpret the OEM’s profit as the revenue received from the customer
w−κE(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µ) minus the total costs which consist of the production cost Km, service
capacity cost cµ, repair cost crE[N |λs, λ∗m], effort cost Cm(∆λm), and the expected payment
transferred to the supplier T . The form of the internal payment T depends on the type of
contracts.
(i) Under PO, the OEM only pays the supplier a selling price of part s. Then T = p1.
(ii) Under RCS, the supplier has to bear the repair cost of part s. The repair cost of part s is
crNs, where Ns is the number of failures of part s. So we have T = p2 − crλ∗s.
(iii) Under PS, the supplier shares the penalty with the OEM. The penalty is allocated by the
downtime caused by failure of the parts. The downtime due to failure of part s is
∑Ns
i=1 S
s
i
∣∣∣λ∗s, µ,
where Ssi is the ith failure of part s, and Ns is the total failures of part s. Then, we have
T = p3 − κE(
∑Ns
i=1 S
s
i
∣∣∣λ∗s, µ).
Compared to the FB, there are more constraints in the OEM’s problem. The first IR-C is
the Individual Rationality constraint for the customer, which states that the customer’s profit
should be no less than a reserved level (normalized to 0). Similarly, the second IR-S constraint
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states that the supplier’s profit should also be no less than 0. The IR constraints ensure the
participation of the customer and the supplier. In addition, there is an IC-S constraint. In
the decentralized supply chain setting, the supplier just chooses an effort level which is best
for his own profit, rather than the desired level for the OEM. Here the IC-S is the Incentive
Compatibility constraint to capture the supplier’s individual interest.
3.5 Analysis of Contracts
3.5.1 Exogenous µ
First, we start with the exogenous µ case. The OEM’s service capacity is exogenously specified.
The OEM designs the contract terms and the effort level of quality improvement for part m.
Given the contracts, the supplier sets the effort level on part s.
Lemma 3.2. (1) Unique equilibrium solutions can be obtained under all contracts. The re-
sults are as summarized in Table 3.2.
(2) IR-C and IR-S constraints are binding at equilibrium.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Table 3.2: Equilibrium solution under contracts, exogenous µ.
PO RCS PS
λ∗m λm0 − r+crµ2cmµ λm0 −
r+crµ
2cmµ
λm0 − r+crµ2cmµ
λ∗s λs0 λs0 − cr2cs λs0 −
r+crµ
2csµ
p∗1,2,3 Ks Ks + crλs0 − cr
2
4cs
Ks + crλs0 − cr24cs −
r(r+2(cr−2csλs0)µ)
4csµ2
w∗, κ∗ w∗ = r − (r−κ∗)(λ∗m+λs0)
µ
w∗ = r − (r−κ∗)(λ∗m+λ∗s)
µ
κ∗ = r + crµ
By analyzing the results in Lemma 3.2, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.3. (1) The OEM’s effort is independent of the type of contracts which are
offered to the supplier.
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(2) Under PO, the supplier exerts no effort on failure rate reduction. RCS and PS can induce
the supplier to exert effort on failure rate reduction.
(3) Under RCS, the supplier’s effort level is increasing in cr and decreasing in cs.
(4) Under PS, the supplier’s effort level is increasing in r and cr, and is decreasing in cs and
µ.
The proof can be found in Appendix C.
From Table 3.2, we can see that the OEM’s effort remains the same across contracts. In other
words, the supplier’s activity does not impact the OEM’s decision on the optimal effort level.
This is because the failure processes of part s and part m are independent. As the leader in
contracting, the OEM’s activity is not affected by the supplier’s following-up action. However,
the supplier’s effort level is affected by the type of contracts. PO cannot induce the supplier
to exert effort. On the other hand, the supplier is willing to invest in failure reduction under
RCS and PS. Under RCS, the supplier has to pay for the repair cost of part s. Thus, if λs is
reduced, the supplier’s service cost payment will become less. We have ∂∆λRCSs /∂cr > 0, and
∂∆λRCSs /∂cs < 0. As cr increases, the supplier will pay more for the repair cost. So the supplier
should reduce the failure rate to a lower level. Similarly, under PS, the supplier’s payment on
penalty will decrease if downtime is reduced. Since lowering failure rate can reduce downtime,
the supplier is also incentivized to invest in failure reductions. In Proposition 3.3, we also notice
that the supplier’s effort is not affected by µ under RCS, but is decreasing in it under PS. The
intuition is that under RCS, the supplier only pays for the repair cost which is only related to
the number of failures; under PS, the supplier pays for the penalty which is determined both by
the number of failures and the repair lead time. An increase in capacity can reduce the product
downtime, but does not affect the failure rate. Hence, the supplier’s effort is decreasing in µ
under PS and is independent of µ under RCS.
Proposition 3.4. (1) Under PO and RCS, the supplier under-invests in the effort of fail-
ure rate reduction on part s.
(2) For the OEM, piPS∗m > pi
RCS∗
m > pi
PO∗
m .
(3) The OEM’s profit is concave in µ if λm0 < 2λs0.
(4) PS achieve the First Best profits and coordinate the supply chain.
Chapter 3. Coordinating Product Support Supply Chains 75
The proof can be found in Appendix D.
Although both RCS and PS can motivate the supplier to exert an effort, the supply chain
members’ profits are different. Proposition 3.4 gives the results of contract comparison. First
of all, compared to FB, PO and RCS lead to under-investment in the effort of failure rate
reduction. Since there is no effort under PO, it is obvious that the optimal failure rate under
PO is higher than FB. For RCS, the supplier’s effort is less than FB. Concretely, we have
∆λPSs −∆λRCSs = r2csµ . Since ∂ r2csµ/∂µ < 0, we know that the under-investment under RCS is
decreasing in µ. Furthermore, the supplier’s effort under PS is equivalent to the FB. In other
words, PS can have the same efficiency as FB in inducing the supplier’s quality improvement
effort. As shown in Figure 3.2, the reduced failure rate under PS is the lower than RCS. As µ
increases, the gap between the two is decreasing.
Figure 3.2: Optimal failure rate of part s at equilibrium under contracts, exogenous µ.
r = 100, cs = 20, cm = 20, λm0 = 1, λs0 = 1, c = 1, cr = 10.
Because the supplier’s effort under PS achieves FB, we can conclude that the efficiency of PS
is the highest. RCS can incentivize the supplier and thus it’s efficiency is higher than PO.
Furthermore, since IR-S constraints are all binding at equilibrium, the supplier has no surplus
whereas the OEM obtains all supply chain’s profit. Consequently, for the OEM’s profit, we
have PS > RCS > PO. Specifically, we can prove that
piPS∗m − piPO∗m =
(r + crµ)
2
4csµ2
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and
piPS∗m − piRCS∗m =
r2
4csµ2
.
Because ∂ (r+crµ)
2
4csµ2
/∂µ < 0, and ∂ r
2
4csµ2
/∂µ < 0, the profit difference between PO, RCS and PS
are decreasing in µ. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the OEM’s profit changes in µ under contracts.
In general, piPS∗m > pi
RCS∗
m > pi
PO∗
m . As µ increases, the difference of profits becomes smaller.
In addition, we give the sensitivity analysis of the OEM’s profit with respect to parameters in
Table 3.3. The OEM’s profit is increasing in r, decreasing in costs (cm, cs, cr, c), and concave
in µ. If r increases, the OEM can offer a higher price to the customer, and then the OEM’s
revenue increases. Any increase in cost will make the profit lower. In addition, as µ increases,
the repair lead time becomes less. However, the failure reduction effort also becomes lower. As
a result, when µ is small, the profit benefits more from the reduction of repair lead time. When
µ becomes sufficiently large, the profit can be decreasing in µ in that the effort level decreases
largely which makes the failure rate become higher.
Another conclusion that we can verify is ∂p∗1/µ = ∂p
∗
2/µ = 0, ∂p
∗
3/µ < 0. That is to say
that under PO and RCS, the price of the supplier’s part is not affected by the OEM’s service
capacity. However, under PS, the OEM can pay less for a part if he has a higher capacity. The
intuition of this result is that under PO or RCS, how quickly a product failure can be restored
is beyond the supplier’s concern. But, if the supplier has to share product downtime penalty,
he is willing to accept a lower price if the OEM’s service rate is increased, because a shorter
repair lead time implies a less penalty for the supplier.
Table 3.3: Sensitivity of the OEM’s profit at equilibrium under contracts, exogenous µ.
r cs cm cr c µ
piPO∗m ↑ - ↓ ↓ ↓ y
piRCS∗m ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ y
piPS∗m ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ y
3.5.2 Endogenous µ
In previous sections, we have assumed that µ is exogenously specified. In this section, we
incorporate µ as an decision variable for the OEM , i.e., the OEM can set an optimal level of
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Figure 3.3: The OEM’s profit at equilibrium under contracts, exogenous µ. r = 100, cs =
20, cm = 20, λm0 = 1, λs0 = 1, c = 1, cr = 10.
the service capacity. Although endogenizing µ reduces the tractability of the model, we can
show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, as summarized in Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.5. (1) Under PO, the supplier’s effort is 0. The optimal capacity µPO∗ satisfies
r(2cm(λm0 + λs0)− cr)µPO∗ − r2 − 2ccmµPO∗3 = 0.
(2) Under RCS, λRCS∗s = λs0 − cr2cs . The optimal capacity µRCS∗ satisfies csr2 + (cmcrr +
csr(cr − 2cm(λm0 + λs0)))µRCS∗ + 2ccmcsµRCS∗3 = 0.
(3) Under PS, the optimal capacity µPS∗ satisfies r2(cm + cs) + (crcsr + cmr(cr − 2cs(λm0 +
λs0)))µ
PS∗ + 2ccmcsµPS∗
3
= 0, and λPS∗s = λs0 − r2csµPS∗ .
The proof can be found in Appendix E.
Once µ can be set by the OEM, the optimal capacity under contracts can be obtained by solving
the equations as given in Lemma 3.5. We notice that under PO and RCS, endogenizing µ does
not impact the supplier’s decision on the effort. Similar to the exogenous µ case, the supplier
does not invest in failure rate reduction under PO. Under RCS, the supplier exerts an effort,
nevertheless, the level of effort is independent of µ∗. The correlation of λ∗s and µ
∗ is only seen
under PS. Moreover, we have ∂λPS∗s /∂µ
PS∗ > 0, i.e., the game under PS is supermodular with
resect to µ and λs. After obtaining the equilibrium solution, we can compare the results across
contacts.
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Proposition 3.6. (1) Under PO and RCS, the OEM over-invest in service capacity, i.e.,
µPO∗ > µFB∗, µRCS∗ > µFB∗.
(2) Under PO and RCS, the supplier under-invest in failure rate reduction, i.e., λPO∗s >
λFB∗s , λ
RCS∗
s > λ
FB∗
s .
(3) PS achieves the First Best decision in both capacity and effort, and coordinate the supply
chain.
The proof can be found in Appendix F.
Once the decision structure becomes decentralized, PO and RCS lead to over-investment in
service capacity, whereas PS realize the FB solution. For the level of effort, under PO and
RCS, the supplier’s investment in failure reduction effort is less than the FB, while PS can
result in the equivalent solution. Under PO, the supplier does not exert any effort. Under
RCS, the supplier’s effort level is lower than the FB. The product failure rate under these two
contracts are higher than the FB and PS, as shown in Figure 3.5. Consequently, the OEM have
to invest more in capacity to deal with higher failure rate. In such a case, over-investment in
capacity appears. In Figure 3.4, we can see that µPO∗ > µRCS∗ > µPS∗. More importantly, PS
has the property of coordinating the supply chains as the exogenous µ case. Even if the OEM
can set up the capacity for his own good, the supplier can still exert the failure reduction effort to
the optimal level, which realizes the maximum profit for the OEM. Because µ∗ is determined by
solving the cubic functions, we can not show the closed-form solutions and compare the OEM’s
profit analytically. However, since PS achieve the FB, and PO have the highest efficiency loss,
it can be concluded that for the OEM’s profit, piPS∗m > pi
RCS∗
m > pi
PO∗
m . This argument is also
verified by numerical experiment. In Figure 3.6, we give the OEM’s profit at equilibrium under
contracts. From the Figure, we can see that profits are decreasing in λm0. The OEM’s profit
is always the highest under PS. Profit becomes lower under RCS, and PO are even worse than
RCS.
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Figure 3.4: Optimal service capacity at equilibrium under contracts, endogenous µ.
Figure 3.5: Optimal failure rate at equilibrium under contracts, endogenous µ. λ∗ = λ∗s+λ∗m.
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Figure 3.6: The OEM’s profit at equilibrium under contracts,endogenous µ.
3.6 Some Extensions
3.6.1 Individual Capacity
In previous sections, we have assumed that the OEM has the capacity to repair both part m
and part s. In practice, the manufacturer can be the unique service provider for the part. For
the setting in this chapter, the OEM may not have the resource to repair part s once failure
occurs. On the contrary, the supplier and the OEM have individual capacity µm and µs to
repair their own part. The OEM is sill the accountable service provider for the customer, yet
he has to ask the supplier to maintenance part s. Under this circumstance, we discuss two
types of contracts - Service Outsourcing (SO) and Penalty Sharing (PS). Under the former, if
part s fails, the OEM calls on the supplier to repair it, and pays pr for each service; under the
latter, the supplier still has to repair part s and shares the penalty with the OEM. Then, the
OEM’s problem becomes
Chapter 3. Coordinating Product Support Supply Chains 81
max
λm,w,κ,pr,(µm)
w − κE(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µm, µs)−Km − cµm − crλm − Cm(∆λm)− prλ∗s
s.t.
r[1− E(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µm, µs)]− w + κE(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µm, µs) ≥ 0, (IR-C)
pis(λ
∗
s) = prλ
∗
s −Ks − crλ∗s − cµs − Cs(∆λ∗s) ≥ 0, (IR-S)
λ∗s = arg maxpis(λs). (IC-S)
(3.3)
and
max
λm,w,κ,p,(µm)
w − κE(
Nm∑
i=1
Smi
∣∣∣∣∣λm, µm)−Km − cµm − crλm − Cm(∆λm)− p4
s.t.
r[1− E(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µm, µs)]− w + κE(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λm, λ∗s, µm, µs) ≥ 0, (IR-C)
pis(λ
∗
s) = p4 − κE(
Ns∑
i=1
Ssi
∣∣∣∣∣λ∗s, µs)−Ks − crλ∗s − cµs − Cs(∆λ∗s) ≥ 0, (IR-S)
λ∗s = arg maxpis(λs). (IC-S)
(3.4)
From Equation (3.3) and (3.4), we can see that the OEM and the supplier build their own
capacity µm and µs, and incurs the repair cost crλm and crλs. Under SO, the OEM pays
the service fee pλ∗s to the supplier. Under PS, the OEM and the supplier repairs their own
part and share the penalty based on the downtime of part s (E(
Ns∑
i=1
Ssi
∣∣∣∣λs, µs)) and part m
(E(
Nm∑
i=1
Smi
∣∣∣∣λm, µm)). In this setting, endogenous µ becomes highly untractable. We have shown
that endogenizing µ does not change the insights significantly, we only look at the exogenous µ
case for this individual capacity setting. We have the unique equilibrium solution summarized
in Table 3.4.
Proposition 3.7. (1) Under SO, the supplier does not invest in failure reduction.
(2) The OEM’s profit under PS is higher than SO.
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Table 3.4: Equilibrium solution of the individual capacity case, exogenous µ.
FB SO PS
λ∗m λm0 − r+crµm2cmµm λm0 −
r+crµm
2cmµm
λm0 − r+crµm2cmµm
λ∗s λs0 − r+crµs2csµs λs0 λs0 −
r+crµs
2csµs
p∗r,4 - cr +
Ks+cµs
λs0
Ks − cr
2
4cs
+ crλs0 + cµs
− r(r + 2(cr − 2csλs0)µs)
4csµs2
w∗, κ∗ - / w∗ = r, κ∗ = r
(3) PS achieve the FB and coordinate the supply chain.
The proof can be found in Appendix G.
Once the supplier has his own service capacity to repair part s, the supplier does not invest in
the effort of reducing failure rate. Recall that in the setting where only the OEM has service
capacity, the supplier has investment in effort under RCS. However, in this individual capacity
setting, even if the supplier still bears the repair cost of part s, the supplier cannot be induced
to exert any effort on quality improvement. This is because the the service fee received from the
OEM covers the repair cost. The supplier’s revenue depends on the failure occurrence of part
s. Intuitively, the supplier’s revenue increases with failure rate of part s. Thus, the supplier
has no incentives to make part s more reliable. As such, SO have efficiency loss due to the
under-investment in the supplier’s effort. On the other hand, PS achieve FB and coordinate
the supply chain. Compared to the single capacity setting, the optimal w and κ are not given
in combinations. The OEM sets w∗ = r, κ∗ = r, i.e., both the initial payment and the penalty
rate are equivalent to the customer’s revenue rate. In this way, the customer’s revenue loss due
to downtime of part s is shifted to the supplier’s profit. As such, the supplier exerts the effort
to a level as the FB. From Figure 3.7, we can see that piPS∗m > pi
SO∗
m . This result shows the
robustness of the PS’s coordinating property. Even if the OEM totally outsources the service
of part s to the supplier, he is still able to induce the supplier to reduce the failure rate of part
s to the desired level, by letting the supplier share the penalty of product downtime.
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Figure 3.7: The OEM’s profit at equilibrium, individual capacity, endogenous µ.
3.6.2 Nonseparable Product
In this section, we discuss the case that once part s and part m have been assembled, the
product becomes nonseparable. In other words, when the product is down, it cannot be figured
out which part causes the product failure. Nevertheless, the RCS and PS contract could also
work. Under RCS, the OEM repairs all the failures, however, he shares the total repair cost
with the supplier in the proportion of θ, (0 < θ < 1) and 1− θ, respectively. Similarly, for the
PS, they share the penalty with the proportion θ and 1− θ.
Proposition 3.8. (1) Under PO, λ∗s = λ
∗
s0; under RCS, λ
∗
s = λs0 − cr(1−θ)2cs ; under PS, λ∗s =
λs0 − r+crµ2csµ .
(2) Under PO and PCS, the supplier under-invests in failure rate reduction. If θ = 1,
λRCS∗s = λ
PO∗
s .
(3) For the OEM, piPS∗m > pi
RCS∗
m > pi
PO∗
m .
(4) PS achieve the First-Best and coordinate the supply chain.
The proof can be found in Appendix H.
If the product becomes nonseparable, the root cause of product failure cannot be figured out.
Thus, it becomes unclear about the contribution of part s and part m to the total system
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downtime. Under RCS, the OEM and the supplier share the total repair cost. Similarly, they
share the total penalty under PS. In this setting, we can show that PO, the same as previous,
cannot induce the supplier to reduce failure rate. Under RCS, the supplier’s effort level is less
than the FB. In addition, we have ∂λRCS∗s /∂θ > 0. In other words, if the OEM bears more
service cost, the supplier will exert less effort. If θ = 1, RCS=W, i.e., if the OEM pays all
the repair cost, the supplier’s effort is 0. Furthermore, under PS, the supplier’s effort level is
independent of θ and archives the FB. For the OEM’s profit, PS> RCS > PO.
The OEM does not have to worry that if θ becomes higher, he will pay more penalty to the
customer under PS. On the contrary, the OEM can change the penalty-sharing proportion by
changing κ. Specifically, κ∗ = r+crµ
1−θ . If θ increases, the penalty rate increases as well. In
this way, the penalty is optimally shared by the OEM and the supplier, and the supplier’s
effort is independent of θ. As such, the supplier’s failure rate reduction can achieve the FB.
The conclusion of this setting enhances the robustness of PS. Even if the liability of product
downtime cannot be identified, PS can still achieve the best outcome for the OEM.
3.6.3 Asymmetric Information
In this section, we introduce Information Asymmetry (AI) into the model. In practice, the
OEM may not have the knowledge about the quality type of the parts manufactured by the
supplier. Within the context of this setting, we assume that there are two types of quality for
part s, λs0H and λs0L, λs0H > λs0L. However, the OEM does not know the true type of part s
beforehand. He estimates the initial failure rate to be λs0H with probability ρ, and to be λs0L
with probability 1−ρ. Then the OEM offers a menu of contracts for λs0H and λs0L respectively,
and the supplier selects the contracts based on the quality type of part s. The OEM’s problem
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under AI can be written as
max
λmH , wH , κH , TH ,
λmL, wL, κL, TL
ρ
(
wH − κHE(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λmH , λ∗sH , µ)−Km − cµ− cr(λ∗sH + λmH)− Cm(∆λmH)− TH
)
+
(1− ρ)
(
wL − κLE(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λmL, λ∗sL, µ)−Km − cµ− cr(λ∗sL + λmL)− Cm(∆λmL)− TL
)
s.t.
r[1− E(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λ∗sH(L), µ)]− wH(L) + κH(L)E(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣∣λ∗sH(L), µ) ≥ 0, (IR-C)
pisH(L)(λ
∗
sH(L)) = TH(L) −Ks − Cs(∆λ∗sH(L)) ≥ 0, (IR-S)
λ∗sH(L) = arg maxpisH(L)(λsH(L)), (IC1)
pisH(λ
∗
sH) > pisH(λ
∗
sL), pisL(λ
∗
sL) > pisL(λ
∗
sH). (IC2)
(3.5)
The objective function in Equation (3.5) is the OEM’s expected profit under AI. The OEM has
to design two sets of contract terms TH and TL for the supplier, and (wH , κH) and (wL, κL)
for the customer, in response to the supplier’s specification of the quality type of part s. In
other words, if the supplier states that the quality type of part s is λs0H , the OEM will offer
a contract with term TH , and vice versa. Contract term TH(L), depends on the contract type.
Specificity, under PO, TH(L) = p1H(L); under RCS, TH(L) = p2H(L) − cr(λ∗sH(L)); under PS,
TH(L) = p3H(L)−κH(L)E(
Ns∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣λ∗sH(L), µ). For the constraints, IR-C and IR-S are the Individual
Rationality constraints for the customer and the supplier. Both sets of contract terms have to
guarantee the participation of the customer and the supplier. IC1 is the one of the Incentive
Compatibility constraints for the supplier, which captures that the supplier’s effort maximizes
his own profit. IC2 is the other Incentive Compatibility constraint in this AI setting. Based on
the Revelation Principle, IC2 makes the supplier “tell the truth” regarding the quality type of
part s. If the supplier lies, his profit will be lower than that if he tells the truth. For example,
assuming the true quality type of part s is λs0H , the optimal reduced effort is λ
∗
sH . If the supplier
tells the truth, his payoff will be TH(λ
∗
sH) − Ks − Cs(∆λ∗sH). Otherwise, if the supplier gives
the false information, his profit will be TH(λ
∗
sL) − Ks − Cs(∆λ∗sL). The IC2 constraint forces
pisH(λ
∗
sH) > pisH(λ
∗
sL), so that the supplier can only be better off if he reveals the information
truthfully.
Again, due to tractability issues, we only discuss the exogenous µ case.
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Lemma 3.9. (1) Under PO, λ∗sH(L) = λs0H(L), and pi
∗
sH = pi
∗
sL = 0.
(2) Under RCS, p∗2H = p
∗
2L = crλs0H − cr
2
4cs
, λ∗sH(L) = λs0H(L) − cr2cs . In addition, pi∗sH = 0,
pi∗sL = cr(λs0H − λs0L) > 0.
(3) Under PS, λ∗sH =
λs0H−λs0L(1−ρ)
ρ
− r+crµ
2csµ
, λ∗sL = λs0L − r+crµ2csµ . The penalty rate κ∗H =
(r + crµ) − 2cs(λs0H − λs0L)µ (1−ρ)ρ , κ∗L = r + crµ. Furthermore, pi∗sH = 0, pi∗sL = (λs0H −
λs0L)
(
r+crµ
µ
− 2cs(λs0H−λs0L)(1−ρ)
ρ
)
> 0.
The proof can be found in Appendix I.
Like the Symmetric Information (SI) case, PO cannot make the supplier exert any effort. Under
RCS, the supplier’s effort level depends on the initial failure rate, repair cost cr, and effort cost
cs. From Lemma 3.9, we also notice that the repair prices for the two failure rate types are
the same. Only the high failure rate λs0H affects repair pricing. Besides, IR-S constraint for
low failure rate is not binding. For both PO and RCS, the OEM’s estimation probability
ρ does not impact the supplier’s effort level. However, under PS, given a high failure rate,
λ∗sH =
λs0H−λs0L(1−ρ)
ρ
− r+crµ
2csµ
. But, if λs0 = λs0L, i.e., given a low failure rate, the customer’s
estimating probability does not affect the supplier’s decision, and the supplier’s profit is greater
than 0.
Let the centralized setting under AI be the Second Best (SB) case. Under SB, there is no
internal payment, but information asymmetry still exists. The central planner maximizes the
expected profit, estimating λs0 = λs0H with probability θ, and λs0 = λs0L with probability 1−θ.
SB can be the comparing benchmark for the decentralized setting under AI.
Proposition 3.10. (1) Under PO and RCS, λ∗sH(L) > λ
FB∗
sH(L), i.e., the supplier under-
invests in the effort of failure rate reduction.
(2) Under PS, λ∗sH > λ
FB∗
sH , λ
∗
sL = λ
FB∗
sL , i.e., the supplier under-invests in the effort of
failure rate reduction under a high failure rate but achieves SB solution under a low failure
rate.
(3) PS cannot coordinate the supply chain. For the OEM’s profit, ΠFB∗ > piPS∗m > pi
RCS∗
m >
piPO∗m .
(4) Under a low failure rate, the supplier can receive extra profit under RCS and PS.
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The proof can be found in Appendix J.
As in the SI case, the supplier still invests less effort under PO and RCS. Furthermore, the level
of the under-investment does not become worse duo to hidden information. In other words,
ρ does not affect the supplier’s effort under PO and RCS. However, information asymmetry
decreases the efficiency of PS. Under SI, PS can achieve the FB solution, whereas under AI,
PS can only achieve SB with regards to the supplier’s effort when the failure rate of part s is
low. If part s has a high failure rate, the supplier under-invests in the effort level. Moreover,
we have ∂∆λ∗sH/∂ρ =
λs0H−λs0L
ρ2
> 0, i.e., the supplier’s effort level under a high failure rate is
increasing in ρ. If the OEM believes that it is more likely that the failure rate of part s is high,
the supplier will exert more effort to reduce failure rate. As shown in Figure 3.8, given a high
failure rate, the supplier’s effort under PO and RCS is lower than FB, and are independent of
ρ. For PS, the supplier’s effort level increases in ρ. Particularly, PS converges with FB if ρ = 1.
The increasing effort implies that the supplier’s decision comes closer to the SB if he has more
“correct” estimation. Specificity, if the true failure rate is high, and the OEM believes it is
high, i.e., ρ = 1, the supplier can make the optimal decision.
Figure 3.8: Optimal failure rate of part s under AI, λs0 = λs0H .
Although the supplier’s effort can achieve SB when failure rate is low, PS cannot coordinate
the supply chain under AI. If we compare the OEM’s profit under three contracts, we have
PS > RCS > PO. Thus, efficiency loss under PS is the lowest. This result resembles the SI
case. As shown in Figure 3.9, the OEM’s profit under contracts are lower than the SB case.
On the other hand, PS has the highest profit compared to RCS and PO. Another result can
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Figure 3.9: The OEM’s expected profit under AI.
be seen is that the OEM’s profits are decreasing in ρ. Analytically, we have ∂ΠSB∗/∂ρ =
− (λs0H−λs0L)(r+crµ)
µ
< 0, ∂piPS∗m /∂ρ = − cs(λs0H−λs0L)
2(1−ρ2)
ρ2
< 0, ∂piRCS∗m /∂ρ = − r(λs0H−λs0L)µ < 0,
and ∂piPO∗m /∂ρ = − (λs0H−λs0L)(r+crµ)µ < 0. In addition, PS converges with SB at ρ = 1. Finally,
the supplier can have a surplus under RCS and PS if the failure rate of part s is low. This
is the “information rent” caused by information asymmetry. Without this extra payment,
the supplier will over-state the quality of part s, i.e., the supplier will state part s has a
low failure rate even if the actual failure rate is high. In addition, we have ∂piRCS∗sL /∂ρ = 0,
∂piPS∗sL /∂ρ =
2cs(λs0H−λs0L)2
ρ2
> 0. In other words, the supplier’s extra profit is independent of ρ
under RCS, and is increasing in ρ under PS.
3.6.4 Multiple Products
In previous sections, the model is established based on the setting where there is a single product
in the supply chain. In this section, we relax this assumption and allow for a multiple products
case. Assuming the customer buysM (identical) products from the OEM. Each product consists
one part s and one part m, with failure rate λs and λm respectively. Therefore, there are M part
s and M part m in the supply chain. The failure process of part s and part m are independent.
Whenever a failure occurs (it can be part s and part m), the product enters the OEM’s repair
facility. The service capacity is µ. We assume the OEM has ample servers and the failure-repair
process can be seen as a M/M/∞ queue (similar assumption as in Kim et al., 2007). Then,
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each failure cause a 1/µ downtime. For M part s and part m, the total expected number of
failures is M(λs + λm), and the expected total system downtime is
M(λs+λm)
µ
. The decision
structure and business sequence are the same as the previous case. Solving the problem with
multiple products, we have the results summarized in Proposition 3.11.
Proposition 3.11. (1) Under PO, λPO∗s = λs0; under RCS, λ
RCS∗
s = λs0 − Mcr2cs ; under PS,
λPS∗s = λs0 − M(r+crµ)2csµ .
(2) λFB∗s = λ
PS∗
s < λ
RCS∗
s < λ
PO∗
s , i.e., the supplier under-invests in the effort of failure
rate reduction under PO and RCS, whereas PS achieve the FB.
The proof can be found in Appendix K.
From Proposition 3.11, we know that if even considering multiple products, which captures
the fact that quality improvement effort is usually exerted on the whole production system or
product design so that all the products can be affected, PS still achieve the First Best result in
aligning the supplier’s incentives.
3.7 Conclusion
Manufacturing and servicing durable products involve collaboration of supply chain partners.
The OEM usually faces challenges of incentivizing the suppliers to improve part reliability
with the objective to improve product availability. In this chapter, we focus on a three stage
supply chain setting, where an outcome-based payment is adopted between the OEM and the
customer. The performance of the final product depends on both the OEM and the supplier’s
effort, yet the OEM cannot directly dictate the supplier’s quality improvement efforts. We
introduce three types of contracts - price-only contracts, repair cost sharing contracts, and
penalty sharing contracts between the OEM and the supplier, and investigate how the OEM
designs the optimal contract terms to induce the supplier to exert effort on part failure reduction
and to maximize the profit.
First, we develop a moral hazard model to capture the setting when the OEM has the capacity
to repair both of the parts, and the repair capacity level is exogenous. We show that price-
only contracts cannot induce the supplier to exert any quality improvement effort. Repair cost
sharing contracts cause under-investment in the supplier’s effort. Penalty sharing contracts
Chapter 3. Coordinating Product Support Supply Chains 90
overcome the under-investment problem and achieve the First Best solution for the supply
chain. Only allocating the service cost to the supplier based on the failures of his part does
not give sufficient incentive to the supplier to invest in the effort to an optimal level. However,
asking the supplier to share the OEM’s penalty due to the downtime of the final product can
make the supplier improve the part quality to the desired level. Next, we endogenize the service
capacity as one of the OEM’s decision variables. We show that price-only contracts and repair
cost sharing contracts lead to over-investment in service capacity for the OEM, and under-
investment in the effort of failure reduction for the supplier. Penalty sharing can achieve the
First Best solution and generate the highest profit for the OEM and the supply chain. The
main managerial insights derived from our model give suggestions for the performance-based
contractors on how to collaborate and share the responsibility with their business partners.
Linking the performance measure of the final product to part suppliers can result in a most
efficient supply chain.
Subsequently, we examine the robustness of the model by introducing more settings. First,
we introduce the individual capacity setting, where the supplier and the OEM take care of
the service of their own parts. Under such circumstances, paying the supplier a service fee for
each repair cannot induce the supplier to invest in the part quality improvement. On the other
hand, penalty sharing can realize the First Best solution by setting an appropriate penalty rate.
Then, we discuss the case when the final product is nonseparable once it has been assembled.
In this setting, the liability of product failure cannot be allocated to the certain part. For repair
cost sharing and penalty sharing contracts, the supplier and the OEM share the total repair
cost/penalty by a predefined proportion. Our model shows that repair cost sharing contracts
still result in under-investment for the supplier’s effort level, and penalty sharing contracts
coordinate the supply chain. The extensions of the above two cases expand the application
area of the penalty sharing contracts. Even if the OEM has no capacity to repair the supplier’s
part, or the failure root cause analysis is not applicable to the final product, sharing penalties
can realize the best outcome for the OEM and the supply chain.
Finally, we put our model into an asymmetric information setting. The supply has private
information on his part, and the customer offers a menu of contracts to screen the part quality.
We develop a screening game model with moral hazard and analyze how information asymmetry
affects the supply chain partners’ decision. We find that penalty sharing contracts outperform
other contracts, however, all contracts have efficiency loss and due to information asymmetry.
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In this chapter, we compare price-only contracts, repair cost sharing contracts and penalty
sharing contracts in a decentralized supply chain setting. We show that only penalty sharing
contracts can lead to the First Best results, while the other two have efficiency loss. However,
we do observe that in practice penalty sharing is not the single dominate contract; on the
contrary, price-only contracts and cost sharing contracts are widely used by companies. This
may due to the easiness of the implementation. First, the implementation of the price-only
contract is the easiest. Both cost sharing and penalty sharing require deep involvement of the
supplier. The supplier has to verify the cause of the failure of the final product, which adds
lots of administrative burden. Second, compared to penalty sharing, cost sharing contracts
have less hassle. The supplier only has to confirm the failure of his part. However, under
penalty sharing, the penalty is based on product downtime. Even if the product breakdown
is duo to the supplier’s part, how quickly the failure can be repaired may depend on the
OEM. As such, the supplier has to verify the OEM’s repair activity. We can see that the cost
of contract implementation may affect the choice of contract, which is assumed away in our
model. However, as the fast development of information technology, the supply chain partners’
activity will become more and more transparent and easy to monitor. We believe the benefit
of the penalty sharing contracts will manifest in the long run.
In the model, we have made some assumptions in order to keep its tractability and facilitate
contracts comparison. We can extend the model by relaxing some of the assumptions in fu-
ture research. For example, we have assumed that all supply chain members are risk neutral
agents. But in practice, companies with different size, market power, etc. may have various
risk appetite. Risk aversion can be introduced into the model to study how the risk appetite
affects the supply chain members’ decision. Another limitation of the model is that we only
consider a single contracting period. However, the supply chain members may have multiple
periods contracts and contract terms can be renegotiated at the beginning of each period. We
can add dynamics to our model to study the repeated interactions among the supply chain
members. Last but not least, we consider a supply chain formed by a single customer, a single
manufacturer (OEM), and a single supplier. We can extend the model by adding more parties
in each stage to investigate the supply chain members behavior under competition.
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3.8 Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 3.1. The supply chain’s expected profit is
Π = r(1− λs + λm
µ
)− (Ks +Km)− cµ− cr(λs + λm)− cs(λs0 − λs)2 − cm(λm0 − λm)2.
Taking the second derivative with respect to (w.r.t.) λm, λs, and µ, we have
∂Π2
∂λm
2 = −2cm < 0,
∂Π2
∂λs
2 = −2cs < 0,
∂Π2
∂µ2
= −2r(λm + λs)
µ3
< 0.
So the supply chain’s profit is concave (not jointly concave) in λm, λs, and µ. Note that joint
concavity for all λm, λs, and µ is not necessarily needed to obtain the optimal solution.
1) If µ is exogenous, the Hessian of Π is
HFB =
(
−2cm 0
0 −2cs
)
which is negative definite. So Π is jointly concave in λm and λs. Thus, solving the First Order
Condition (FOC) with w.r.t. λm and λs, we can obtain the optimal solution that maximizes Π.
2) If µ is endogenous, the Hessian of Π w.r.t. λm, λs, and µ is
HFB =

−2cm 0 rµ
0 −2cs rµ
r
µ
r
µ
−2r(λm+λs)
µ3

Solving the FOC w.r.t. λm, λs, and µ, we have λ
FB∗
m , λ
FB∗
s , and µ
FB∗. As long as the Hessian
given λFB∗m , λ
FB∗
s , and µ
FB∗ is negative definite, λFB∗m , λ
FB∗
s , and µ
FB∗ are the optimal solution
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maximizing Π. Placing µ with λFB∗m in the above HFB, we have
HFB =

−2cm 0 rµFB∗2
0 −2cs rµFB∗2
r
µFB∗2
r
µFB∗2
r(cs(r+crµFB∗)+cm(r+(cr−2cs(λm0+λs0))µFB∗))
cmcsµFB∗4

HFB is negative definite iff the determinant of HFB is negative. We have
det[HFB] =
6(cm + cs)r
2 + 4r(crcs + cm(cr − 2cs(λm0 + λs0)))µFB∗
µFB∗4
.
Hence, if 6(cm + cs)r
2 + 4r(crcs + cm(cr − 2cs(λm0 + λs0)))µFB∗ < 0, HFB is negative definite,
and µ∗FB is the maximum point. 
B. Proof of Lemma 3.2. We solve the OEM’s problem under PS. For RCS and W, we can
use similar methods to find out the equilibrium solution. Based on Equation (3.2), we have the
OEM’s problem under PS as
max
λm,w,κ
w − κλm
µ
−Km − cµ− cr(λm + λs)− cm(λm0 − λm)2 − p3
s.t.
r(1− λs + λm
µ
)− w + κλs + λm
µ
≥ 0, (IR-C)
p3 −Ks − cs(λs0 − λs)2 − κλs
µ
≥ 0, (IR-S)
λs = arg max{p3 −Ks − cs(λs0 − λs)2 − κλs
µ
}. (IC-S)
We solve the game by backward induction. Since the OEM is the leader, we first solve the
supplier’s problem, and then put the supplier’s best response into the OEM’s profit function
and constraints. The supplier’s problem is
max
λs
p3 −Ks − cs(λs0 − λs)2 − κλs
µ
.
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The supplier’s profit function is concave in λs and we have the best response of λ
∗
s. Substituting
λ∗s into the OEM’s problem, we have
max
λm,w,κ
cr(κ− 2cs(λm + λs0)µ)− 2cs(κλm + µ(Km + p3 − w + cm(λm − λm0)2 + cµ))
2csµ
s.t.
r − w + κ(−κ+ r)
2csµ2
+
(κ− r)(λm + λs0)
µ
≥ 0, (IR-C)
p3 +
κ(κ− 4csλs0µ)
4csµ2
−Ks ≥ 0. (IR-S)
Then we solve the problem by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (K-K-T) condition. The Lagrangian
of the problem is
L(λm, w, κ, l1, l2) =
cr(κ− 2cs(λm + λs0)µ)− 2cs(κλm + µ(Km + p3 − w + cm(λm − λm0)2 + cµ))
2csµ
+ l1(r − w + κ(−κ+ r)
2csµ2
+
(κ− r)(λm + λs0)
µ
) + l2(p3 +
κ(κ− 4csλs0µ)
4csµ2
−Ks)
where l1, l2 are the Lagrange multipliers. We have the K-K-T condition as
∂L(w, κ, λm, l1, l2)
∂w
= 1− l1 = 0,
∂L(w, κ, λm, l1, l2)
∂κ
=
κ(−2l1 + l2) + (cr − 2cs(λm + l2λs0))µ+ l1(r + 2cs(λm + λs0)µ)
2csµ2
= 0,
∂L(w, κ, λm, l1, l2)
∂p3
= −1 + l2 = 0,
∂L(w, κ, λm, l1, l2)
∂λm
= −κ− κl1 + l1r + (cr + 2cmλm − 2cmλm0)µ
µ
= 0,
l1(r − w + κ(−κ+ r)
2csµ2
+
(κ− r)(λm + λs0)
µ
) = 0,
l2(p3 +
κ(κ− 4csλs0µ)
4csµ2
−Ks) = 0,
l1 ≥ 0, l2 ≥ 0.
Solving the above systems of equations, we have w∗, κ∗, p∗, λ∗s, λ
∗
m as shown in Table 3.2, and
l1 = 1 > 0, l2 = 1 > 0, which satisfies the constraint specified in the last inequality of the K-K-T
condition. Substituting the solution into the equations of the IR-C and IR-S constraints, we
have the left-hand-side equations are 0, i.e., IR-C and IR-S are binding. 
Chapter 3. Coordinating Product Support Supply Chains 95
C. Proof of Proposition 3.3. (1) From Lemma 3.2, we have λ∗m = λm0 − r+crµ2cmµ under all
contracts. It is straightforward to see that λ∗s is independent of cs. (2) From Table 3.2, we have
under PO, λ∗s = λs0; under RCS, λ
∗
s = λs0 − cr2cs ; under PS, λ∗s = λs0 −
r+crµ
2csµ
. Therefore, the
supplier’s effort is 0 under PO and greater than 0 under RCS and PS. (3) Under RCS, we have
∂λ∗s/∂cs =
cr
2cs2
> 0, ∂λ∗s/∂cr = − 12cs < 0. So the effort is is decreasing in cr and increasing in
cs. (4) Under PS, we have ∂λ
∗
s/∂r = − 12csµ < 0, ∂λ∗s/∂cr = − 12cs < 0, ∂λ∗s/∂cs =
r+crµ
2cs2µ
> 0,
and ∂λ∗s/∂µ =
r
2csµ2
> 0. 
D. Proof of Proposition 3.4. (1) The optimal effort level for part s of the FB is λFB∗s =
λs0 − r+crµ2csµ . Comparing to PO, RCS, and PS, we have
λFB∗s − λPO∗s = −
r + crµ
2csµ
< 0,
λFB∗s − λRCS∗s = −
r
2csµ
< 0,
λFB∗s − λPS∗s = 0.
So we can conclude that PO and RCS lead to under-investment in effort and PS achieve FB.
(2) For the OEM’s profit, we have
piPS∗m − λPO∗s =
(r + crµ)
2
4csµ2
> 0,
piPS∗m − λRCS∗s =
r2
4csµ2
> 0,
and (r+crµ)
2
4csµ2
> r
2
4csµ2
, So we have piPS∗m > λ
RCS∗
s > λ
PO∗
s . (3) Differentiating pi
∗
m w.r.t. µ, we have
∂2piPO∗m
µ2
=
r(3r + 2(cr − 2cm(λm0 + λs0))µ)
2cmµ4
,
∂2piRCS∗m
µ2
=
r(2cmcrµ+ cs(3r + 2(cr − 2cm(λm0 + λs0))µ))
2cmcsµ4
,
∂2piPS∗m
µ2
=
r(3(cm + cs)r + 2(crcs + cm(cr − 2cs(λm0 + λs0)))µ)
2cmcsµ4
.
If λm0 < 2λs0, we have
∂2piPO∗m
µ2
< 0, ∂
2piRCS∗m
µ2
< 0, ∂
2piPS∗m
µ2
< 0, and thus pi∗m is concave in µ. 
E. Proof of Lemma 3.5. Under PO, the supplier’s problem is max
λs
p1 −Ks − cs(λs0 − λs)2.
So µ does not affect the supplier’s decision. Similarly, the supplier’s problem under RCS is
max
λs
p2−Ks− cs(λs0 − λs)2− crλs. The supplier’s problem remains the same as the exogenous
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µ case. Under PS, the supplier’s problem becomes max
λs
p3 − Ks − cs(λs0 − λs)2 − κλsµ . Here
we can see that the OEM’s decision on µ plays a role in the supplier’s decision. Solving the
optimization problem, we have the supplier’s best response as λ∗s = λs0− κ2csµ . Substituting the
supplier’s best response to the OEM’s objective functions and constraints and solve the FOCs,
we can obtain the equilibrium solutions given in Lemma 3.5.
F. Proof of Proposition 3.6. Solving the FOC of FB, we have λ∗s and µ
∗ satisfies that
λ∗s = λs0 − r+crµ
∗
2csµ∗ and r
2(cm + cs) + (crcsr + cmr(cr − 2cs(λm0 + λs0)))µ∗ + 2ccmcsµ∗3 = 0. In
addition, for all the cases under three contracts, the best response of the OEM’s decision on µ∗
w.r.t. the supplier’s effort λ∗s satisfies
µ*=
√
r
√
λ*m + λ
∗
s√
c
.
1) Solving the problem under PS, we have κ∗ = r + crµ∗, and λ∗s, µ
∗ the same as the solution
of FB. 2) Under PO, λ∗s = λs0, so λ
PO∗
s > λ
FB∗
s , and µ
PO∗ > µFB∗. 3) Similarly, under RCS,
we have λFB∗s − λRCS∗s = − r2csµ∗ < 0. Thus, µRCS∗ > µFB∗. Hence, under PO and RCS, the
supplier under-invests in the effort, and the OEM over-invests in capacity. 
G. Proof of Proposition 3.7. A hidden constraint is that 0 < λ∗s ≤ λs0, i.e., after being
exerted the effort, the failure rate can only be less or equal to the initial value. Solving the K-
K-T condition of Equation (3.3), we have this constraint is binding, i.e., λ*s = λs0. Furthermore,
we can obtain w∗ = r, κ∗ = r, and λ∗s = λs0 − r+crµs2csµs . Then we have
piPS∗s − piSO∗s =
(r + crµs)
2
4csµs2
> 0,
i.e., piPS∗s > pi
SO∗
s . 
H. Proof of Proposition 3.8. If the product is nonseparable, the problem under PO is the
same as before. Under RCS, the supplier’s problem becomes
max
λs
p−Ks − cs(λs0 − λs)2 − (1− θ)cr(λs + λm).
Then the best response of the supplier is λ∗s = λs0 − cr(1−θ)2cs . So if θ = 1, λ∗s = λs0. Moreover,
we have
λFB∗s − λRCS∗s = −
r + crθµ
2csµ
< 0,
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i.e., the supplier’s effort is less than the FB. Similarly, we can solve the problem under PS. We
have the equilibrium solution κ = r+crµ
1−θ , λ
∗
s = λs0 − r+crµ2csµ . Furthermore, we have
piPS∗m − piRCS∗m =
(r + crθµ)
2
4csµ2
,
piPS∗m − piPO∗m =
(r + crµ)
2
4csµ2
.
Because 0 < θ < 1, (r+crθµ)
2
4csµ2
< (r+crµ)
2
4csµ2
. Thus, piPS∗m > pi
RCS∗
m > pi
PO∗
m . 
I. Proof of Lemma 3.9. We only show the proof of the results under PS. For PO and RCS, the
proof is simpler and can be done in similarly methods. First, we solve the supplier’s problem,
IC1 in Equation (3.5).
max
λsH
pH − κH λsH
µs
− crλsH − cs(λs0H − λsH)2,
max
κL
pL − κLλsL
µs
− crλsL − cs(λs0L − λsL)2.
We have
λ*sH = λs0H −
κH
2csµ
, λ*sL = λs0L −
κL
2csµ
.
Then, we put λ*sH , λ
*
sL into the objective function and constraints IR-S, IR-C. Next, we expand
constraint IC2. For λs0 = λs0H , we have the supplier’s profit of telling the truth (left-hand-side
term) is
pH − cs(λs0H − λsH)2 − κH
µ
(λsH)
∣∣∣∣
λsH=argmax pH−cs(λs0H−λsH)2−κHµ (λsH)
= pH+
κH(κH − 4csλs0Hµ)
4csµ2
.
The supplier’s profit of lying (right-hand-side term) is
pL − cs(λs0H − λsH)2 − κL
µ
(λsH)
∣∣∣∣
λsH=argmax pL−cs(λs0H−λsH)2−κLµ (λsH)
= pL +
κL(κL − 4csλs0Hµ)
4csµ2
.
Then, for λs0 = λs0H , IC2 can be reduced to
pH − pL + (κH − κL)(κH + κL)
4csµ2
− (κH − κL)λs0H
µ
> 0.
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Similarly, we can reduce IC2 for λs0 = λs0L as
pL − pH − (κH − κL)(κH + κL − 4csλs0Lµ)
4csµ2
> 0.
Then we solve the K-K-T condition and obtain the equilibrium
κ∗H=
2cs(λs0H − λs0L)µ(−1 + ρ) + (r + crµ)ρ
ρ
, κ∗L = r + crµ,
λ∗sH =
2csµ(λs0H + λs0L(−1 + ρ))− (r + crµ)ρ
2csµρ
, λ∗sL = λs0L −
r + crµ
2csµ
.
Moreover, pi∗sH = 0, pi
∗
sL = (λs0H − λs0L)κ
∗
H
µ
> 0. 
J. Proof of Proposition 3.10. (1) Because
λPO∗sH(L) − λSB∗sH(L) =
r + crµ
2csµ
> 0,
λRCS∗sH(L) − λSB∗sH(L) =
r
2csµ
> 0,
λPS∗sH − λSB∗sH =
(λs0H − λs0L)(1− ρ)
ρ
> 0,
λPS∗sH − λSB∗sH = 0,
we can conclude that under PO and RCS, the supplier under-invests in the effort. (2) Under
PS, if λs0 = λs0H , the supplier under-invests in effort; if λs0 = λs0L, the supplier’s effort achieves
SB. (3) Comparing the OEM’s effort at equilibrium, we have
ΠSB − piPS∗m =
(λs0H − λs0L)(1− ρ)(cs(λs0H − λs0L)µ(1− ρ) + (r + crµ)ρ)
µρ
> 0,
piPS∗m − piRCS∗m =
r2ρ+ 4cs(λs0H − λs0L)µ(1− ρ)(cs(λs0H − λs0L)µ(1− ρ) + rρ)
4csµ2ρ
> 0,
piRCS∗m − piPO∗m =
cr(2r + µ(cr + 4cs(λs0H − λs0L)(1− ρ)))
4csµ
> 0.
So ΠSB > piPS∗m > pi
RCS∗
m > pi
PO∗
m . (4) Under RCS, pi
∗
sL = cr(λs0H − λs0L) > 0. Under PS,
pi∗sL = (λs0H − λs0L)κ
∗
H
µ
> 0. 
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K. Proof of Proposition 3.11. If there are M products in the supply chain, the problem for
the intergraded firm (FB) becomes
max
λs,λm
Π = Mr(1−λs + λm
µ
)−M(Ks+Km)−cµ−Mcr(λs+λm)−cs(λs0 − λs)2−cm(λm0 − λm)2.
The profit function is concave in λs, and solving the FOC, we have λ
FB∗
s = λs0− M(r+crµ)2csµ . The
problem of the decentralized supply chain becomes
max
w,k,λs,λm
Mw − κ[1− M(λs + λm)
µ
]−MKm − cµ−Mcr(λs + λm)− cm(λm0 − λm)2 − T
s.t.
Mr(1− λs + λm
µ
)−Mw + κ[1− M(λs + λm)
µ
] ≥ 0, IRC
pis(λs
∗) = T −MKs − cs(λs0 − λ∗s)2 ≥ 0, IRS
λs
∗ = arg maxpis(λs). ICS
where
T =

Mp1, PO
Mp2 −Mcrλs, RCS
Mp3 − κMλs
µ
. PS
Solving the above optimization problem, we can obtain the solutions as given in Proposition
3.11. 

Chapter 4
Contract Choice for Product Support
4.1 Introduction
In recent decades, service outsourcing has been world-widely witnessed in manufacturing in-
dustry (Kedia and Lahiri, 2007). By outsourcing service to suppliers, companies can focus on
their core competence and develop new value to customers. As a consequent result, there has
been ongoing rapid growth in service sectors (Fixler and Siegel, 1999). Many traditional manu-
facturing companies have shifted their business to service-oriented domains. For example, IBM
reduces its manufacturing business by selling department of personal computers to Lenovo1, and
expand the global service unit to the world’s largest business and technology services provider.
Apart from the IT service, repair and maintenance outsourcing are also commonly seen in
manufacturing industries (Jain et al., 2013). For example, Dell, Apple, Fujitsu, and Honeywell,
etc. outsource their product repair center to DBK2. In such setting, DBK has to establish the
capacity (repair technicians, error testing equipment, spare parts, etc.) for failure restoration.
Although outsourcing service enables the product users to develop their own advantageous
business, the customer may lose direct control of the service process, which creates misaligned
objectives for the customer and the supplier. The customer usually wants the product avail-
ability to be maintained at a high level, whereas the supplier may not be willing to do so since
it increases the service cost and even reduces revenue, especially when repairing failures is the
supplier’s revenue stream. The interactions between the customer and the supplier depends
1http://www.techhive.com/article/120670/article.html
2http://www.dbk.com/repair-center transparent oem repairs.htm
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on the compensation schemes, i.e., the service contracts. Under different contracts, the service
supplier’s repair activity is paid by the customer in different manners. Typically, service out-
sourcing is based on the Time & Material contracts (T&M) or the Performance-based contracts
(PBC) (Roels et al., 2010). Under T&M, the customer pays a service fee to the supplier for each
repair. Under PBC, the customer only pays for product availability. Within PBC, the way of
how the customer’s payment is transferred can also be various. The customer can only pay for
product uptime during the contract period. For example, Wagner Equipment offers Power by
the Hour contracts, under which the customers have 24 hours access to the machines but only
pays for the hours they use. If the product is inoperable, the customer does not have to pay
for it3. We call this type of contracts PBC-U. Under the other type of PBC, the supplier pays
downtime penalties to the customer, i.e., if the product performance is under the predefined
level, the supplier is penalized for the under-performance4. We refer to this type of contracts
PBC-P. Although PBC are becoming more attractive, the other type of service contracts like
T&M are also used in many occasions5.
In the context of oursourcing, the most challenging task for the customer is to deal with the
supplier’s moral hazard problem, i.e., the customer is usually unable to control and monitor
the supplier’s repair and maintenance activities. Although PBC are stated to be able to align
the incentives for the customer and the supplier (Cohen et al., 2006), the suppliers may worry
about the financial impact of PBC because compared to traditional T&M, PBC mostly shift
risks to the suppliers, which makes them “reluctant to sign up”6. As a matter of fact, designing
optimal contracts becomes a critical task for the contract offerer. In this chapter, we build
stylized models to address the problems of service contract choice and answer the following
research questions: (1) What are the optimal contract terms in T&M and PBC? (2) Which
type of contracts is better for the supplier/customer under what circumstance? (3) How service
contracts affect the supplier’s and the customer’s individual activities in capacity setting and
product failure prevention?
We find that if both supplier and the customer are risk neutral, T&M and PBC are equivalent
for the supplier. Under T&M, the supplier invests in service capacity by asking for a higher
service fee. Under PBC, incentives are generated by the penalty terms or uptime payments,
3http://wagnerequipment.com/contact/power
4http://reason.org/news/show/performance-based-contracting
5http://www.niaid.nih.gov/researchfunding/sop/pages/contracttype.aspx
6http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/pay-for-what-you-get-putting-performance-based-
contracting-to-the-test/
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which makes the supplier to set up the appropriate capacity to guarantee the optimal product
uptime. This finding shows that T&M may not be less effective than PBC in incentivizing the
supplier to invest in capacity for failure restoration. If the supplier becomes risk averse to the
variance of his revenue, the optimal contract is PBC-P, where the penalty rate is 0, i.e., a fixed
fee contract is optimal for the supplier. A zero penalty eliminates the impact of uncertainty
caused by product failures, and the risk-free lump sum can satisfy the risk neutral customer’s
participation requirement. As such, PBC-P realize the highest profit for the supplier as the
risk neutral case. On the other hand, if the failure rate is relatively low, the supplier has a
higher profit under PBC-U than T&M, whereas the customer has more surplus under T&M
than PBC-U. If the product failure rate is high, the result is reversed.
Next, we discuss the case when the customer exerts failure prevention effort by performing
preventive maintenance. If the supplier’s capacity is exogenous, PBC-P achieve the First Best
(FB) solution. For PBC-U vs. T&M, the customer over-invests in the effort under T&M and
under-invests in it under PBC-U. The supplier has a higher profit under T&M than PBC-U
if the failure rate is high, and has a lower profit under T&M than PBC-U if the failure rate
is low. If the supplier’s capacity becomes endogenous, PBC-P also achieve FB. Under T&M,
the customer over-invests in the effort of failure reduction, and the supplier under-invests in
capacity. Under PBC-U, the situation is reversed. In addition, the supplier has the lowest
profit under T&M.
Finally, we extend the model with more settings. If the penalty rate is forced be to above 0
under PBC-P, we find that the penalty rate leads to over-investment in capacity and decreases
the supplier’s profit. If the penalty rate is sufficiently large, the supplier’s profit can be lower
than T&M or PBC-U. Another finding is that when the customer becomes risk averse, PBC
dominates T&M If the supplier is risk neutral.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. After a brief survey of related literature in §4.2,
we develop the basic model of risk neutral in §4.3. Next, in §4.4, we discuss the setting when
the supplier becomes risk averse. Subsequently, we investigate the impact of contracts on the
customer’s failure prevention effort in §4.5. Then, we extend the model in more settings in §4.6.
Finally, we summarize the major findings and discuss future directions for research in §4.7.
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4.2 Literature Review
The model in this chapter is formulated based on principal-agent framework and focuses on ser-
vice outsourcing context. Traditional OM literature mainly study service process management
based on queueing models. Some examples are Gilbert and Weng. (1998), Plambeck and Zenios
(2003), Ren and Zhou (2008), and Lu et al. (2009). Although principle-agent relationship is
considered in those papers, the main focus is congestion management by changing number of
servers or service rate. In this chapter, we emphasize the impact of different service contracts
on the supply chain members’ decisions on pricing and service rate setting.
For failure restoration, spare parts inventory management is a traditional area in OM literature.
Muckstadt (2005) gives an extensive overview of this research. Compared to the model in this
chapter, incentive and contracting are often not incorporated in the spare parts inventory
literature. An exception is Kim et al. (2007), where they study Performance-based contracting
by constructing multiple-agents model with repairable spare parts inventory decisions. Our work
differs from theirs in several aspects. The model in this chapter focuses on failure restoration
by setting service capacity, rather than spare parts inventory. In addition, we discuss Time
& Material contracts by considering a service fee for each repair. Similar cases occur when
comparing this chapter with (Kim et al., 2010). The failure restoration model in this chapter
is in line with Kim et al. (2010), but the setting of the problems are different. In (Kim et al.,
2010), the customer sets prices of the PBC, and two performance measures are investigated. In
this chapter, we deal with the case where the supplier sets prices, which is more often seen in
commercial sectors, and study two payment schemes- paying penalty for downtime and paying
only for uptime under PBC. Moreover, we compare PBC with T&M where in (Kim et al., 2010),
only PBC is discussed.
In this chapter, efforts which affect product reliability are discussed in a principal-agent model.
Incentives of effort on product quality improvement have been studied in literature such as
(Balachandran and Radhakrishnan, 2005), (Zhu et al., 2007), and (Kim and Tomlin, 2013).
The settings in those papers are either the customer incentivizes the supplier or both the
customer and the supplier exerts quality improvement effort. As a contrast, in this chapter,
we focus on the customer’s preventive failure reduction before service outsourcing, and explore
how T&M and PBC affect the customer’s effort.
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Finally, this chapter also relates to classical moral-hazard problem and supply chain contracting
literature. Extensive reviews of principal-agents models and supply chain contracting can be
found in (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) and (Cachon, 2004). In this chapter, we apply the
principal-agent and contracting analysis to contracting for product support, which also enriches
the research in this area.
4.3 The Basic Model
We first consider a setting in which a risk-neutral customer (she) has a fleet of identical products
which need support and maintenance by a single service supplier (he). We first assume the
product quantity is 1. The product is subject to random failures during the contract period.
Following the common assumptions in literature, we model the failure occurrence as a Poisson
process with rate λ which is determined by some exogenous activities such as product design,
manufacturing, and preventive maintenance7. If we normalize the contract period to 1, we have
the expected value of the total number of failures (denoted by N) E[N ] = λ. Once system
downtime occurs, the supplier has to repair the failed product. The repair lead time of the ith
failure is Si (i = 1, .., N). We assume Si is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with
a mean 1/µ, where µ is the supplier’s capacity for conducting service activities. We assume µ
is set by the supplier at the beginning and remains unchanged during the contract period. In
addition, let µ be the default level of the service capacity. The supplier may choose to set up a
higher capacity or maintain the default level. The unit cost of the service capacity is c. To avoid
trivial cases, for the relation between µ and λ, we assume 1/λ > 1/µ, which can be interpreted
that the service capacity is ample and the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is longer than
the repair lead time. Otherwise, the product will remain inoperable all the time. Then we can
formulate the downtime of the product as
∑N
i=1 Si and uptime as 1 −
∑N
i=1 Si. Once product
downtime occurs, the customer will suffer a revenue loss. Let r be the revenue rate per unit
uptime. The customer’s total revenue derived from running the product is r(1−∑Ni=1 Si).
7We endogenize the customer’s effort on failure reduction in §4.5.
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4.3.1 Contracting
As we observed in practice, the supplier offers two types of service contracts to the customer -
T&M and PBC. Under T&M, the customer pays a service fee to the supplier for each repair.
Let p be the service fee. Then the supplier’s revenue during the contract period is pN . Under
PBC, the supplier’s revenue is tied to some performance measure of the product. In most
of the cases, product uptime is the performance indicator for the supplier. In particular, the
transfer of payment under PBC can be based on a lump sum + penalty or an uptime revenue
framework. In this chapter, we use PBC-P and PBC-U to represent the former and the latter
case respectively. Under PBC-P, the customer first pays a initial fee to the supplier. After the
uptime of the product has been measured at the end of the contract period, the supplier pays a
penalty to the customer based on product downtime. Let w denote the lump sum and κ be the
penalty rate. Then the supplier’s revenue under PBC-P is w − κ∑Ni=1 Si. Under PBC-U, the
customer only pays for product uptime. Let v be the unit uptime price. The supplier’s revenue
under PBC-U is v(1−∑Ni=1 Si).
The business sequence is as follows. First, the supplier offers a contract with specified contract
terms (p under T&M, w, κ under PBC-P, or v under PBC-U) to the customer. The customer
can accept or reject the contract. If the contract is accepted, the supplier sets up the service
capacity at the beginning and starts to provide product support. Whenever a product failure
occurs, the supplier has to restore the failed product by using his service capacity. The customer
then transfers payment to the supplier based on the type of contracts.
4.3.2 The supplier’s Objective
Given such a sequence of events, we can model the supplier’s problem as
• Under T&M,
max
p, µ
E(pN)− c(µ− µ)
s.t.
E[r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− pN ] ≥ 0, (IR)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.1)
Chapter 4. Contract Choice for Product Support 107
• Under PBC-P,
max
w, κ, µ
E[w − κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ]− c(µ− µ)
s.t.
E[r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− (w − κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)] ≥ 0, (IR)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.2)
• Under PBC-U,
max
v, µ
E[v(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)]− c(µ− µ)
s.t.
E[(r − v)(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)] ≥ 0, (IR)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.3)
The supplier’s problem is to maximize the expected profit, which equals the payment received
from the customer minus the service capacity cost, by setting the contract terms and capacity.
In Equations (4.1)-(4.3), the Individual Rationality (IR) constraints state that the customer’s
expected profit (revenue generated by running the product minus the payment transferred to
the supplier) has to be greater than a reserved level (here normalized to 0), which guarantees
the participation of the customer. It can be proved that
∑N
i=1 Si satisfies a Compound Poisson
distribution, and E(
∑N
i=1 Si|λ, µ) = λ/µ.
Lemma 4.1. (1) The profit functions under PBC are concave in µ.
(2) The IR constraints are binding at optimality.
(3) The optimal solutions are as shown in Table 4.1-4.2.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 4.1: The optimal solution of the basic model under T&M.
λ ≤ cµ2
r
λ >
cµ2
r
contract
terms
p∗ = r( 1
λ
− 1
µ
), µ∗ = µ p* = r−
√
c
√
r
√
λ
λ
, µ∗ =
√
rλ
c
pi∗s r(1−
λ
µ
) r − 2√crλ+ cµ
pi∗c 0 0
Table 4.2: The optimal solution of the basic model under PBC.
PBC-P PBC-U
λ ≤ cµ2
r
λ >
cµ2
r
λ ≤ cµ2
r
λ >
cµ2
r
contract
terms
w* = r − (r−κ∗)λ
µ
, µ∗ = µ w*=r − (r − κ∗)
√
cλ
r
, µ∗ =
√
rλ
c
v∗ = r, µ∗ = µ v∗ = r, µ∗ =
√
rλ
c
pi∗s r(1−
λ
µ
) r − 2√crλ+ cµ r(1− λ
µ
) r − 2√crλ+ cµ
pi∗c 0 0 0 0
When both the supplier and the customer are risk-neutral, we notice that the IR constraint
under each case is binding at optimality. The supplier can set the prices which give him the
maximum profit while enable the customer to accept the contract. Next, we discuss how the
optimal solution changes with parameters and compare contracts.
Proposition 4.2. (1) If λ >
cµ2
r
, the supplier will invest more service capacity , and ∂µ*/∂r >
0, ∂µ*/∂λ > 0, ∂µ*/∂c < 0. Otherwise, if λ <
cµ2
r
, the supplier will keep the capacity at
the default level µ.
(2) Under T&M, ∂p*/∂µ∗ > 0; Under PBC-P, w∗ and κ∗ are given as combinations; Under
PBC-U, v∗ is independent of µ∗.
(3) The supplier’s profit is decreasing in λ, i.e., ∂pi∗s/∂λ > 0.
(4) The product uptime and the supplier’s profit under each contract are equivalent.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
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The supplier’s optimal service capacity only depends on the relation between λ and cµ2/r. If the
failure rate is large (λ >
cµ2
r
), the supplier will set a capacity which is higher than the initial
level. This is intuitive for PBC because a high failure rate implies more system downtime,
which needs more capacity to restore the product to avoid penalty. Our model shows that
this is also true for T&M. Since the supplier’s revenue only depends on the number of failures
rather than system downtime, it seems intuitive that the supplier has no incentive to invest in
service capacity. However, the results of our model shows that whether the supplier invests in
capacity does not depend on the types of contract, but on the relative value of the failure rate.
Under T&M, the optimal service fee, p∗, is the product of the customer’s revenue rate r and the
difference between MTBF and repair lead time. Furthermore, we have ∂p*/∂µ∗ > 0. In other
words, a quicker repair lead time can result in a higher service fee. This is the reason why the
supplier will invest in service capacity under T&M. Under PBC, prices are set differently under
the corresponding payment methods. Under PBC-P, w∗ and κ∗ are given in combinations as
w*=r− (r−κ*)λ
µ*
. And we have ∂w*/∂κ* > 0. Under PBC-U, the optimal price v∗ is independent
of the service capacity and remains the same value as the revenue rate r.
Even though prices are different across contracts, the product uptime and the supplier’s profit
is the same. From Lemma 4.1, we can see that the supplier’s optimal capacity under each
contract is identical. Since the expected product uptime E(1 −∑Ni=1 Si|λ, µ∗) = 1 − λ/µ∗,
we know that given the same λ and µ∗, the product uptime will be indentical. Moreover, the
results show that all IR constraints are binding, which means that the customer has 0 surplus
in the game and the supplier takes all the profit of the supply chain. The supply chain’s profit
is given by r(1 − λ/µ∗) − c(µ∗ − µ). Therefore, for a given value of µ∗, profit under different
contracts will be equivalent.
The basic model captures the setting when decision-makers are risk-neutral. Although T&M
and PBC create different incentives for the supplier, our model shows that the supplier’s invest-
ment in service capacity is independent of the types of contract. Under T&M, the supplier’s
revenue does not link to product downtime apparently. However, he can have a higher service
fee if he invests in capacity, which results in a higher profit. Meanwhile the increased service
fee does not hurt the customer’s profit (pi∗c ≥ 0 can be satisfied.)
Generally, although one may argue that PBC can incentivize the supplier to improve product
availability, our analysis states that PBC may not have superior performance over T&M, if
both supply chain partners are risk-neutral and prices are set by the supplier.
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4.4 Risk-averse Agents
In the basic model, we have assumed that both the supplier and the customer are risk-neutral.
In practice, the bilateral relationship between the supplier and the customer can be various.
The financial status of some small service suppliers can be tightly connected with a single large
customer. In such a case, the supplier would be risk averse to the variance of the payment
that is received from the customer. In this section, we discuss how the supplier’s’ risk aversion
affects the choice of contracts.
Let γs, γs > 0, be the supplier’s coefficient of risk aversion, where the subscript s represents the
supplier. Following literature, we assume that a risk-averse agent has a mean-variance utility
function in the decision problem. Under risk-aversion, we have the supplier’s problem as
• Under T&M,
max
p, µ
E(pN)− γs var(pN)− c(µ− µ
−
)
s.t.
E[r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− pN ] ≥ 0, (IR)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.4)
• Under PBC-P,
max
w, κ, µ
E[w − κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ]− γs var[κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ]− c(µ− µ
−
)
s.t.
E[r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− (w − κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)] ≥ 0, (IR)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.5)
• Under PBC-U,
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max
v, µ
E[v(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)]− γs var[v(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)]− c(µ− µ
−
)
s.t.
E[(r − v)(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)] ≥ 0, (IR)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.6)
In order to obtain the closed-form solutions for comparing contracts, we assume that the repair
lead time, Si, satisfies exponential distribution with parameter µ. Then we have the variance
term in the supplier’s utility functions as summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.3. (1) Under T&M, var(pN) = p2λ;
(2) Under PBC-P, var[κ
∑N
i=1 Si|λ, µ] = 2λκ
2
µ2
;
(3) Under PBC-U, var[v(1−∑Ni=1 Si|λ, µ)] = 2λv2µ2 .
The proof can be found in Appendix C.
Solving Equations (4.4-4.6), we can obtain the optimal solutions. Firstly, the optimal capacity
is determined as follows.
Lemma 4.4. (1) Under T&M, if λ >
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, µ∗ satisfies 2r2γs(λ−µ∗)+rλµ∗− cµ∗3 = 0.
If λ <
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, µ∗ = µ.
(2) Under PBC-P, if λ >
cµ2
r
, µ∗ =
√
rλ
c
. If λ <
cµ2
r
, µ∗ = µ.
(3) Under PBC-U, if
cµ3
4r2γs+rµ
< λ <
µ2
µ+4rγs
, µ∗ satisfies rλ(4rγs+µ∗)−cµ∗3 = 0. If λ > µ
2
µ+4rγs
or λ <
cµ3
4r2γs+rµ
, µ∗ = µ.
The proof can be found in Appendix D.
Compared to the risk-neutral setting, the risk-averse coefficient plays a role in setting the
optimal service capacity, except PBC-P. Generally, the supplier will invest in capacity if the
failure rate is relatively high. We also notice that there is a special case under PBC-U. If
λ >
µ2
µ+4rγs
, the supplier will not invest in capacity. We interpret this counter-intuitive result in
the following discussions.
Secondly, prices are set as given in Lemma 4.5.
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Lemma 4.5. (1) Under T&M, If λ <
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
, p∗ = 1
2γs
.
If
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
< λ <
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, p∗ =
r(µ−λ)
λµ
.
If λ >
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, p∗ = r(µ
∗−λ)
λµ∗ .
(2) Under PBC-P, If λ >
cµ2
r
, w∗ = r −√crλ, κ∗ = 0.
If λ <
cµ2
r
, w∗ = r(1− λ
µ
), κ∗ = 0.
(3) Under PBC-U, If λ >
µ2
µ+4rγs
, v∗ =
µ(µ−λ)
4γsλ
.
If λ <
µ2
µ+4rγs
, v∗ = r.
The proof can be found in Appendix D.
The most remarkable change with risk aversion lies in the prices in PBC-P. Under risk neutrality,
w∗ and κ∗ are set as combinations. However, under risk aversion, κ∗ = 0 if it can be set by the
supplier. A zero penalty rate implies the supplier’s compensation does not link to the product’s
performance. PBC-P becomes a fixed-fee contract. For PBC-U, we can see that if the failure
rate is high (λ >
µ2
µ+4rγs
), a price
µ(µ−λ)
4γsλ
, which is lower than r, is optimal for the supplier.
From Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5, we can see that risk aversion has changed the supplier’s
decision on setting the optimal service capacity and contract price. Next, we compare the
service capacity level to the case of risk neutrality.
Proposition 4.6. Let the subscript RA and RN denotes the case of risk aversion and risk
neutrality. If the supplier is risk-averse,
(1) under T&M, if λ >
cµ2
r
, the supplier under-invests in capacity, i.e., µ∗RA < µ
∗
RN . If
λ <
cµ2
r
, µ∗RA = µ
∗
RN .
(2) under PBC-P, µ∗RA = µ
∗
RN .
(3) under PBC-U, if
cµ3
4r2γs+rµ
< λ <
µ2
µ+4rγs
, the supplier over-invests in capacity, i.e.,
µ∗RA > µ
∗
RN ; otherwise, µ
∗
RA = µ
∗
RN .
The proof can be found in Appendix E.
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According to Proposition 4.6, under PBC-P, the supplier sets the penalty rate κ∗ = 0. As a
result, the variance term in the utility function is eliminated. At the same time, the supplier
also cuts the link between his payment and product downtime. In this way, he can achieve
the same capacity level as the risk neutral case. Compared to the risk neutrality case, T&M
can lead to under-investment while PBC-U can lead to over-investment in capacity due to
risk aversion if failure rate is high. Consequently, we can conclude that PBC-U results in the
highest product uptime, and T&M results in the lowest product uptime. However, both of
them deviate from the solution under risk neutrality, which can be achieved under PBC-P. As
shown in Figure 4.1, when λ >
cµ3
4r2γs+rµ
, the supplier invests in capacity under PBC-U. The
capacity level is higher than PBC-P. On the contrary, when λ >
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, the supplier invests
in capacity under T&M. The capacity level is lower than PBC-P.
Figure 4.1: Optimal service capacity under risk aversion. r = 1000, c = 1, µ = 100, γs =
0.001.
Although both PBC-P and PBC-U have performance linkage on the supplier’s revenue, the
payment framework creates differences under risk aversion. Under PBC-P, the supplier pays a
penalty based on the product downtime. However, he can charge a lump sum beforehand. By
setting κ∗ = 0, the supplier exempts himself from paying penalty; at the same time, he also
eliminate the variance caused by the uncertainty. w∗ is a risk-free revenue for the supplier. As
long as the customer’s participation condition is satisfied, the supplier can set w∗ to an optimal
value which maximizes his utility (with 0 variance). Hence, PBC-P can achieve the same profit
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for the supplier as the risk neutrality case8. However, this is not the case for PBC-U. Since the
customer only pays for uptime, the variance of the supplier’s revenue can never be eliminated.
As a result, risk aversion affects the decisions on pricing and capacity setting.
Proposition 4.7. (1) Under PBC-P, IR constraint is always binding. Under T&M, pi∗c > 0
if λ <
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
. Under PBC-U, pi∗c > 0 if λ >
µ2
µ+4rγs
.
(2) For the supplier’s profit, PBC-P is higher than PBC-U and T&M. Furthermore, if λ >
(
√
2− 1)µ, pi∗s(T&M) > pi∗s(PBC − U). If λ < (
√
2− 1)µ, pi∗s(T&M) < pi∗s(PBC − U).
(3) For the customer’s profit, PBC-P is lower than or equal to PBC-U and T&M. Further-
more, if λ > (
√
2 − 1)µ, pi∗c (T&M) < pi∗c (PBC − U). If λ < (
√
2 − 1)µ, pi∗c (T&M) >
pi∗c (PBC − U).
The proof can be found in Appendix F.
Proposition 4.7, part (1) compares the customer’s profit under risk aversion with the risk
neutral case. When the supply chain members are risk-neutral, the customer can never obtain
any surplus. But if the supplier becomes risk averse, the customer can derive some benefits out
of it. Specifically, under T&M, if λ <
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
, the supplier can set an optimal price p∗ = 1
2γs
which maximizes his utility while keeps the customer has a positive profit r(1 − λ
µ
) − λ
2γs
. In
addition, we have ∂pi∗c/∂λ < 0. Because a high failure rate leads to a lower product uptime,
the customer’s profit is decreasing in λ. For PBC-U, when λ >
µ2
µ+4rγs
, the customer can get a
positive profit.
From Proposition 4.7, part (2), we know that the supplier has the highest profit under PBC-P.
As stated in a previous argument, the variance of the supplier’s revenue is eliminated and thus
PBC-P achieve the highest utility. If we compare PBC-U and T&M, we see that if λ > (
√
2−1)µ,
the supplier’s profit under T&M is higher than PBC-U, as shown in Figure 4.2(a). Unlike the
risk neutral case where the supplier’s profit is monotonically decreasing in λ, the supplier’s
utility is increasing in λ under T&M. This is in line with the fact that the customer pays for
each repair, and a higher failure rate leads to more failures and thus a higher revenue for the
supplier. Here risk aversion changes the way how the repair price is set. Our models shows
that if the failure rate is sufficiently large (λ > (
√
2 − 1)µ), the supplier’s profit under T&M
8Recall that under risk neutrality, w∗ and κ∗ are set in combinations. In that case, if we let κ∗ = 0, w∗ is
the same as the risk averse case.
Chapter 4. Contract Choice for Product Support 115
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.2: The supplier’s (a) and the customer’s (b) optimal profit under T&M and PBC-U.
r = 2000, c = 1, µ = 20, γs = 0.01.
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can be higher than PBC-U. For the customer’s profit, as stated in Proposition 4.7, part (3),
the result is reversed. Under T&M, the customer can have a positive profit if the failure rate
is low; under PBC-U, the customer can have a positive profit if the failure is high. Thus, as
shown in Figure 4.2(b), If the failure rate is high, i.e., λ > (
√
2 − 1)µ, the customer’s profit
under T&M is lower than PBC-U.
4.5 Preventive Maintenance by the Customer
In previous sections, we have assumed that the failure rate of the product is exogenous. In
this section, we discuss the case when the product reliability can be improved by the customer.
Before outsourcing product support to the supplier, the customer can exert effort on reducing
the product failure by performing preventive maintenance. Let λ0 be the initial product failure
and λc be the failure rate after the customer’s effort. Then the change of failure rate is ∆λ =
λ0 − λc. The cost of the failure rate reduction is C(∆λ). We assume that C(·) is continuously
differentiable and convex in ∆λ. In order to obtain the closed form solutions to compare
contracts analytically, we use a quadratic function K(λ0 − λc)2, where K is the coefficient of
effort cost, to model the customer’s preventive maintenance cost. We assume that information
is symmetric in the supply chain, i.e., the initial failure rate of the product is a public knowledge
of the supply chain members . As the contract offerer, the supplier sets the prices anticipating
the customer’s effort level on reducing failure rate. Then the supplier’s problem becomes
• Under T&M,
max
p, (µ)
E(p N |λ∗c)− c(µ− µ)
s.t.
E[r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ∗c , µ)− p N |λ∗c ] ≥ 0, (IR)
λ∗c = arg maxE[r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− p N |λ], (IC)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.7)
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• Under PBC-P,
max
w, κ, (µ)
E[w − κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ∗c , µ]− c(µ− µ)
s.t.
E[r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ∗c , µ)− (w − κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ∗c , µ)] ≥ 0, (IR)
λ∗c = arg maxE[r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− (w − κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)], (IC)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.8)
• Under PBC-U,
max
v, (µ)
E[v(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ∗c , µ)]− c(µ− µ)
s.t.
E[(r − v)(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ∗c , µ)] ≥ 0, (IR)
λ∗c = arg maxE[(r − v)(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)] ≥ 0, (IC)
µ ≥ µ.
(4.9)
With the customer’s failure reduction effort, the decision becomes a sequential game. When
setting prices and capacity, the supplier expects that the customer will make some effort on
reducing the failure rate. We have the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints in Equations
(4.7)-(4.9). These IC constraints capture the customer’s individual objective. When she exerts
an effort, she will reduce the failure rate to an optimal level λ∗c which maximizes her own profit.
4.5.1 Exogenous µ
First, for the sake of tractability, we discuss the case when the supplier’s service capacity level
is exogenous, i.e., µ is given as a parameter in the supplier’s objective functions. If the supplier
and the customer is integrated as a centralized firm, it is the First Best (FB) case in this setting.
The central firm solves for an optimal failure rate λ∗sc which maximizes the supply chains’ profit,
where Πsc= r[1−E(
N∑
i=1
Si
∣∣∣∣λsc, µ)]− cµ−K(λ0 − λsc)2. It is not difficult to see that the supply
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chains’ profit function is concave in λsc and we have the FB solution as:
λ∗sc = λ0 −
r
2Kµ
,Π∗sc = r +
r2
4Kµ2
− rλ0
µ
− cµ.
Next, we solve the supplier’s problem under each type of contract and the equilibrium solutions
are given in Lemma 4.8.
Lemma 4.8. (1) The customer’s profit function is concave in λc. The supplier’s profit func-
tion given the customer’s best response of λ∗c is concave in p, κ, and v under T&M, PBC-P
and PBC-U, respectively.
(2) Under T&M, if λ0 ≤ 2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
, λ∗c =
λ0
2
− r
4Kµ
. If λ0 >
2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
, λ∗c =√
λ0
2 − r
K
.
(3) Under PBC-P, λ∗c = λ0 − r2Kµ . Particularly, κ∗ = 0.
(4) Under PBC-U, if λ0 ≤ µ− r2Kµ , λ∗c = λ0. If λ0 > µ− r2Kµ , λ∗c = λ0+µ2 − r4Kµ .
The proof can be found in Appendix G.
We can see that, except for the case PBC-U when λ0 < µ − r2Kµ , the customer tries to lower
the failure rate under all contracts, yet the levels of effort are different. In addition, we have
∂λ∗c/∂K > 0. In other words, if the cost of failure reduction increases, the level of effort
decreases. Subsequently, we can compare the results of contracts by analyzing the equilibrium
solutions. Proposition 4.9 gives the results of contract comparison with regard to the customer’s
effort level and the supplier’s and the customer’s profit.
Proposition 4.9. (1) PBC-P achieve the FB solution for the customer’s optimal effort level,
i.e., λ∗c = λ
∗
sc. Under T&M, the customer over-invests in the effort of failure reduction,
i.e., λ∗c < λ
∗
sc. Under PBC-U, the customer under-invests in effort of failure reduction,
i.e., λ∗c > λ
∗
sc.
(2) The customer has a surplus under T&M, if λ0 <
2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
, and under PBC-U, if
λ0 > µ− r2Kµ . Otherwise, pi∗c = 0.
(3) For the supplier’s profit, pi∗s(PBC-P) is the highest, and pi
∗
s(PBC-P) = Π
∗
sc. Furthermore,
if λ0 >
µ
2
+ r
2Kµ
, pi∗s(T&M) > pi
∗
s(PBC-U). If λ0 ≤ µ2 + r2Kµ , pi∗s(T&M) ≤ pi∗s(PBC-U).
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The proof can be found in Appendix H.
As shown in Figure 4.3, under T&M, the optimal failure rate is lower than PBC-P (also the FB).
Under PBC-U, the optimal failure rate is higher than PBC-P (also the FB). Under T&M, the
customer has to pay the service fee for each repair. Hence, she would like to have lower failure
rate so as to cut down the service cost. In a decentralized setting, the customer tends to over-
invest in reducing product failure rate. The situation is reversed under PBC-U. Under PBC-U,
the supplier does not receive payment from the customer if the product is down. Intuitively,
at the customer’s end, she has no direct inventive to reduce the product failure rate because
it seems the supplier’s duty to shorten product downtime. Our model confirms this argument.
Lemma 4.8 states that if λ0 < µ− r2Kµ , λ∗c = λ0. However, we also notice that the customer can
make a failure reduction investment if λ0 > µ − r2Kµ . This is because if this condition holds,
the customer can get a surplus by exerting effort. Meanwhile, we have proved that even if the
customer can lower the failure rate, λ∗c > λ
∗
sc, i.e., the customer’s effort under PBC-U is lower
than the FB.
Similar to the risk aversion setting, the supplier can achieve the FB solution under PBC-P by
setting κ∗ = 0. Generally, efficiency loss is caused by “Double Marginalization”. The internal
payment that affects the players’ decision makes the system less efficient. Under PBC-P, only
κ is related to the customer’s effort because penalty is based on downtime. The customer can
receive more penalty from the supplier in the presence of a higher κ. However, if the supplier sets
κ = 0, the customer’s “moral hazard”-type action, i.e., not investing in failure rate reduction
in this setting, will be eliminated. Consequently, PBC-P can achieve the FB solution and the
supplier can get the highest profit.
If we look at the supplier’s profit, as shown in Figure 4.4, PBC-P have the highest profit which
equals the FB. The supplier’s profit is decreasing in λ0 under PBC. The supplier’s profit under
T&M is not monotonic. Because the supplier’s revenue is generated from product failures, the
supplier’s profit is increasing in λc. However, the customer keeps reducing λ0 as it increases.
Moreover, the customer’s effort is nonlinear in λ0 (shown in Figure 4.3). If we compare T&M
with PBC-U, an important result is that if failure rate is sufficiently large, i.e., λ0 >
µ
2
+ r
2Kµ
,
T&M can be better than PBC-U for the supplier. This is because when λ0 is low, the customer’s
over-investment is significantly high. A lower failure rate brings the supplier less revenue. As λ0
increases, the acceleration of the customer’s effort becomes lower. The supplier receives more
revenue than the loss under PBC-U. Thus, the supplier’s profit becomes higher than PBC-U.
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Figure 4.3: The optimal failure rate under contracts, exogenous µ. r = 1000,K = 200, µ =
20.
Figure 4.4: The supplier’s profit at equilibrium under contracts, exogenous µ. r = 1000,K =
100, µ = 10.
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4.5.2 Endogenous µ
In this section, we incorporate capacity µ as an endogenous decision variable for the supplier.
First of all, we have the solution for the FB case as summarized in Table 4.3. The effort of
failure reduction depends on the level of capacity. We have ∂∆λ/∂µ∗ < 0, i.e., level of effort is
decreasing in capacity. Whether to invest in capacity depends on the initial failure rate. If λ0
is large (λ0 >
cµ2
r
+ r
2Kµ
) , it is optimal to increase capacity to a level which is defined by the
equation 2cKµ∗3sc − 2rKλ0µ∗sc + r2 = 0.
Table 4.3: Optimal solution of FB, endogenous µ.
λ0 <
cµ2
r
+ r
2Kµ
λ0 >
cµ2
r
+ r
2Kµ
λ∗sc, µ
∗
sc λ
∗
sc = λ0 − r2Kµ , µ∗sc = µ
λ∗sc = λ0 −
r
2Kµ∗sc
,
2cKµ∗3sc − 2rKλ0µ∗sc + r2 = 0.
Π∗sc
r(r+4Kµ(µ−λ0))
4Kµ2
r + r
2
4Kµ∗sc2
− rλ0
µ∗sc
− c(µ∗sc − µ)
Next, we explore how the suppliers’ decision on capacity and the customer’s decision on failure
rate reduction jointly affect the contract choice in the decentralized setting. Unlike the exoge-
nous µ case, the model’s tractability drops a lot and we cannot obtain closed-form solutions.
In order to simply the model, we assume µ = 0. This assumption implies that the supplier
cannot keep an initial capacity level unchanged but has to invest in it. The simplification does
not change the aim of the model which is to understand the joint impact of capacity and effort
on supply chain contracting.
Lemma 4.10. (1) Under T&M, if 4+
√
cKr
(K(Kλ0−r))3/4−
2Kλ0√
K(Kλ0−r)
> 0, µ∗ =
√
r
cK
(K(Kλ0
2 − r))1/4,
λ∗c =
√
λ20 − rK .
If 4+
√
cKr
(K(Kλ0−r))3/4−
2Kλ0√
K(Kλ0−r)
< 0, λ∗c =
λ0
2
− r
4Kµ∗ , and µ
∗ solves r2−2Krλ0µ∗+4cKµ∗3 =
0.
(2) Under PBC-P, λ∗c = λ0 − r2Kµ∗ , and µ∗ solves 2cKµ∗3 − 2rKλ0µ∗ + r2 = 0.
(3) Under PBC-U, if K > c(r+
√
crλ0)
2λ0(r−cλ0) , λ
∗
c = λ0, µ
∗ =
√
rλ0
c
. If K < c(r+
√
crλ0)
2λ0(r−cλ0) , λ
∗
c =
2Kµ∗(λ+µ∗)−r
4Kµ∗ , and µ
∗ solves 4cKµ∗3 = (r − 2Kµ∗2)(2Kµ∗(µ∗ − λ0)− r).
The proof can be found in Appendix I.
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Lemma 4.10 gives the equilibrium solutions of the decentralized setting. Under PBC-P, the
optimal failure rate always depends on the service capacity. In addition, ∂λ*c/∂µ
∗ = r
2Kµ*
2 > 0.
Under T&M, solving the customer’s problem, we have λ*c= − r+pµ
*−2Kλ0µ*
2Kµ*
. Then, ∂λ∗c/∂µ
∗ =
r
2Kµ∗2 > 0. Under PBC-U, there are two cases. 1) λ
∗
c > λ0, and ∂λ
∗
c/∂µ
∗ = 0. 2) λ∗c =
2Kµ∗(λ0+µ∗)−r
4Kµ∗ , and ∂λ
∗
c/∂µ
∗ = 1
4
(2 + r
Kµ∗2 ). Although there are various cases under different
contracts, we can see that the basic trend is that ∂λ∗c/∂µ
∗ ≥ 0. In other words, if the supplier
sets a higher capacity, the customer will invest less in failure reduction. If we compare the
decentralized setting to the FB, we have the main insights as given in Proposition 4.11.
Proposition 4.11. (1) PBC-P achieve the FB results. The optimal penalty rate κ∗ = 0.
(2) Under T&M, the customer over-invests in failure rate reduction; the supplier under-
invests in service capacity, i.e., λ∗c(T&M) < λ
∗
c(FB), µ
∗(T&M) < µ∗(FB).
(3) Under PBC-U, the customer under-invests in failure rate reduction; the supplier over-
invests in service capacity, i.e., λ∗c(PBC − U) > λ∗c(FB), µ∗(PBC − U) > µ∗(FB).
Like the exogenous µ case, PBC-P achieve the FB solution, and κ∗ = 0. The reason is similar
as explained in the previous section. κ∗ = 0 eliminates the impact of the customer’s unilateral
action. By setting an independent lump sum w∗, the supplier can realize the highest profit
while ensure the customer’s participation. However, both T&M and PBC-U have efficiency loss.
Similar to the exogenous µ case, T&M leads to over-investment while PBC-U leads to under-
investment in failure reduction. The results for capacity is the other way round. Compared
to the FB, the supplier’s investment is less under T&M and more under PBC-U. Numerical
exhibit can be seen from Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. The reverse situation of T&M and PBC-U
can be explained by the extended finding from Lemma 4.10, i.e., ∂λ∗c/∂µ
∗ > 0. A higher service
capacity results in a lower effort level. Under PBC-P, since the customer under-invests in effort,
i.e., λ∗c is higher, the supplier will set up a higher service capacity, which causes over-investment.
The same reasoning applies to the T&M.
Although we have derived the analytical results of contract comparison with respect to effort and
capacity, we are not able to compare the supplier’s profit under T&M and PBC-U analytically.
Since PBC-P achieve the FB, we can conclude that the supplier’s profit under PBC-P is the
highest. We then compare T&M and PBC-U by numerical analysis. As shown in Figure 4.7, the
supplier’s profit is decreasing in λ under PBC-U whereas unmonotonic under T&M. Compared
to the exogenous µ case (Figure 4.4), we have not seen T&M > PBC-U. On the contrary, the
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Figure 4.5: The optimal failure rate under contracts, endogenous µ. r = 1000,K = 100, c =
1.
Figure 4.6: The optimal service capacity under contracts, endogenous µ. r = 1000,K =
100, c = 1.
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supplier’s profit under PBC-U is higher than T&M in the entire range of λ0. To examine the
convergence, we look at the extreme case when λ0 →∞. We can prove that
lim
λ0→∞
pi∗s(PBC-U)− pi∗s(T & M) =
lim
λ0→∞
(r − 2
√
crλ0)− 2(r −
√
cr(K(Kλ0
2 − r))1/4√
K
+ λ0(
√
K(Kλ0
2 − r)−Kλ0))
= 0.
Thus, T&M and PBC-U converges at infinity. Consequently, we can argue that in most of the
cases, the supplier’s profit under PBC-U is higher than T&M.
Figure 4.7: The supplier’s profit at equilibrium under contracts, endogenous µ. r =
1000,K = 100, c = 1.
4.6 Extensions
4.6.1 Bargaining
In previous sections, we have assumed that the supplier is the contract offerer in the supply
chain. In other words, the supplier acts as the leader in the business sequence. In this section,
we discuss another setting under which the supplier and the customer bargain with each on the
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contract terms. As such, the supplier and the customer make simultaneous actions and thus,
we model the decision process based on a Nash Bargaining framework. First, we discuss the
case when both supply chain members are risk neutral. The problem under contracts are as
follows.
Under T&M,
max
p, µ
[pE(N)− cµ]α[E(r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− pN)]
1−α
(4.10)
Under PBC-P,
max
w,κ,µ
[w − κE(
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− cµ]α[E(r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− w + κ
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)]
1−α
(4.11)
Under PBC-U,
max
v,µ
[vE(
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)− cµ]α[E((r − v)(1−
∑N
i=1
Si|λ, µ)]
1−α
(4.12)
In Equations (4.10)-(4.12), α and 1 − α represents the bargaining power of the supplier and
the customer respectively (0 < α < 1). The supplier and the customer bargain over prices
(p, w, κ, v) and service capacity µ under contracts. Nash products are formed by the supply
chain members’ respective profits. Nash equilibrium can be obtained by solving the solutions
maximizing the Nash products.
Proposition 4.12. (1) Under T&M, p∗ = rα+
√
crλ(1−2α)
λ
, µ∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
.
(2) Under PBC-P, w∗ = κ∗ + rα +
√
cλ√
r
(r − 2rα− κ∗), µ∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
. .
(3) Under PBC-U, v∗ = r(
√
rα+
√
cλ(1−2α))√
r−√cλ , µ
∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
.
(4) The supplier’s and the customer’s profits are equivalent under contacts. pi∗s = α(r −
2
√
rcλ), pi∗c = (1− α)(r − 2
√
rcλ).
The proof can be found in Appendix J.
If both the supplier and the customer are risk neutral, the optimal service capacity at equi-
librium µ∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
under all contracts. Unlike in the basic leader-follower model, where the
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supplier takes all the profit, the customer and the supplier share the supply chain’s profit (
r−2√crλ) with proportion 1−α and α. Although the bargaining power determines the supply
chain members’ profits, different contracts do not play a role in the profit structure. In other
words, even if prices are different, the supplier and the customer share the supply chain’s profit
in a same manner under different contracts. This result is in line with the basic model where
the supplier moves first as the contract designer. We can conclude that risk neutrality equates
contracts.
Next, we discuss the setting when the supplier becomes risk averse. Unfortunately, variance
terms in the supply chain members’ profit function make the model untractable for contract
comparison. We conduct numerical experiments to observe how contracts change the supplier’s
and the customer’s utility. From Figure 4.8, we can see that first, the supplier’s utility is
decreasing under PBC and is concave under T&M. Secondly, the supplier’s utility under PBC-
P is always higher than PBC-U and T&M. On the other hand, when λ is large, the supplier’s
utility under T&M is higher than PBC-U. Compared to Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4, we have
similar trend for contract comparison. By setting κ∗ = 0, the supplier avoids revenue risk and
generates the highest utility. When the variance terms can not be removed under T&M and
PBC-U, the supplier prefers PBC-U when failure rate is low and prefers T&M when failure
rate is high. If we look at the customer’s profit, the result is reversed. Figure 4.9 tells us
that the customer’s utility is the lowest under PBC-P. Furthermore, under T&M, the utility is
higher than PBC-U when the failure rate is low. Recalling the argument in Proposition 4.7 and
Proposition 4.9, we know that the customer has no surplus under PBC-P, but can have a higher
profit under T&M with a low failure rate and under PBC-U with a high failure rate. Under
this bargaining setting, we have seen similar results. If the supplier is risk averse, PBC-P are
preferable for the supplier, but result in the lowest profit for the customer. On the other hand,
when the product failure rate is low, T&M are better for the customer and PBC-U generate a
higher profit for the supplier. When the product failure rate is relatively high, the result is the
other way round.
4.6.2 Exogenous κ in PBC-P
Thus far, we have shown that PBC-P turn out to be fixed-fee contracts when the supplier is
risk averse, or the customer performs preemptive maintenance to reduce product failure rate.
The basic logic is that κ = 0 can eliminate the supplier’s profit variance and the moral hazard
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Figure 4.8: The supplier’s utility at equilibrium under Nash bargaining, risk averse supplier.
r = 100, µ = 10, c = 1, γs = 0.01, α = 0.5.
Figure 4.9: The customer’s utility at equilibrium under Nash bargaining, risk averse supplier.
r = 100, µ = 10, c = 1, γs = 0.01, α = 0.5.
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environment for the customer. However, in practice, the customer may not accept 0 penalty
even though the customer’s reserved profit can be realized theoretically. In this circumstance,
penalty rate κ can be specified by negotiation. In this section, we discuss the case when κ is
exogenous under PBC-P.
Proposition 4.13. (1) If both supply chain members are risk neutral, the supplier’s decision
on service capacity is not affected by κ. Equivalent profits can be realized across all
contracts.
(2) If the supplier is risk averse, the optimal service capacity µ∗ under PBC-P satisfies
λ(4κ2γs + rµ
∗)− cµ∗3 = 0 if λ > cµ3
4κ2γs+rµ
, and the supplier over-invests in µ.
The proof can be found in Appendix K.
If both the supplier and the customer are risk neutral, the penalty rate has no impact on the
supplier’s investment in capacity. The supplier can raise the lump sum w to overcome the
increased penalty. Consequently, like the endogenous κ case, the supplier can derive equivalent
profits under all contracts. However, if the supplier becomes risk averse, κ deteriorates the
supplier’s utility by forcing the supplier to over-invest in service capacity, as stated in Propo-
sition 4.13. We have proved that κ = 0 is the best solution for the risk averse supplier. Hence,
any increase in κ should be detrimental. If λ <
cµ3
4κ2γs+rµ
, we have pi∗s = r − 2κ
2γsλ
µ2
− rλ
µ
, and
∂pi∗s/∂κ = −4κγsλµ2 < 0, i.e., the supplier’s profit is decreasing in κ. If λ >
cµ3
4κ2γs+rµ
, we can not
obtain the closed-form solution. However, since κ increases the over-investment, we can infer
that if κ is sufficiently large, the supplier’s profit under PBC-P can be lower than T&M or
PBC-U. For example, we can compare PBC-P with T&M over the case where there are closed-
form solutions. Under T&M, if λ <
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
, pi∗s(T&M) =
λ
4γs
. Under PBC-P, if λ <
cµ3
4κ2γs+rµ
,
pi∗s(PBC−P ) = r− 2κ
2γsλ
µ2
− rλ
µ
. Then, if κ >
√
µ(4rγs(µ−λ)−λµ)
8γs2λ
, pi∗s(PBC−P ) < pi∗s(T&M). This
result explains the phenomenon that many non-performance-based contracts are still adopted
by service providers. If penalty is forced to be incurred, the supplier may have lower profit and
offers other types of contracts.
4.6.3 Risk averse Customer
In previous sections, we have assumed that the customer is risk neural in all cases. In this
section, we relax this assumption and discuss the case when the customer becomes risk averse.
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Let γc be the risk averse coefficient of the customer. The customer’s profit variance is given in
the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.14. (1) Under T&M, var(pic) = 2r
2λ/µ2 + p2λ+ 2rpλ/µ.
(2) Under PBC-P, var(pic) = 2(r − κ)2λ/µ2.
(3) Under PBC-U, var(pic) = 2(r − v)2λ/µ2.
The proof can be found in Appendix L.
Proposition 4.15. (1) If the supplier is risk neutral, under PBC-P, w∗ = r, κ∗ = r; under
PBC-U, v∗ = r. The supplier has equivalent profit under PBC-P and PBC-U while has
lower profit under T&M, where the supplier over-invests in µ.
(2) If the supplier is risk averse, under PBC-P, κ∗ = rγc
γc+γs
. Furthermore, pis(PBC − P ) >
pis(T&M).
The proof can be found in Appendix M.
If the supplier is risk neutral, risk aversion of the customer can be eliminated under PBC.
In particular, the supplier sets κ = r under PBC-P and v = r under T&M. Consequently,
the customer’s profit variance is 0, which does not affect the supplier’s capacity level. Then,
the supplier can have the same profit level as the risk neutrality case. However, the service
fee p under T&M cannot be adjusted in a manner which can eliminate the customer’s profit
variance. As such, the supplier has redundant capacity resulting in a lower profit. On the other
hand, if both the supplier and the customer are risk averse, we have under PBC-P, penalty
rate κ∗ = rγc
γc+γs
, i.e., the customer’s risk aversion affects the penalty rate setting. Analytically,
we can prove that the supplier has a higher profit under PBC-P than T&M. However, analysis
under PBC-U becomes untractable. To sum up, if the customer becomes risk averse, PBC
mostly have a higher efficiency than T&M.
4.6.4 Discounting Effect
In previous sections, we normalize the contract period to 1 and use a constant revenue rate r in
the model. However, in practice, contract period can be as long as decades. In such a case, the
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supplier and the customer should consider discounted cash flow when planning the contract. In
this section, we investigate whether incorporating discounting would change the results.
Assuming the supply chain members consider two periods for discounting cash flows. Let d be
the discounting factor. Then the supplier’s problem9 under T&M and PBC can be written as
max
p,µ
pλ− c(µ− µ)
s.t.
r(1− λ
µ
)
(
1
2
+
1
2d2
)
− pλ ≥ 0,
µ > µ.
and
max
w,κ,µ
w − κλ
µ
− c(µ− µ)
s.t.
r(1− λ
µ
)
(
1
2
+
1
2d2
)
− (w − κλ
µ
) ≥ 0,
µ > µ.
The solution of the optimal capacity under the two contracts is µ∗ =
√
1+d2√
2d
√
rλ√
c
or µ∗ = µ. We
can see that although the discounting factor d will affect the level of the service capacity, but
its impact is in a same manner across contracts. Thus, the insights of contract comparison that
we have derived from the previous sections will not change.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study two commonly used product support contracts - Time & Material
contracts and Performance-based contracts and explore the different incentives created by con-
tracts under several decision-making settings. In our model, the supplier sets prices and invests
in repair service capacity. Under T&M, the customer pays a service fee to the supplier for each
repair. Under PBC, there are two payment frameworks - lump sum + penalty (PBC-P) and
paying for uptime (PBC-U). Under PBC-P, the customer first pays a lump sum to the supplier
9Here we just look at the basic model with discounting.
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to initiate the contract. Then, the supplier pays the customer a penalty based on the total
downtime of the product during the contract period. Under PBC-U, the customer’s payment
is only based on product uptime. We find that under different circumstances, the supplier may
prefer different contracts.
First, we develop a basic model to discuss the setting when both the supplier and the customer
are risk neutral, i.e., decisions are made upon maximizing the expected profits. We find that
under risk neutrality, equivalent maximal profits can be realized across contracts for the supplier.
Under T&M, although the supplier only receives payment for each repair, which does not give
obvious incentive to the supplier to invest in service capacity, the supplier still would like to set
up a higher capacity to have a quicker repair, in that the customer will agree to pay a higher
service fee, which gives the supplier a higher profit. This finding states that PBC may not be
more effective than T&M in incentivizing the supplier to reduce product downtime.
Next, we discuss the setting when the supplier becomes risk averse to the variance of his
revenue caused by the uncertainty in product failures. The results of our model show that if
the penalty rate under PBC-P can be set by the supplier, the optimal value of the penalty
rate is 0, and PBC-P then become fixed fee contracts. Because the variance of the supplier’s
profit is caused by the uncertainty in product downtime, setting a zero penalty eliminates the
impact of product failures. On the other hand, the risk-free lump sum can satisfy the risk
neutral customer’s participation requirement. As such, PBC-P realize the highest profit for the
supplier as the risk neutral case. However, under T&M and PBC-U, the impact of product
failures can not be eliminated. We find that if the failure rate is relatively low, the supplier has
a higher profit under PBC-U than T&M, whereas the customer has more surplus under T&M
than PBC-U. If the product failure rate is high, the result is reversed.
Subsequently, we develop a moral hazard model to endogenize the product failure rate by
incorporating the customer’s preventive maintenance. Before the customer hands over product
support to the supplier, the customer performs preventive maintenance to reduce the product
failure rate. If the supplier’s capacity is exogenous, PBC-P achieve the FB solution with
penalty rate equals 0. On the other hand, the customer over-invests in the effort of failure
reduction under T&M and under-invests in it under PBC-U. With regard to the supplier’s
profit, the supplier has a higher profit under T&M than PBC-U if the failure rate is high,
and has a lower profit under T&M than PBC-U if the failure rate is low. If the supplier’s
capacity becomes endogenous, PBC-P also achieve FB. Under T&M, the customer over-invests
in the effort of failure reduction, and the supplier under-invests in capacity. Under PBC-U,
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the customer under-invests in failure reduction while the supplier over-invests in repair service
capacity. Moreover, the supplier has the lowest profit under T&M.
Finally, we extend the model with more settings. If the supplier and the customer do not have a
leader-follower relationship, but can bargain on the contracting terms, we obtain similar results.
Under risk neutrality, the supplier and the customer have identical profits. Under risk aversion,
PBC-P generate the highest profits, and the supplier prefers PBC-U while the customer prefers
T&M if the product failure rate is low, and the choice is the opposite if the product failure
is high. Then, we discuss the case when penalty rate is forced be to above 0 under PBC-P.
We find that the penalty rate leads to over-investment in service capacity and decreases the
supplier’s profit. If the penalty rate is sufficiently large, the supplier’s profit can be lower than
T&M or PBC-U. At last, we discuss the case when the customer becomes risk averse. If the
supplier is risk neutral, the supplier’s profit under PBC is higher than T&M. If the supplier is
also risk averse, some analysis becomes untractable. However, we can show that in most of the
case, the supplier’s profit under PBC-P is higher than T&M.
The assumptions in our model can be regard as shortcomings. For example, we assume there
is a single product which needs maintenance by the supplier. We believe that out model can
be easily extended to capture the multiple identical products setting. However, if the products
are heterogenous with different failure rates and requires different types of repair capacities,
the results are not straightforward to see, which can be one of the streams for future research.
Another potential direction is to incorporate various contract durations. For short and long
contract terms, the supplier may make different choices on the service contracts. Last but not
least, the impact of information asymmetry can be explored by extending the model.
4.8 Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 4.1. The Lagrangian of Equation (4.1) is
L(p, µ, l1, l2) = pλ− c(µ− µ) + l1(r(1− λ
µ
)− pλ) + l2(µ− µ).
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Next, the K-K-T condition of the problem is
∂L(p, µ, l1, l2)
∂p
= λ(1− l1) = 0,
∂L(p, µ, l1, l2)
∂µ
= −c+ l2 + l1rλ
µ2
= 0,
l1(r(1− λ
µ
)− pλ) = 0,
l2(µ− µ) = 0,
l1 ≥ 0, l2 ≥ 0.
Solving the above system of equations, we have the solutions: 1) p = r−
√
c
√
r
√
λ
λ
, µ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
, l1 =
1, l2 = 0. 2) p = r(
1
λ
− 1
µ
), µ = µ, l1 = 1, l2 = c − rλµ2 . Because the constraint l1 ≥ 0, l2 ≥ 0
have to be satisfied, in solution 2), we have to let l2 = c − rλµ2 > 0, i.e., λ <
cµ2
r
. For both
solutions 1) and 2), we have the IR constraint
r(1− λ
µ∗
)− p∗λ = 0.
So IR is binding.
For Equation (4.2), we have
∂2pis(PBC-P)
∂µ2
= −2kλ
µ3
< 0.
So the supplier’s profit function is concave in µ. The K-K-T condition of Equation (4.2) is
1− l2 = 0,
(−1 + l2)λ
µ
= 0,
l2rλ+ k(λ− l2λ) + (−c+ l1)µ2
µ2
= 0,
l1(µ− µ) = 0,
l2(r(1− λ/µ)− w + kλ/µ) = 0,
l1 ≥ 0, l2 ≥ 0.
Solving this system of equations, we can have the results of PBC-P as in Table 4.2.
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For Equation (4.3), we have
∂2pis(PBC-U)
∂µ2
= −2vλ
µ3
< 0.
So the supplier’s profit function is concave in µ. The K-K-T condition of Equation (4.3) is
(−1 + l2)(λ− µ)
µ
= 0,
− c+ l1 + l2(r − v)λ
µ2
+
vλ
µ2
= 0,
l1(µ− µ) = 0,
l2((r − v)(1− λ/µ) = 0,
l1 ≥ 0, l2 ≥ 0.
Solving this system of equations, we can have the results of PBC-U as in Table 4.2. 
B. Proof of Proposition 4.2. (1) From Table 4.1, we can see that if λ >
cµ2
r
, µ∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
> µ.
In addition, we have
∂µ∗
∂r
=
√
λ
2
√
c
√
r
> 0,
∂µ∗
∂λ
=
√
r
2
√
c
√
λ
> 0,
∂µ∗
∂c
= −
√
r
√
λ
2c3/2
< 0.
if λ >
cµ2
r
, µ∗ = µ.
(2) Because IR is always binding, under T&M, we have
r(1− λ
µ∗
)− p∗λ = 0.
Equivalently,
p∗ = r(
1
λ
− 1
µ∗
).
Then we have
∂p∗
∂µ∗
=
r
µ2
> 0.
Under PBC-P, w∗ and κ∗ are given as combinations, as shown in Table 4.2. Under PBC-U,
v∗ = r, so v∗ is independent of µ∗.
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(3) For all the cases, if λ >
cµ2
r
, pi∗s = r − 2
√
c
√
r
√
λ + cµ. Then, ∂pi∗s/∂λ = −
√
c
√
r√
λ
< 0. If
λ <
cµ2
r
, pi∗s = r(1− λµ). Then we have ∂pi∗s/∂λ = − rµ < 0.
(4) The expected product uptime is 1 − λ
µ∗ . Since µ
∗ is the same under contracts, we can
conclude that the uptime is equivalent under contracts, and so as the supplier’s profit. 
C. Proof of Lemma 4.3. (1) var(pN) = p2 var(N). Because N satisfies a Poisson distri-
bution with parameter λ, we have var(pN) = p2 var(N) = p2λ. (2) var(κ
∑N
i=1 Si|λ, µ) =
κ2 var(
∑N
i=1 Si|λ, µ). Because
∑N
i=1 Si|λ, µ satisfies a Compound Poisson distribution, we have
var(
∑N
i=1 Si|λ, µ) = E(N)E(Si2). Because Si satisfies a exponential distribution with parame-
ter 1/µ, we have E(Si2) = 2/µ2. So var(
∑N
i=1 Si|λ, µ) = 2λµ2 , and var(κ
∑N
i=1 Si|λ, µ) = 2λκ
2
µ2
. (3)
var[v(1−∑Ni=1 Si|λ, µ)] = v2 var(∑Ni=1 Si|λ, µ) = 2v2λµ2 . 
D. Proof of Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5. The Lagrangian of Equation (4.4) can be written
as
L(p, µ, l1, l2) = pλ− c(µ− µ)− γsp2λ+ l1(r(1− λ/µ)− pN) + l2(µ− µ).
1) l1 = 0, l2 > 0. We have
∂L(p, µ, l1, l2)
∂p
= λ− 2pγsλ,
∂L(p, µ, l1, l2)
∂µ
= −c+ l1.
We have p* = 1
2γs
, µ∗ = µ. Since l1 = 0, IR is not binding, so
r(1− λ/µ)− pλ|p*= 1
2γs
, µ∗=µ = r −
λ
2γs
− rλ
µ
> 0
has to hold. Rearrange the above inequality, we have λ <
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
.
2) l1 > 0, l2 > 0. Both constraints are binding, we have p
∗=r( 1
λ
− 1
µ
), µ∗ = µ. Furthermore,
l1 = 1− 2rγs
λ
+
2rγs
µ
, l2 = c−
r(2rγs(λ− µ) + λµ)
µ3
.
Then we have
2rγsµ
2rγs + µ
< λ <
2r2γsµ+ cµ
3
2r2γs + rµ
.
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3) l1 > 0, l2 = 0. IR is binding, i.e, r(1− λ/µ)− pλ = 0. We have p∗ = r( 1λ − 1µ∗ ). We have
∂pis
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
p=r( 1
λ
− 1
µ
)
=
2r2γs(λ− µ) + rλµ− cµ3
µ3
.
So µ∗ solves 2r2γs(λ− µ*) + rλµ* − cµ*3=0.
4) l1 = 0, l2 = 0. We have
∂L(p,µ,l1,l2)
∂p
= λ − 2pγsλ, ∂L(p,µ,l1,l2)∂µ = −c. There are no feasible
solutions. Summarizing the cases of 1)-4), we have the conditions and solutions for T&M as
shown in Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5. Similarly, we can have the solutions for PBC-P and
PBC-U by solving Equations (4.5) and (4.6). 
E. Proof of Proposition 4.6. (1) From Lemma 4.1, we know that under T&M, µ∗RN =
√
r
√
λ√
c
if λ >
cµ2
r
. Otherwise, µ∗RN = µ. From Lemma 4.4, we have if λ >
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, µ∗RA satisfies
2r2γs(λ− µ∗RA) + rλµ∗RA − cµ∗RA3=0. Otherwise, µ∗RA = µ. First,
2r2γsµ+ cµ
3
2r2γs + rµ
− cµ
2
r
=
2γsµ(r − cµ)
2rγs + µ
> 0.
Then if
cµ2
r
< λ <
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, µ∗RA < µ
∗
RN . Next, if λ >
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, µ∗RA is the fixed point of the
equation 2r2γs(λ − µ∗RA) + rλµ∗RA − cµ∗RA3=0. Rearranging the equation, we have 2r2γs(λ −
µ∗RA) + rλµ
∗
RA=cµ
∗
RA
3. So µ∗RA is the intersecting point of function cµ
3 and 2r2γs(λ−µ) + rλµ.
If γs = 0, we have µ
∗
RA =
√
rλ/c = µ∗RN . Thus µ
∗
RN is the intersecting point of cµ
3 and rλµ. If
we compare the slope the two lines, we have
∂(rλµ)/∂µ = rλ,
∂(2r2γs(λ− µ) + rλµ)/∂µ = rλ− 2r2γs.
If we let rλµ = 2r2γs(λ − µ) + rλµ, we have µ = λ. So ∀µ > λ, rλµ > 2r2γs(λ − µ) + rλµ.
Since rλµ and cµ3 insects at µ∗RN =
√
rλ/c, the intersection point of 2r2γs(λ − µ) + rλµ and
cµ3, i.e., µ∗RA < µ
∗
RN , as shown in Figure 4.10.
(2) Under PBC-P, from Lemma 4.4, we know µ∗RA =
√
rλ/c = µ∗RN . (3) Under PBC-U,
similarly, we can prove µ∗RA > µ
∗
RN . 
F. Proof of Proposition 4.7. (1) Under PBC-P, κ∗ = 0, w∗ = r(1 − λ/µ∗). Substituting
to the customer’s profit function, we have pi∗c = 0. Under T&M, from Appendix D, we have
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Figure 4.10: µ∗RA and µ
∗
RN under T&M.
if λ <
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
, IR is not binding. pi*c = r − λ2γs − rλµ > 0. Under PBC-P, if λ >
µ2
4rγs+µ
,
v∗ =
µ2−λµ
4γsλ
, µ∗ = µ. In such a case, pi∗s = (1− λµ)(r −
(µ−λ)µ
4γsλ
) > 0.
(2) Because PBC-P achieves FB, we can conclude that the supplier’s profit is the highest under
PBC-P. Then, we compare PBC-U and T&M. Under T&M, cases separated by conditions are
1) λ <
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
, 2)
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
< λ <
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, 3) λ >
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
. Under PBC-P, cases separated by
conditions are 1) λ >
µ2
µ+4rγs
, 2)
cµ3
4r2γs+rµ
< λ <
µ2
µ+4rγs
, 3) λ <
cµ3
4r2γs+rµ
. Then, for T&M 1) vs.
PBC-U 1), we have pi∗s(T&M) =
λ
4γs
, pi∗s(PBC-P) =
(µ−λ)2
8γsλ
. We have if (
√
2− 1)µ < λ < 2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
,
pi∗s(T&M) > pi
∗
s(PBC-U). If
µ2
4rγs+µ
< λ < (
√
2−1)µ, pi∗s(T&M) < pi∗s(PBC-U). For T&M 1) vs.
PBC-U 3), we have if λ <
cµ3
4r2γs+rµ
, pi∗s(T&M) < pi
∗
s(PBC-U). Because PBC-U 2) > PBC-U-3),
we have for T&M 1) vs. PBC-U 2), pi∗s(T&M) < pi
∗
s(PBC-U). For T&M 2) vs. PBC-U 1), we
have if
2rγsµ
2rγs+µ
< λ <
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, pi∗s(T&M) > pi
∗
s(PBC-U). Because T&M 3) > T&M 2), we
have for T&M 3) vs. PBC-U 1), if λ >
2r2γsµ+cµ3
2r2γs+rµ
, pi∗s(T&M) > pi
∗
s(PBC-U). For T&M 2) vs.
PBC-U 2) and T&M 2) vs. PBC-U 3), conditions are not overlapping. To sum up, we have if
λ > (
√
2− 1)µ, pi∗s(T&M) > pi∗s(PBC-U). If λ < (
√
2− 1)µ, pi∗s(T&M) < pi∗s(PBC-U).
(3) For the customer’s profit, since IR constraint is always binding under PBC-P, the cus-
tomer’s profit under PBC-P is the lowest. For T&M and PBC-U, similarly, we can compare
the customer’s profit case by case and have the results stated in Proposition 4.7. 
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G. Proof of Lemma 4.8. (1) Under all contracts, we have ∂2pic/∂λc
2 = −2K < 0. Thus,
the customer’s profit is concave in λc. Under T&M, solving the customers problem, we have
the customer’s best response is λ∗c= − r+p
∗µ−2Kλ0µ
2Kµ
. Substituting into the supplier’s objective
function, we have pis = pλ0 − p(r+pµ)2Kµ − c(µ − µ). Then, ∂2pis/∂p2 = −1/K < 0, i.e., pis
is concave in p. Similarly, we have under PBP-P, ∂2pis/∂κ
2 = − 1
Kµ2
< 0. Under PBC-U,
∂2pis/∂v
2 = − 1
Kµ2
< 0.
(2) Under T&M, the Lagrangian of the supplier’s problem incorporating the customer’s best
response is
L(p, l1) = pλ0 − cµ− p(r + pµ)
2Kµ
+ l1
(
r2 + p(p− 4Kλ0)µ2 + 2rµ(p+ 2K(µ− λ0))
4Kµ2
)
.
1) If l1 = 0, we solve ∂L(p, l1)/∂p = λ0 − r+2pµ2Kµ = 0. We have p∗ = Kλ0 − r2µ , λ∗c = λ02 − r4Kµ ,
pi∗s =
1
8
(4Kλ0
2+ r
2
Kµ2
− 4rλ0
µ
−8cµ), and pi∗c = r− 3Kλ0
2
4
+ r
2
16Kµ2
− rλ0
4µ
. Since pi∗c > 0, we have λ0 <
2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
. 2) If l1 > 0, i.e., IR is binding. Then we solve
r2+p(p−4Kλ0)µ2+2rµ(p+2K(µ−λ0))
4Kµ2
=
0. We have p∗ = 2Kλ0 − 2
√
K(Kλ0
2 − r) − r
µ
. Subsequently, we have λ∗c =
√
λ20 − rK ,
pi∗s = 2λ0(
√
K(Kλ0
2 − r)−Kλ0) + r(2−
√
K(Kλ0
2−r)
Kµ
)− cµ, and pi∗c = 0. Similarly, we can have
the equilibrium solutions of PBC-P and PBC-U. 
H. Proof of Proposition 4.9. (1) Comparing the results in Lemma 4.8 with the solution of FB
where λ∗sc = λ0 − r2Kµ , we have under PBC-P, λ∗c = λ∗sc. Under T&M, if λ0 <
2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
,
λ∗c =
λ0
2
− r
4Kµ
= λ∗sc/2. If λ0 >
2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
, λ∗c =
√
λ0
2 − r
K
< λ∗sc. Under PBC-U, if
λ0 < µ− r2Kµ , λ∗c = λ0 > λ∗sc. If λ0 > µ− r2Kµ , we have
λ∗c − λ∗sc =
λ0 + µ
2
− r
4Kµ
− (λ0 − r
2Kµ
) =
r + 2Kµ(µ− λ0)
4Kµ
> 0.
(2) Under T&M, solving the supplier’s problem, we have if λ0 <
2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
, IR is not bind-
ing. Similarly, under PBC-U, if λ0 > µ− r2Kµ , IR is not binding, and pi∗c = (r−2K(µ−λ0)µ)(r+6Kµ(µ−λ0))16Kµ2 .
(3) Since PBC-P achieves the FB, the supplier’s profit is higher than T&M and PBC-U. For
T&M and PBC-U, we have under T&M, 1) If λ0 <
2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
, pi∗s(T & M) =
1
8
(4Kλ0
2 +
r2
Kµ2
− 4rλ0
µ
− 8cµ). 2) If λ0 > 2
√
r(r+12Kµ2)−r
6Kµ
, pi∗s = 2λ0(
√
K(Kλ0
2 − r) − Kλ0) + r(2 −√
K(−r+Kλ02)
Kµ
)− cµ. Under PBC-U, 1) if λ0 > µ− r2Kµ ,
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pi∗s =
r2+4Krµ(µ−λ0)+4Kµ2(K(µ−λ0)2−2cµ)
8Kµ2
. 2) If λ0 < µ− r2Kµ , pi∗s = r(1− λµ)− cµ. For T&M 1) vs.
PBC-U 1), if λ0 <
µ
2
+ r
2Kµ
, pi∗s(T&M) < pi
∗
s(PBC-U). If λ0 >
µ
2
+ r
2Kµ
, pi∗s(T&M) > pi
∗
s(PBC-U).
For T&M 1) vs. PBC-U 2), if conditions of T&M 1) and PBC-U 2) are satisfied, pi∗s(T&M) <
pi∗s(PBC-U). For T&M 2) vs. PBC-U 1), if conditions T&M 2) and PBC-U 1) are satisfied,
pi∗s(T&M) > pi
∗
s(PBC-U). For T&M 2) vs. PBC-U 2), if λ0 <
µ
2
+ r
2Kµ
, pi∗s(T&M) < pi
∗
s(PBC-U).
If λ0 >
µ
2
+ r
2Kµ
, pi∗s(T&M) > pi
∗
s(PBC-U). 
I. Proof of Lemma 4.10. Under T&M, the Lagrangian of the supplier’s problem is
L(p, µ, l1) = pλ0 − cµ− p(r + pµ)
2Kµ
+ l1
(
r2 + p(p− 4Kλ0)µ2 + 2rµ(p+ 2K(µ− λ0))
4Kµ2
.
)
1) l1 > 0. IR is binding. We solve
r2+p(p−4Kλ0)µ2+2rµ(p+2K(−λ0+µ))
4Kµ2
= 0. We have p = 2Kλ0 −
2
√
K(Kλ0
2 − r)− r
µ
. Then we solve for µ and l1 by
∂L(p, µ, l1)
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
p=2Kλ0−2
√
K(Kλ0
2−r)− r
µ
= 0,
∂L(p, µ, l1)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=2Kλ0−2
√
K(Kλ0
2−r)− r
µ
= 0.
We have µ* =
√
r(K(Kλ0
2−r))1/4√
cK
, l1 =
1
2
(4 +
√
cKr
(K(Kλ0
2−r))3/4 −
2Kλ0√
K(Kλ0
2−r)
). Let l1 > 0, we have
4 +
√
cKr
(K(Kλ0
2−r))3/4 −
2Kλ0√
K(Kλ0
2−r)
> 0. 2) l1 = 0. We solve
∂L(p, µ, l1)
∂µ
= Kλ0 − r
2µ
= 0,
∂L(p, µ, l1)
∂p
= −c+ pr
2Kµ2
= 0.
We have p∗ = Kλ0 − r2µ∗ , µ∗ solves r2 − 2Krλ0µ∗ + 4cKµ∗3 = 0. Similarly, we can have the
solution of PBC-U and PBC-P. 
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J. Proof of Proposition 4.12. Under T&M, the FOC of the objective function w.r.t. p and
µ is 
λ(r − pλ− rλ
µ
)
−α
(pλ− cµ)−1+α(rα(λ− µ) + µ(pλ+ c(−1 + α)µ))
µ
= 0
(r − pλ− rλ
µ
)
−α
(pλ− cµ)−1+α(crµ(λ− 2αλ+ αµ) + pλ(r(−1 + α)λ− cαµ2))
µ2
= 0
Solving the system equations, we have p∗ =
√
r(
√
rα+
√
c(1−2α)√λ)
λ
, µ∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
, and pi∗s = α(r −
2
√
crλ), pi∗c = (1−α)(r−2
√
crλ). Furthermore, the determinant of the Hessian of the objective
function is
−2r(1− α)
2αλ3(r − pλ− rλ
µ
)
−2α
(pλ− cµ)−2+2α(r(λ− µ) + cµ2)2
µ4(r(µ− λ) + pλµ) < 0.
So (p∗ , µ∗) maximizes the objective function. Similarly, we solve the problem under PBC-P
and PBC-U and have the solutions stated in Proposition 4.12. 
K. Proof of Proposition 4.13. (1) If the supplier’s is risk-neutral, solving the supplier’s
problem under PBC-P, we have w* = r − (r−κ)λ
µ∗ , and µ
∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
or µ∗ = µ, which are the
same as the endogenous κ case.
(2) If the supplier is risk-averse, we have if λ <
cµ3
4κ2γs+rµ
, µ∗ = µ. If λ >
cµ3
4κ2γs+rµ
, µ∗ solves
4κ2γsλ + rλµ
∗ = cµ∗3. If κ = 0, solving 4κ2γsλ + rλµ = cµ3, we have µ∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
which is
the same as the FB and the endogenous κ case. If κ > 0, 4κ2γsλ + rλµ > rλµ. Then, the
intersecting point of 4κ2γsλ + rλµ and cµ
3 is larger than µ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
, as shown in Figure 4.11.
So we can conclude that the supplier’s capacity is higher than FB if κ > 0. 
L. Proof of Lemma 4.14. (1) Under T&M,
var(pic) = var(r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si)− pN) = var(r
∑N
i=1
Si + pN)
= r2 var(
∑N
i=1
Si) + p
2 var(N) + 2rp cov(
∑N
i=1
Si, N)
= r22λ/µ2 + p2λ+ 2rp
(
E(N
∑N
i=1
Si)− λ2/µ
)
= r22λ/µ2 + p2λ+ 2rp
(
E(N2)E(Si)− λ2/µ
)
= r22λ/µ2 + p2λ+ 2rp
(
(λ+ λ2)/µ− λ2/µ)
= 2r2λ/µ2 + p2λ+ 2rpλ/µ
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Figure 4.11: µ∗FB and µ
∗
PBC−P , exogenous κ.
(2) Under PBC-P,
var(pic) = var(r(1−
∑N
i=1
Si)− w + κ
∑N
i=1
Si) = var((κ− r)
∑N
i=1
Si)
= 2(κ− r)2λ/µ2
(3) Under PBC-U, var(pic) = var((r − v)(1−
∑N
i=1 Si)) = 2(κ− v)2λ/µ2 
M. Proof of Proposition 4.15. (1) Under T&M, solving the supplier’s problem, we have
if λ ≤ cµ2
r
, p∗ =
−2rγcλµ−λµ2+
√
λµ2(−4r2γc2λ+4rγcµ2+λµ2)
2γcλµ2
, µ∗ = µ. If λ >
cµ2
r
, we have p∗ =
−2rγcλµ∗−λµ∗2+
√
λµ∗2(−4r2γc2λ+4rγcµ∗2+λµ∗2)
2γcλµ∗2 , µ
∗ solves 2r
2γcλ2µ∗√
(4rγc+λ)µ∗2λ−4r2γc2λ2
+ rλµ∗ = cµ∗3. If
γc = 0, solving the equation, we have µ
∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
, which is the FB solution. If γc > 0, the
intersecting point of 2r
2γcλ2µ√
(4rγc+λ)µ2λ−4r2γc2λ2
+ rλµ and cµ3 is larger than that with rλµ, i.e.,
µ∗(T&M) > µ∗(FB).
Under PBC-P and PBC-U, solving the supplier’s problem, we have if λ >
cµ2
r
, µ∗ =
√
r
√
λ√
c
,
w∗ = r, κ∗ = r, v∗ = r. If λ ≤ cµ2
r
, µ∗ = µ, w∗ = r, κ∗ = r, v∗ = r. Then, we can see that the
supplier’s capacity achieves the FB under PBC-P and PBC-U. Compared to T&M, where the
supplier over-invests in capacity, the supplier’s profit under PBC is higher than T&M.
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(2) If the supplier becomes risk-averse, under T&M, we have if λ <
4rγs2µ2
8r2γcγs2+4rγs(γc+γs)µ+(γc+2γs)µ2
,
p∗ = 1
2γs
, µ∗ = µ, and pi∗s =
λ
4γs
. For other cases, we do not have closed-form solutions. If we
look at the supplier’s profit function, we have ∂2pis/∂p
2 = −2γsλ, ∂pis/∂µ = −c. So pis is
decreasing in µ and concave in p. Thus, solving the FOC w.r.t. p, we have p∗ = 1
2γs
, and
µ∗ = µ maximize pis among all cases. In other words, without considering the conditions,
pi∗s |p∗= 1
2γs
, µ∗=µ =
λ
4γs
is the highest profit for the supplier.
Under PBC-P, we have the closed-form solution if λ <
(γc+γs)cµ3
r(4rγcγs+(γc+γs)µ)
, κ∗ = rγc
γc+γs
, µ∗ = µ, and
pi∗s = r(1− λµ − 2rγcγsλ(γc+γs)µ2 ). Because the supplier does not invests in capacity, pi∗s is lower than the
other case when µ∗ > µ. If we compare the highest pi∗s(T&M) and the lowest pi
∗
s(PBC − P ),
we have if the conditions for the two cases hold, pi∗s(PBC − P ) > pi∗s(T&M). Then, we can
conclude for other cases, the supplier’s profit under PBC-P is higher than T&M as well. 
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Research
Various types of contracts for after-sales service and product support are employed by compa-
nies. Traditionally, Warranty and Time & Material contracts (T&M) are commonly used for
after-sales service. More recently, Performance-based service contracts have become increas-
ingly popular in industry. Different contracts not only offers multiple choices for the customer,
but also require different business models for the manufacturer and service providers. There-
fore, companies need to learn more about the impact of different contracts on their operations
management framework and make wise decisions accordingly. In this thesis, we develop theo-
retical frameworks of how to model and analyze service contracts and come up with optimal
solutions for several important issues in after-sales and product support management.
5.1 Conclusion
In Chapter 2, we study joint contracting for products and the after-sales service between a
customer and a supplier while the supplier simultaneously has to plan the spare part inventory,
as the part may expire. The customer makes decisions on how many products to buy to satisfy
the external demand. At the same time, the customer must take the after-sales service into
account since only working products can generate revenue. On the supplier’s side, when selling
the products, spare parts need to be well planned to service the product after the sale, because
those parts may expire and become difficult to reacquire once stockouts occur. We establish
game-theoretic models for the cases of Warranty + Transaction-based contracts (W+T) and
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Performance-based contracts (PBC) and make comparisons. We discuss different penalty terms
under PBC - penalty based on number of spare parts stockouts and penalty based on the
customer’s lost revenue. We also discuss the cases when the quantity of Lifetime-buy spare
parts are exogenous and endogenous. The main findings of Chapter 2 are as follows.
• Under PBC, if a penalty is incurred on spare parts stockouts, the penalty rate can be
set in combination with the product price; if a penalty is incurred on the customer’s lost
revenue, the optimal PBC become fixed fee contracts, i.e., penalty rate should be 0. If
penalty is exogenously given, the penalty rate on the customer’s lost revenue increases
spare parts inventory and product availability, but reduces supply chain members’ profits.
• Under W+T, increasing duration of warranty can lead to higher product availability, but
may result in different impact on profits. If the cost of reacquisition of spare parts is low,
a longer warranty will generate more profits even if spare parts stockouts occur during
warranty. As the reacquisition cost increases, profits (of the supplier, the customer, and
the supply chain) can be reduced.
• Comparing W+T with PBC, we find that if spare parts are sufficient and no stockouts
occur during warranty, PBC and W+T can result in equal profits. However, if spare
parts stockouts occur during warranty, the cost of reacquisition plays a role. The supplier
should choose W+T if the reacquisition cost is low and choose PBC if the reacquisition
cost is high.
In Chapter 3, we study the supply chain coordination problems under the outcome-based con-
tracts, when the OEM is responsible for the availability of the final product, while the supplier’s
effort also impacts the final product’s performance. The OEM can not directly control the sup-
plier’s quality improvement activity, but only use contracts to induce the supplier to exert effort
on reducing the failure rate of his part. We discuss three types of contracts - price-only con-
tracts, repair cost sharing contracts, and penalty sharing contracts between the OEM and the
supplier, and propose a penalty sharing contract as a channel coordination mechanism. First,
we discuss the setting where the OEM has the capacity to repair both of the parts, and the
repair capacity level can be exogenous or endogenous. Then, we study the individual capacity
setting, where the supplier and the OEM take care of the service of their own parts. Next, we
explore the setting when the final product is nonseparable, i.e., once the product is assembled,
it is not possible to identify the root cause of product failure. Finally, we discuss the impact
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of information asymmetry on the choice of contracts. The main findings are summarized as
follows.
• If the repair capacity is exogenous, price-only contracts cannot induce the supplier to exert
any quality improvement effort; repair cost sharing contracts cause under-investment in
the supplier’s effort. If repair capacity is endogenous, price-only contracts and repair cost
sharing contracts lead to over-investment in service capacity. For both settings, penalty
sharing contracts achieve the First Best solution for the supply chain.
• If the repair capacity becomes decentralized, paying a service fee for each repair can
not incentive the supplier to improve part quality. However, sharing product downtime
penalty can induce the supplier to exert the failure rate reduction effort to the optimal
level.
• If the final product is nonseparable, the supplier and the OEM share the repair cost or
penalty with a predefined proportion. In such a case, repair cost sharing contracts still
result in under-investment in the supplier’s effort level, and penalty sharing contracts can
coordinate the supply chain.
Furthermore, we also discuss the case when the quality of the supplier’s part is unknown infor-
mation for the OEM. We show that although the efficiency loss due to information asymmetry
cannot be solved completely, the OEM has the highest profit under penalty sharing contracts
compared the other two.
In Chapter 4, we systematically compare Time & Material contracts with two types of Performance-
based contracts - PBC with downtime penalty (PBC-P) and PBC with uptime payment (PBC-
U), and investigate how decision-makers’ risk appetite and the customer’ effort of failure pre-
vention affect the choice of contracts. First, we study the contracting problem when both the
supplier and the customer are risk neutral. Then, we introduce risk aversion to the supplier.
Next, we discuss the case when the customer performs preventive maintenance on the product
to reduce it’s failure rate. Finally, we extend the model by adding cases when the customer
and the supplier bargain on contract prices, and when the customer becomes risk averse. The
main findings are as follows.
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• If both the customer and the supplier are risk neutral, equivalent product availability
and profits can be achieved under PBC and T&M, which infers that product availability
under T&M may not be lower than PBC.
• If the supplier becomes risk averse, the optimal contract is a fixed fee contract, i.e., PBC-
P with 0 penalty rate. For PBC-U and T&M, the preference of the supplier and the
customer are opposite. If product failure rate is high, the supplier has a higher profit
under T&M, whereas the customer has a surplus under PBC. If product failure rate is
high, the result is reversed.
• If the customer does preventive maintenance before the supplier taking over the product
support, PBC-P still dominate other contacts (with 0 penalty rate). T&M cause over-
investment and PBC-U cause under-investment for the customer’s failure reduction effort.
Moreover, the supplier has the lowest profit under T&M.
• If the penalty rate under PBC-P is exogenous, the supplier’s profit decreases in the penalty
rate. On the other hand, if the customer becomes risk averse, PBC is more preferable to
the supplier.
5.2 Future Research
Sevitization and business model innovation in manufacturing and service operations create
many research opportunities in OM. In this thesis, we study several service contracting issues
concerning spare parts and capacity management, service pricing, and supply chain coordina-
tion. However, there is ample room for future research. Next, we give a brief discussion on
some potential directions.
Performance-based contracting in networks. The models in this thesis mainly consider
single customer / single supplier supply chains. However, as we have observed in practice, a
manufacturer usually faces multiple customers with heterogenous products and demand. For
example, under a short-term contract period, the customer would go for Transaction-based
contracts, while under a long-term contract period, the customers may choose Performance-
based contracts. Because different contracts may generate conflicting incentives, it becomes
much more challenging for the manufacturer to make the best of common service capacity
and resources to serve various customers under different contacts. In Economics literature,
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papers like (Pavan and Calzolari, 2009; Attar et al., 2010), discuss multiple principals/agents
moral hazard problems, which can be used to study Performance-based contracting in this
circumstance.
Repeated interaction in service contracting. In this thesis, we only consider single-
period contracting, where the customer and the supplier make one-shot decisions. However,
in practice, the relationship between supply chain members can be long term and cover multi-
periods. Repeated interaction and renegotiation are not rare to be seen. For example, in
(Swinney and Netessine, 2009) , a two-period game model is built to study long-term contracts.
As a matter of fact, the dynamics in the supply chain members’ situation may vary in different
periods, which may induce them to make different decisions. Applying theory and models of
repeated games can be another direction for future research.
Performance-based contracting and Sustainability. In modern business, Sustainabil-
ity is an important part of operations management. For both commercial and public sectors,
people are expecting organizations to implement sustainable policies in the long run. As such,
performance-based contracting applying Sustainability metrics is becoming increasingly popu-
lar. For example, the Department of Transportation of the USA is conducting PBC to achieve
energy saving1. Moreover, as stated in (Drake and Spinler, 2013), Sustainability will be a con-
tinuous topic in both practice and theoretic research. Hence, performance-based contracting
and Sustainability will be a promising field for future research.
1http://www.dot.gov/mission/sustainability/performance-based-contracts
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Summary
Nowadays, service business contributes more than 70% of GDP in most developed countries.
Even in traditional manufacturing sectors, the value of service has been explored dramatically
by companies when they sell their products. Over the past decades, business model innovation
in product and its service has been growing rapidly, especially for durable goods. Companies
shift their strategies from selling physical products to delivering solutions and performance for
customers. Within this context, the outcome-based service contracts, such as Performance-
based Logistics and Power-by-the-Hour, have been developed in both public and commercial
industry. At the same time, traditional service contracts such as Warranty and Time & Material
contracts are still being used in many occasions. Under various business models, managing the
after-sales service and product support becomes increasingly challenging.
In this thesis, we study several nontrivial service contracting problems concerning optimal
design of contract terms, spare parts inventory and service capacity management, and service
outsourcing control. We provide managerial insights for selecting the best service contract,
choosing the right performance measurement, setting the optimal service resources (spare parts
and repair capacity), and incentivizing the supplier to improve the profits of the supply chain.
In Chapter 2, we study joint contracting for products and the after-sales service under two
types of contracts: Warranty + Transaction-based contracts (W+T) and Performance-based
contracts (PBC) with different penalty terms. We also consider part obsolescence problem
in the setting, where the spare parts inventory determines product availability. We formulate
Stackelberg leader-follower models to capture the setting where the customer makes decision on
product order quantity while taking the after-sales service into account; and the supplier sets
the contract terms when the lifetime buy inventory affects product availability. The equilibrium
solutions show that under PBC, penalty based on the customer’s lost revenue leads to a lower
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profit, and a longer warranty contract is better than PBC when the cost of part reacquisition
is low.
In Chapter 3, we study service outsourcing management under an outcome-based contract
for product support. In such a setting, the final product is formulated by parts which are
manufactured by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and the supplier. As a result,
the quality of the final product is affected by the effort of the supplier and the OEM. Meanwhile,
the OEM is responsible for the product support but cannot directly control the supplier’s quality
management activity. We formulate Principle-Agent models to fit the moral hazard setting and
capture the supply chain members’s decision under price-only contracts, repair cost sharing
contracts, and penalty sharing contracts. We show that penalty sharing contracts lead to the
first-best solutions which coordinate the supply chain, while price-only contracts and repair
cost sharing contracts result in efficiency loss due to over-investment in service capacity and
under-investment in part failure rate reduction. The results hold even when repair capacity is
decentralized or the final product is nonseparable.
In Chapter 4, we study comparisons between Performance-based contracts (PBC) and Time
& Material contracts (T&M) under various settings where the supplier makes decisions on
designing contract terms and setting service capacity level. Under PBC, we discuss two types
of payment framework - downtime penalty (PBC-P) and uptime payment (PBC-U). Under
the former, the customer pays the supplier a lump sum and the supplier pays penalty to the
customer based on product downtime; under the latter, the customer pays the supplier based
on product uptime. We show that if the supply chain members are risk neutral, equivalent
profits can be realized across contracts for the supplier. If the supplier becomes risk averse to
the profit variance caused by uncertainty of product failures, PBC-P is the best contract for
the supplier while T&M is better than PBC-U if the product failure rate is high. PBC-P also
dominate when the customer exerts effort on reducing the product failure rate, yet T&M lead
to the lowest profit in this occasion.
Finally, we give conclusions of the thesis and discuss potential directions for future research in
Chapter 5. In sum, the research in this thesis contributes to the theoretical study in Contracting
and Operations Management, and the findings provide useful insights for management of the
after-sales service and product support in real business environment.
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Tegenwoordig omvat de dienstensector in de meeste ontwikkelde landen meer dan 70% van het
BBP. De waarde van diensten bij de verkoop van producten is uitvoerig bekeken en onderzocht
in veel industriesectoren. Gedurende de afgelopen decennia is het aantal innovaties in business
modellen zowel voor producten als diensten sterk toegenomen, in het bijzonder voor duurzame
goederen. Bedrijven verschuiven hun strategie van het verkopen van tastbare producten naar
het leveren van oplossingen en prestaties aan de klant. Binnen deze context zijn uitkomst-
gebaseerde dienstencontracten, zoals prestatie-gebaseerde logistiek en “Power-by-the-Hour”,
ontwikkeld in zowel de publieke als de commercie¨le sector. Tegelijkertijd worden traditionele
dienstencontracten zoals garantie- en tijd- & materiaalcontracten nog steeds gebruikt in veel
situaties. Bij een aantal business modellen wordt het beheren van de after-sales dienst- en
productondersteuning een steeds grotere uitdaging.
In dit proefschrift bestuderen we ontwerp en vergelijking van service-contracten, met betrekking
tot de optimale opzet van de contractvoorwaarden, het management van de reserve-onderdelenvoorraad
en service capaciteit, en het beheersen van de service bij uitbesteding. We bieden manage-
ment inzichten voor het selecteren van het beste service contract, het kiezen van de juiste
prestatiemaatstaf, het bepalen van de optimale service resources (reserve onderdelen en reparatieca-
paciteit), en het structureren van contractvoorwaarden voor de leverancier.
In hoofdstuk 2 bestuderen we de gezamelijke contractering voor producten en de after-sales
diensten voor twee soorten contracten: Garantie + Transactie-gebaseerde contracten (War-
ranty + Transaction, W+T) en Prestatie-gebaseerde contracten (PBC) met verschillende boete-
voorwaarden. We beschouwen ook het onderdeelverouderingsprobleem in een situatie, waar de
reserve-onderdelenvoorraad de productbeschikbaarheid bepaalt. We formuleren Stackelberg
leider-volger modellen om de situaties te beschrijven, waar de klant beslist over product order
hoeveelheid, waarbij hij de after sales diensten in zijn beslissing meeneemt en de leverancier de
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contractvoorwaarden stelt in het geval dat de lifetime buy voorraad de productbeschikbaarheid
be¨ınvloedt. De evenwichtsoplossingen tonen aan dat bij PBC, een penalty gebaseerd op de
verloren omzet van de klant leidt tot een lagere winst, en een contract met langere garantie
beter is dan PBC als de kosten van het opnieuw verwerven van onderdelen laag is.
In hoofdstuk 3 bestuderen we service outsourcing management voor een uitkomst-gebaseerd con-
tract voor productondersteuning. We veronderstellen dat uiteindelijke product samengesteld
wordt uit onderdelen die geproduceerd zijn door de “Original Equipment Manufacturer” (OEM)
en de leverancier. Het gevolg is dat de kwaliteit van het uiteindelijke product be¨ınvloedt wordt
door de inzet van de leverancier en de OEM. De OEM is verantwoordelijk voor de producton-
dersteuning, maar heeft geen directe controle over de kwaliteitsmanagement-activiteiten van de
leverancier. We formuleren Principal-Agent modellen die passen bij deze moral hazard situatie
en beschrijven daarmee de beslissingen van de supply chain leden voor price-only contracten,
repair cost sharing contracten en penalty sharing contracten. We laten zien dat penalty shar-
ing contracten leiden tot de beste oplossingen waarmee de supply chain volledig gecoordineerd
kan worden, terwijl price-only contracten en repair cost sharing contracten resulteren in ef-
ficie¨ntieverlies vanwege een teveel aan investeringen in service capaciteit en vanwege te lage
investeringen in verbetering van het faalgedrag van onderdelen. De resultaten gelden ook als
de reparatiecapaciteit gedecentraliseerd is.
In hoofdstuk 4 vergelijken we Prestatie-gebaseerde (PBC) en Tijd & Materiaalcontracten (T&M)
voor situaties waarin de leverancier beslist over de opzet van contractvoorwaarden en het zetten
van de hoogte van de service capaciteit. Voor PBC bediscussieren we twee soorten betaal-
frameworks - downtime penalty (PBC-P) en uptime payment (PBC-U). Bij PBC-P betaalt de
klant de leverancier een hoofdsom en de leverancier betaalt een penalty aan de klant gebaseerd
op de product downtime; voor PBC-U betaalt de klant de leverancier gebaseerd op de prod-
uct uptime. We tonen aan dat als de supply chain leden risico-neutraal zijn, de leverancier
dezelfde winsten kan verkrijgen voor alle soorten contracten. Als de leverancier risico-avers is
met betrekking tot de winstvariantie veroorzaakt door de onzekerheid van productfalen, dan is
PBC-P het beste contract voor de leverancier, terwijl T&M beter is dan PBC-U als de mate van
productfalen hoog is. PBC-P domineert ook als de klant tracht de faalkans van de producten
te verlagen, maar T&M leidt tot de laagste winst in dit geval.
Tenslotte trekken we conclusies voor dit proefschift en bediscussieren we mogelijke richtingen
voor toekomstig onderzoek in hoofdstuk 5. Kort samengevat draagt dit proefschrift bij aan
de theoretische kennis in Contracting and Operations Management, en de bevindingen bieden
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nuttige inzichten voor management van after-sales diensten- en productondersteuning in echte
bedrijfsomgevingen.
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